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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RANDY G. MOON
Petitioner and CrossRespondent,

CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD,
and the UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES.

BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER
AND RESPONDENT DEPARTMENT
OF NATURAL RESOURCES

CaseNo.980134-CA
Priority 14

Cross-Petitioner and
Respondents.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a final order of the Career Service Review Board of the State of
Utah. Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon this court under Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-14(1997).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
A formal evidentiary hearing was held under the Administrative Procedures Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-l et seq. (1997) and the State Grievance and Appeal Procedures, Utah
Code Ann. § 67-19a-l et seq. (1996). Following the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner Randy
G. Moon (Moon) appealed the decision to the Career Service Review Board (Board). The
Board upheld the termination of Petitioner on the ground of a poaching incident, but rejected
the Department of Natural Resources' (Department) claim that Moon had abused his

position. Moon appeals the ultimate decision upholding his termination and the Department
cross-appeals the Board's ruling that Moon did not abuse his position.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Has Moon properly challenged the Board's findings that he was an active,

knowing participant in the poaching incident which justified his termination?
Standard of review: For Moon to successfully argue that his version of the facts are
controlling, he must marshal the evidence in favor of the Board's findings and establish that
after all reasonable inferences supporting the findings are viewed, they are not supported by
substantial evidence. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah
1993); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311.315 (Utah App. 1991).
2.

Does one prior case decided by the Board under different Board rules and

before this Court decided the Board's role in reviewing agency decisions bind the Board?
Standard of review: The Board's determination that a prior case is not binding in
Moon's case is a legal issue which is reviewed for correctness. Savage Industries. Inc., v.
State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d
581 (Utah 1991).
3.

Did the Board correctly affirm as reasonable and rational the Department's

termination of Moon for the poaching incident alone?
Standard of review: The Board, in applying the facts as established in the evidentiary
hearing must determine whether the decision of the Department is reasonable and rational.
2

Kent v. Department of Employment Security, 860 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1993); Taylor v.
Department of Commerce. 952 P.2d 1090 (Utah App. 1998).
ISSUE ON CROSS-APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
4.

Did the Board incorrectly rule that Moon did not "abuse his position" when he

got other employees to issue a permit change without following specific procedures required
by rule?
Standard of review: The determination of whether the Board correctly ruled is an
issue of law, reviewed for correctness. See: Savage, supra. Morton, supra.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are applicable in this matter. The text of the
provisions either appears in the argument or in Addendum to this Brief.
STATUTES: Utah Code Ann. § 23-14-1(2) (1995); Utah Code Ann. §67-16-4(3)
(1996); Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18(5)(e) (1996).
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES: Utah Admin. Code R137-1 -20(1) (1994); Utah Admin.
CodeR137-l-21(D)(3)(1997); Utah Admin. CodeR137-l-22(4)(1997); UtahAdmin. Code
R477-1 l-l(3)(e) (1996); Utah Admin. Code R657-37-4(8)(a) and (b) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Moon had been deputy director of the Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR) and at
the time of his termination was serving in the director's office as DWR's Programs and Field
Operations Administrator. Moon was terminated from employment because he actively
3

participated in a poaching incident with his son in Wyoming and abused his position in
getting other employees to violate published division rules in obtaining a permit transfer
from one Posted Hunting Unit (PHU) to another PHU.
Moon appealed the director's decision to the Board, which assigned a hearing officer
to hear the appeal. The hearing officer, after a four-day evidentiary hearing, issued a
decision sustaining Moon's termination on both grounds set forth by the Department.
Petitioner appealed the hearing officer's decision to the Board which, after reviewing
the briefs, transcripts, and evidence and hearing oral argument overturned the hearing
officer's conclusion that Moon had abused his position, but sustained the termination on the
poaching incident alone. From that decision, included Addendum B, Moon appeals and the
Department cross-appeals to this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
ANTELOPE POACHING INCIDENT
Moon and his sons were hunting in the Crawford Mountain area as described in the
Utah Hunting Proclamation for 1996 at page 51 (Exhibit G-5, R. 208). Moon and his sons
Nathan and Ryan each saw an entering Wyoming sign when they drove east of Randolf on
Highway US 30 (R.864, R. 976, R. 1028). The Utah-Wyoming state marker is on the fence
line west of a power station where a painted stripe is on the roadway (A-19, R. 203; R. 1172).
The north-south fence from the marker was the marked border (R. 441). During the summer
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of 1996, Wyoming state employees had marked the roads with markers consisting of steel
posts, boards and signs where Moon and his sons hunted (R. 438-9).
Where Wyoming's Lincoln County Road 220 crosses into Utah from Wyoming at the
south, Utah/Wyoming markers were present and visible (R.292-3, R. 324, R. 492, R. 564).
Between the border markers to the north and south, however, there were no additional
markers on the fence line (R. 494, R. 564). Lincoln County Road 220 connects with US
Highway 30 about .2 to .25 miles to the east of the Utah/Wyoming border (R. 293, R. 435,
R. 490, R. 872). The road angled back into Utah (R. 293) about 1 mile from US 30 (R. 492).
Moon and his son Nathan acknowledged that when they turned south off US 30 onto
Lincoln County Road 220, they were in Wyoming (R. 937, R. 994). They drove south on
Lincoln County Road 220 approximately 700 yards or four-tenths of a mile where Nathan
got out of the car with his rifle (R. 875). While there, Moon and his sons saw a white
Suburban on the west side of the fence herding antelope (R.449, A-2, point N, R. 159, R.
473, R. 533-4, R. 873-5, R. 995). From where the Moons were on Lincoln County Road 220
they were several hundred yards from the fence - border (R. 316; G-56 pictures, R. 227).
Moon and his sons saw several antelope jump the fence heading easterly between the
fence and the front of their vehicle (R. 469, R. 874, R. 995, R. 1019). As the antelope ran
toward Lincoln County Road 220, they crossed between the Moon vehicle and a power
substation east of the border. Moon told his son Nathan "Don't shoot at the power station.'1
(R. 450, R. 534,R. 875, R. 952, R. 977). The antelope crossed Lincoln County Road 220
5

some distance in front of the Moon vehicle and headed easterly over a hill (Point E, Exhibit
A-2, R. 159, R. 469) at which time Nathan shot one round (R. 449-50, R. 534, R. 875, R.
977, R. 1020) and missed (R. 457, R.534, R.1001, R. 1020).
Moon drove his vehicle up a spur road after the antelope which headed further
northeasterly (R. 450, R. 876, R. 978, R. 1021). Nathan told Wyoming Officer Neil Hymas
that the antelope were running away fast "further into Wyoming" (R. 471). As they were
returning to Lincoln County Road 220, they encountered the white Suburban they had seen
earlier. Moon had a conversation with the driver of the Suburban. Nathan testified that the
driver of the Suburban advised them that he thought the fence line south of the substation
was the state line (R. 472, R. 995-6).
Glen and Jane Chen were also parked along the spur road observing another hunter
shooting at an antelope in a bowl area east of Lincoln County Road 220 (R. 282, R. 313).
As Moon and his sons met the Chen vehicle, Mr. Chen asked Moon "Aren't we in Wyoming
here?" (R. 282, R. 314, R. 880, R. 1023). Moon responded : "Yes, the Utah border is back
behind us at the fence line" (R. 282, R. 282, R. 315). Nathan confirmed that that is what his
father told the Chens (R. 472). Moon added that he believed they were in Wyoming (R. 452,
R. 1160) and said: "According to the guy in the white truck we are" (R. 880). Later, Moon
told Officers Hymas and Woody that he believed Lincoln County Road 220 was the state line
(R. 486, R. 887, R. 1160).
Moon drove his vehicle down Lincoln County Road 220 where they saw a group of
6

antelope in a bowl east of the road approximately 350-400 yards (R. 436, R. 479). Moon
asked his son what he wanted to do (R. 882) and let Nathan and his brother out to hunt the
antelope (R. 1024). Nathan and Ryan climbed over a southern hill east of Lincoln County
Road 220 stalking the antelope (R. 453), shooting four shots from varying distances (R. 289,
R. 453, R. 459, R. 884). One antelope did not run and Nathan ultimately shot the antelope
at point blank range (R. 289, R. 981).
Moon stood outside his vehicle and watched the shooting (R. 292, R. 322, R. 337, R.
453, R. 884). He tried to get his sons' attention (R. 292) by whistling or calling to them (R.
292) and waiving his arms (R. 292, R. 323). The boys had left the carcass and were walking
back until Moon got their attention. Thereafter, the boys walked back to the antelope and
began dragging it toward the Moon vehicle (R. 292-3). Moon walked up the draw to see if
he could determine whether the animal had been previously hit (R. 456, R. 503, R. 504, R.
1024). Nathan and Ryan dragged the antelope to Moon to be by him and be in a "safety
zone" with their father (R. 537).
Moon told his son to f,Go ahead and clean it,f (R. 1025) and while Nathan did most
of the field dressing (R. 963), Nathan said "My dad got me started gutting the antelope" (R.
503) and assisted in field dressing the animal (R. 477), all of which took place on the east
side of Lincoln County Road 220 (R. 478).
Moon made no attempt to stop Nathan (R. 485) or keep Nathan from shooting at the
antelope (R. 449-50, R. 952) except telling Nathan not to shoot in the direction of the power
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station (R. 450, R. 534, R. 952, R. 977, R. 1019). Moon sought direction from his son on
numerous occasions as to what Nathan wanted to do (R. 873, R. 882, R. 883, R. 977-8, R.
981), then watched his sons stalk and shoot the antelope (R. 453, R. 952).
After field dressing the animal, Moon helped load the animal on his vehicle (R. 458,
R. 477, R. 486), tagged it with a Utah tag (R. 458-9, R. 1164), and transported it to his home
in Bountiful, Utah (R. 486, R. 1164). The Moons made no attempt to determine whether
they were in Utah (R. 937, R. 994, R. 1030, R. 1033). They consulted no maps (R. 1001) and
did not drive down Lincoln County Road 220 any further to determine where they were (R.
946) even though Moon knew boundaries were important (R. 943) and was concerned
because of what the other drivers said (R. 953).
Moon also knew where DWR Officer Gregory lived in Randolf (R. 510, R. 745) yet
didn't try to contact him (R. 943), didn't contact anyone outside of his hunting group (R.
943), and didn't report the kill (R. 445). Moon did not contact anyone between the time of
the incident and when he was interviewed by Officer Hymas (R. 889-90).
Moon took Officers Hymas and Gregory to his home where the antelope was hanging
in his yard (R. 458, R. 539) with a Utah tag (R. 467, R. 539). The animal was seized as
evidence (R. 467). Moon stated that it was his intent to process the animal prior to it being
seized by Officer Hymas (R. 1173).
ABUSE OF POSITION IN OBTAINING PHU TRANSFER
A Posted Hunting Unit (PHU) is a private land block where an individual owner can
8

allow hunting to augment income (R. 353). Though wildlife belongs to the State of Utah (R.
582) private landowners may request permission to permit the sale of hunting permits for
their property (R. 411, R. 647).
Applications for such permission (CORs), are submitted to DWR after which
professional biologists review the request with the landowner, operator or others to determine
what the harvest of particular animals will be for a particular area (R. 646). The State
Wildlife Board gives final approval and sets the number of animals that may be harvested
in a certain area (R. 647-8). Approved CORs contain the number of private hunters as well
as public hunters that may hunt on a particular PHU during any season (A-12, R. 184-8; A13, R. 189-94). The handling of CORs was under Petitioner Moon's section at DWR (R.
948).
DWR enacted rules regarding PHUs, found in R657 (A-4, R. 162-67). The rules
contain procedures to allow transfers from one PHU to another PHU. These included the
requirement that all operators or owners submit requests in writing for DWR approval (R.
616; A-4, R. 162-67).
Moon had been a DWR deputy director under Tim Provan and Bob Valentine, former
directors of the division (R. 343). His responsibilities included the day-to-day operations of
the division (R. 343). In the summer and fall of 1996, he held the position of Programs and
Field Operations Administrator (R. 383) with responsibilities over all fiscal, information and
education areas of DWR (R. 342). He reported to the director, who was his supervisor (R.
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730, R. 947). He was part of DWR's upper management team associated with the director's
office (R. 729) and, along with other assistants, participated in making key decisions for the
division (R. 728).
In the summer of 1996, Ryan Moon, Moon's son, drew a bull mouse permit as a
public hunter on the East Fork Chalk Creek PHU (R.1008; A-17, R.201). The East Fork
Chalk Creek PHU operator was Cal Haskell (A-12, R. 184) and the South Fork Chalk Creek
PHU operator was Terry Thatcher (A-13, R. 189). During the hunting season, Haskell and
Thatcher did not see many moose in the East Fork Chalk Creek PHU area (R. 769, R. 841).
Haskell told Moon that he was going to investigate whether he could transfer permits
to the South Fork Chalk Creek PHU (R. 842). Moon likewise investigated whether a transfer
was possible by going to Wes Shields, DWR Wildlife Inspection Chief (R. 580). Shields
informed Moon that transfers were permitted by rule and told Moon where he could find the
procedure (R. 600). Shields pointed out the sections of the rule as they talked (R. 597, R.
620, R. 949). Moon was told that both operators had to agree and the request for transfer had
to be signed off by the region (R. 846). Shields did not tell Moon that Moon could make the
request (R. 600) and never told him that the Unit operators didn't have to make the request
(R. 600). He said it could be done legally pursuant to the rule (R. 618).
Haskell called Lou Cornicelli, the Regional Wildlife Manager for the Northern Region
(R. 670) about transferring 3 private hunters from one PHU to another (R. 677). Cornicelli
had never done a transfer before so he looked at the PHU Rule (A-4, R. 162-67) and called
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the Salt Lake Office and talked with Mike Welch who was over the program (R. 678).
Welch told Cornicelli that it could be done and that the call of whether it could be done was
up to the region (R. 678). After consulting with the region biologist, Steve Kearl, Cornicelli
felt the request to transfer three was appropriate (R. 677). Cornicelli called Haskell and
informed him that the transfer could be done (R. 679) and told him that Haskell needed to
draft a letter that the two operators needed to sign (R. 679). Cornicelli told Haskell what to
write (R. 681).
Haskell and Thatcher submitted a written request to transfer three private hunters on
October 2, 1996 via fax machine from Haskell's business United Sportsman, to Lou
Cornicelli (R. 754, R. 755, A-14, R. 195). Cornicelli faxed the letter back after he had signed
it (R. 755). Haskell and Thatcher were familiar with the PHU rules and knew the rule
required that the request for transfer be in writing (R.759, R. 782-3).
Neither Haskell nor Thatcher ever submitted a request in writing for Ryan Moon to
be transferred (R. 685, R. 756, R. 759, R. 787) and neither talked to Cornicelli about
transferring Ryan (R. 758, R. 789). Nothing was ever faxed to Cornicelli regarding Ryan (R.
761)_and no messages were left by either PHU operator (R. 758, R. 789). The PHU rule
required that only owners or operators of PHU areas could request a transfer in writing (A-4,
R. 162-167, R. 595, R. 688). Neither Haskell nor Thatcher, who were the operators of the
PHUs, submitted anything (R. 685, R. 689).
Haskell called Moon and told Moon that he had left Ryan's name off of the October
11

3rd request for transfer (R. 843). Haskell told Moon that he had not been able to get in touch
with Comicelli (R. 758, R. 843). Moon offered to call Comicelli (R. 758, R. 759, R. 844).
Moon called Comicelli from his office in Salt Lake DWR (R. 844) and left a message
(R.685, R. 847). Comicelli returned Moon's call to Moon's office in Salt Lake and talked
to him (R. 686, R. 847).
Moon told Comicelli that Haskell had forgotten to put his son's name on the letter of
October 3, (R. 686, R. 847; A-14, R. 195). Moon said he had spoken with Haskell (not
Thatcher) and everything was all right (R. 686, R. 695). Because the rule required only
owners or operators to make the request (R. 595, R. 648), Comicelli said Moon's request
"seemed kind of strange" (R. 686). Moon was from the director's office and not an owner
or operator of a PHU (R. 672, R. 713).
Comicelli went to his supervisor because he had concerns over the request (R. 692-3).
Comicelli and the Regional Director, Bob Hasenyager, discussed what to do (R. 687).
Hasenyager and Comicelli recognized that the request was outside the parameters of the rule
(R. 687). Hasenyager told Comicelli to approve the request because Moon was an extension
of the director's office and they don't question what is requested when it comes from the
director's office (R. 672, R. 713). Because Moon's request came from the director's office
Comicelli approved it (R. 687, R. 712).
Because of their concerns Hasenyager told Comicelli to "cover your butt and make
a note" (R. 712-13). Comicelli did so by writing the handwritten statement on the bottom
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of the October 3rd request, dated it 10/16/96 and signed it (R. 681; A-14, R. 195). Cornicelli
faxed the letter with his handwritten notation to Moon at his DWR office in Salt Lake City
(R. 849-50, G-60, R. 233).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Moon argues his case from the premise that he was an unknowing and passive
participant. In so arguing he does not address the contrary factual findings of the Board and
show they are not supported by substantial evidence. In order for Moon to so argue, he must
marshal all supportive evidence to the Board's findings and then establish the fatal flaw.
Moon never does so. Therefore, the factual findings of the Board stand.
Point II: Moon relies on a prior Board decision as dispositive of this appeal. The case
relied on was decided by the Board under a different standard of review and before this Court
issued four cases defining the role the Board is to take in reviewing department actions.
Applying the correct standard of review and the Board's current rule, Rl 37-1 -22(4), the case
is of no precedential value and is not dispositive.
Point HI: Moon asserts that he was treated differently than other employees who were
not terminated. He fails to establish that such situations are "substantially similar" and
provides no basis to overturn the Board's decision.
Point IV: Moon claims that had the Board adequately reviewed his prior work history
as a mitigating factor, he would not have been terminated. The Board appropriately found
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that the aggravating factors of the antelope poaching incident alone were sufficient to sustain
the termination.
Point V: Because Moon was a high level statewide manager in DWR, his activities
of poaching were sufficiently connected to his job and the mission of the Department to
establish nexus.
Point VI: Employees cannot use their position and influence to get other employees
to violate procedures set by rule in order to secure a special privilege for a son or someone
else. One who does so is "abusing his position." The Board erred in concluding there was
no "abuse of position."
Point VII: Even if the single antelope poaching incident is not sufficient to sustain the
termination, the fact that Moon abused his position and engaged in the poaching incident are
sufficient to sustain the termination when considered together.
ARGUMENT - RESPONSE TO PETITIONER MOON
POINT I
MOON HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE RECORD
EVIDENCE, WHICH IS SUBSTANTIAL, SUPPORTING
THE FINDING THAT HE WAS A KNOWING, ACTIVE
PARTICIPANT IN THE ANTELOPE POACHING.
Petitioner Moon's arguments are based on his assertion that he was a passive
bystander who has no culpability. Both the hearing officer and the Board rejected this claim
and issued lengthy decisions reciting why they found Moon was an active participant and
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knew his actions were illegal. Without attacking any specific finding of the Board, Moon
simply cites portions of the record he argues support his articulated position.
At no place in his brief has Moon pointed out where the evidence is so lacking that
the Board's findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence. The
Department's lengthy recitation of facts demonstrates that the hearing officer's decision,
Addendum A, and the Board's decision, Addendum B, had ample evidence to conclude that
Moon knew he was in Wyoming and was an active participant. Moon simply sets forth a few
facts, then argues his "non-participation" in the event.
Moon drove his son to every location, carried on conversations with the Chens and
the driver of the Suburban, encouraged his son by prodding him as to what he wanted to do,
directed him to locations, signaled for the antelope to be brought to the vehicle, checked the
draw to determine his son's involvement, helped in cleaning the antelope, helped load the
antelope on the vehicle, helped tag it with a Utah tag, transported it to his home in Bountiful,
Utah, and hung the carcass in his yard in preparation for processing. These actions bespeak
a knowing aiding and abetting.
This Court in Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Utah App. 1993) held that it
will not address a challenge to findings of fact unless an appellant has properly marshaled
the evidence. According to Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comnf n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1385
(Utah 1993), the marshaling of evidence is a listing of the evidence supporting the finding
that is challenged. Thereafter, the party so challenging the finding must show that, despite
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the supporting evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence given the record as a whole. See: Stewart
v. Board of Review. 831 P.2d 134, 138 (Utah App. 1992); McPherson v. Belnap. 830 P.2d
302, 305 (Utah App. 1992).
This Court discussed what it expects for such a challenge in West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah App. 1991):
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's
advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the
client's shoes and folly assume the adversary's position. In
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence,
the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After
constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence.
Id. at 1315 (emphasis added, italics in original).
Moon simply takes the position that the Board was wrong and argues his version of
the facts. This method has been rejected by this Court as an improper marshaling for
purposes of argument. See: Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. v. Board of Review. 839 P.2d
841, 844 (Utah App. 1992). Because Moon has failed to marshal the evidence supporting
the Board's finding that (1) Moon was in Wyoming, (2) knew he was in Wyoming and (3)
was an active participant in the poaching incident, those findings should be accepted by this
Court. See: Johnson v. Board of Review. 842 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah App. 1992) where this
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Court accepts the findings of the tribunal when a petitioner fails to adequately marshal the
evidence.
POINT II
ONE PRIOR BOARD DECISION THAT PREDATES
CURRENT RULES AND COURT DECISIONS DOES NOT
CREATE BINDING PRECEDENT AND IS NOT
CONTROLLING IN THIS CASE.
THE BOARD
PROPERLY
DETERMINED
THAT
THE
DEPARTMENT'S DECISION WAS REASONABLE AND
RATIONAL.
Moon argues that Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson and D.
Dennis Weaver. 3 PRB 22 (1987), issued by the Board, binds the Board and this Court. He
claims his circumstances were sufficiently similar to those of Dennis Weaver, who was
reinstated by the Board, that he, too, should be reinstated. Department asserts, however, that
Anderson was decided by the Board using different Board rules of review and prior to this
Court issuing four significant decisions that define the role of the Board in reviewing an
agency's disciplinary actions. The very Board that issued Anderson applied current rule and
case law to differentiate Moon's situation from Anderson.
In 1987 when Anderson was decided, Board Rule 19.8.2 set forth the Board's standard
of review, with emphasis added:
The Board's standards of review consist of determining whether
the Hearing Officer's decision was supported by substantial
evidence and whether that decision is warranted by the facts.
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The Board placed itself in the role of a "superagency," allowing itself to determine
whether a discipline was "warranted" regardless of an agency's determination. The Board
changed its rule regarding standard of review to reflect decisions issued by this court. Rule
Rl37-1-22(4) currently provides that the Board will look at three things: (a) whether the
allegations are supported by substantial evidence, (b) whether an agency has applied relevant
policies and statutes correctly, and:
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the
CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions
imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon
the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant
policies, rules and statutes determined according to the above
provisions.
Under the prior rule, this Court reversed the Board twice in cases where the Board
relied on its ability to determine whether termination was warranted. See: Utah Department
of Corrections v. Suchen 796 P.2d 721 (Utah App. 1990); Utah Department of Corrections
v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1991).
In Kent v. Department of Employment Security, 860 P.2d 984,987 (Utah App. 1993),
this Court clearly defined the role of the Board as follows: "The CSRB must affirm the
Department's decision if it is within the bounds of reasonableness and rationality" (emphasis
added). The Board changed its rule to Rl37-1-22(4), cited above, to reflect this role.
The latest pronouncement of this Court affirms the role of the Board as follows:
Therefore, we must determine if the CSRB appropriately
reviewed Lunnen's disciplinary sanction by considering if
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UDOT presented factual support for its allegations and if the
sanction was so disproportionate that it amounted to an abuse of
discretion.
Lunnen v. Utah Dept. of Transportation. 886 P.2d 70, 73 (Utah App. 1994). See: Despain.
824P.2dat443.
The Board properly reviewed Moon's situation in light of these significant changes.
While Department believes that Weaver's termination would have been sustained under
current Board rule and court decisions, such a discussion is unnecessary. The Board's
unreflited findings and conclusions relative to Moon's knowledge and participation stand as
ample support for the ultimate conclusion that Anderson is not controlling. Pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5)(e) the department head found "adequate cause or reason" and the
Board sustained this conclusion as "reasonable and rational."
The Board's discussion differentiating Weaver and Moon, while informative, is not
necessary. Moon has cited no support for his argument that Anderson alone binds the Board
and this Court. The changes brought about by recent court decisions nullify Moon's
reasoning. The Court is urged to reject Moon's argument as being without basis in law.
POINT III
MOON'S CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT "SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR" TO OTHER SITUATIONS CITED.
MANAGEMENT'S DIFFERENTIATION IS ADEQUATE.
Though the Board's findings regarding Moon's knowing and active participation in
the poaching incident have never been adequately challenged by Moon he continues to argue
19

his case as if this Court should adopt his version. At page 16 of his Brief he states: "...the
CSRB failed to follow Rl 37-1-21(D)(3) in this case, and denied Moon a consistent,
proportionate penalty for his infraction when it terminated him for an unintentional wildlife
violation" (emphasis added).
Moon refers to the CSRB decision at R.154 as support for his argument that he was
treated differently than others, under the claim his actions were "unintentional". The Board
discusses the other situations and states why it believes Moon's termination was justified.
Moon, however, makes little attempt to compare situations and discuss why the Board is
legally in error. He simply argues that since the few others he cites weren't terminated, he
shouldn't be terminated either. His lack of specificity and comparison falls short of
submitting sufficient evidence and argument to establish that those situations are
"substantially similar" and dispositive of his sanction.
In Pickett v. Department of Commerce. 858 P.2d 187 (Utah App. 1993), this Court
addressed the issue of similar situations having an affect on future decisions. Pickett dealt
with numerous examples of conduct so similarly situated that the court found it necessary
to overturn the Department's sanction against Pickett's professional license.
While Pickett is informative, its application must be viewed in light of the totality of
all circumstances of a particular case. Broad discretion is granted to management to
determine the sanction to impose on employees in the employment setting. There is no
instruction sheet that dictates which sanction to impose for each of a myriad of situations.
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The decision is left to a department head as he/she reviews all factors. For every situation,
there is a "universe" of "acceptable" alternative disciplines that, if imposed, would not violate
the "reasonable and rational" and "abuse of discretion" standards established by this Court.
For any one situation the potential disciplines will be different from other situations.
Any option chosen from that "universe" would be considered reasonable and rational. As
long as the discipline falls within that universe, there is no abuse of discretion. In order for
an act to be abusive under Moon's argument, the universe would have to be so narrowed by
previous "substantially similar" actions that a universe of only one option exists. Department
asserts such a universe could only be created by consistent and numerous applications of the
same disciplinary penalty for the same offense under the same circumstances. One case,
such as Anderson, even assuming it has some precedential value, does not create a universe
of one. If it did, then one case would destroy discretion.
Recently Taylor v. Department of Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090,1095 (UtahApp. 1998)
interpreted Pickett regarding past practices. Past practice is only created when "prior cases
present facts substantially similar to the facts in Taylor's case" (emphasis added).
Under Pickett, and Taylor, Moon fails to establish that the cases are "substantially
similar" and/or that they create any type of pattern. The most he argues is that in other
situations no one else was terminated.
First, the hearing officer found numerous justifications as to why Moon was treated
differently than others (R. 46). The Board adopted those findings. While Department
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contends that there is "no" pattern of "substantially similar" situations from which to hold
that deviation is inappropriate, Moon fails to show the differences in light of the evidence
justifying the difference in sanction. This Court, in Taylor, cited SEMCO Industries v. State
Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) to hold that that reasonable and rational
explanations as to differences is all that is needed to support an inconsistent action.
Second, the Department did terminate Anderson, Weaver and Moon's son Ryan.
Weaver was reinstated by the Board, not the department as alluded to by Moon.
Third, Weaver and Anderson were employees of Parks and Recreation, a different
division whose mission is totally different from that of DWR.
Fourth, the termination of a high level manager with statewide authority in DWR is
justified when compared to lower level nonsupervisory employees, such as those cited by
Moon..
Moon had been a deputy director of DWR under two former directors, Tim Provan
and Bob Valentine (R. 343). Moon's responsibilities included directing the day-to-day
operations of the division (R. 343). He was in charge of all facets of DWR including liaison
between sections and the director (R. 830).
Moon accepted a reassignment in 1995 as Programs and Field Operations
Administrator (R. 383) with statewide responsibilities over all fiscal, information and
education areas of DWR (R. 342) and was functioning in this position at the time of the
hunting incident. The DWR director was his supervisor (R. 730, R. 947). Moon was one of
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only a few high level managers on the executive management team (R. 729) and along with
other assistants to the director participated in making key decisions for the division (R. 728).
Moon was considered part of the director's office (R. 721).
Moon had formerly been over law enforcement (R. 357) and at the time of his
termination was recognized as an authority figure (R. 362). Those in Assistant, Associate or
Program Coordinator positions bore a larger responsibility because of the larger order of
authority they possessed (R. 380).
No employee situation cited by Moon involved a supervisor, especially a supervisor
at such a high level. The Board makes particular note of this fact which Moon ignores. This
alone differentiates him from all others and makes his situation "substantially different."
Moon names several individuals who he asserts are similarly situated. These consist
of several biologists, a heavy equipment operator and a park ranger. None of these
individuals were supervisors and none had any relationship to setting department policy. As
will be discussed below, no situation was "substantially similar" to Moon.
K.S. was a biologist who shot twice at what he thought was one elk. He learned that
he had in fact shot at two elk, hitting both. He turned himself in when he discovered what
he had done (R. 348, R. 925). D.A. was a biologist who discovered on his own that he had
hunted sage grouse in a closed area. He turned himself in (R. 394). W.B. was a biologist
who assisted a sheepherder spot game from an airplane. He was suspended 21 days (R. 923).
The department could locate no information on a second incident (G-65, R. 239). Only a
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hearsay statement from Moon about such an incident was made, objected to by counsel for
Department and noted as a continuing objection by the hearing officer (R.919). There is no
corroborating testimony on this issue - it cannot be relied on for any comparison. W.H. was
a heavy equipment operator whose offense was to shoot across a road. He took no game (G65, R. 238, R. 919-20). M.H. was a park ranger who killed a cougar. He was suspended, but
resigned (G-65, R.239). R.H. was a biologist who shot a 4 pt. Bull in a spike only area. He
was suspended (G-65, R. 239).
Director Kimball articulated additional reasons why Moon was treated differently.
Moon had adequate time to turn himself in or do something to correct what he had done (R.
418). Instead of checking things out, he was getting ready to process the meat for family
consumption (R. 1173). This is substantially different from every other situation.
Moon has failed to show how any of these situations are "substantially similar." Top
level administrators justifiably are treated differently than nonsupervisory, lower level
employees. He simply asserts that discipline imposed in dissimilar situations should dictate
what happens to him. There are no "substantially similar" situations to justify this Court
overturning the Board's finding.

It is not the Department's responsibility to defend

something that Moon has not adequately set forth. The Department has met its legal
responsibility of showing sufficient differences to sustain Moon's discipline.
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POINT IV
THE BOARD DID NOT ABUSE ITS AUTHORITY IN
REJECTING MOON'S MITIGATION ARGUMENTS
BECAUSE HIS ACTS WERE SO EGREGIOUS.
Moon contends that his fifteen years of service with the State of Utah is sufficient to
overcome a termination. This he argues is controlling "mitigation." The Board listened to
Moon's arguments and simply rejected his claim. Moon further contends that an exhaustive
analysis of his past record must be conducted before the Board can sustain a termination
found by the Department and the hearing officer as appropriate.
The Board concluded that Moon's active participation and his senior status at DWR
were "so compelling" that they outweighed all of the mitigating factors he presented. The
record speaks volumes as to the seriousness of the poaching incident. As pointed out earlier,
Moon's knowing involvement and gross disregard for the laws and procedures of hunting
were so significant that the board's rejection of his record as a mitigation factor was no error.
Moon cites Rl 37-1-20(1) as support of his position that the Board erred. The rule
simply says that "the past employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of
either mitigating or sustaining the penalty..." This rule does not purport to mandate that any
positive work record is controlling when the totality of facts is considered. The degree that
one's work record applies to any circumstance is dictated by each particular case. One's
work record is only one of many factors that may be considered. Positions held, knowledge
of rules and policy, supervisory roles, law enforcement status, seriousness of the incident,
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etc., can all bear some role in determining the type of discipline to impose. It is not an abuse
of discretion to determine that one's actions are so egregious that a positive work record will
not prevent the discipline from being imposed.
Director Kimball testified at great length why Moon's actions, in light of his past
employment with the Department, were sufficient to terminate him. The hearing officer at
length discussed these issues and the Board, in reviewing all of the circumstances, simply
rejected Moon's argument.
Contrary to what Moon argues, R477-1 l-l(3)(e) is not a listing of factors that must
be considered for mitigating purposes. It is a listing of factors that may be considered by
management in deciding the type and severity of discipline. The specific language of the rule
is as follows: "When deciding the specific type and severity of the discipline to administer
to any employee, the agency representative may consider the following factors'1 (emphasis
added). Both "past work record" and "severity of the infraction" are listed as matters that
may be considered. There is no requirement that each factor be considered in every case.
While Moon attempts to do so at page 22 of his Brief, some factors simply are not relevant.
Department maintains that any one factor could be so significant that it outweighs all others
in determining whether the discipline imposed is appropriate.
Lunnen does not stand for the proposition that every factor must be considered or that
the agency must affirmatively establish that it considered each factor in its case proper before
a decision is made. 886 P.2d at 73. To the contrary, when Moon presented his past work
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record, it was considered. The aggravating circumstances of the event and his role in the
poaching, however, so outweighed his past work record that the Board rejected it as a reason
to modify the discipline.
The Board's position is not without support.

In Ruffin v. Department of

Transportation. 428 N.E.2d 628 (111. App. 1981), the court held that the seriousness of an
event can outweigh the good record of an employee: "While the plaintiffs past work record
is good, it cannot be said to outweigh the serious misconduct which occurred in this case.
Therefore, we reverse the trial court's determination that the Commission abused its
discretion in discharging plaintiff."
Indeed, the Board addressed many of the issues discussed by Moon who alleges that
they were not considered. Even R477-1 l-l(3)(e) goes to whether management had a basis
upon which to act. The Board agreed that it did and supported the findings of the hearing
officer. Moon, again, simply states facts which he believes support his position instead of
showing where the Board's findings were unsupported.
The totality of the record justifies the ultimate conclusion of the Board that Moon's
past employment record is offset by the seriousness of the poaching incident. Moon's
argument should therefore be rejected.
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POINT V
THERE IS SUFFICIENT NEXUS TO MOON'S POSITION
THAT THE BOARD WAS CORRECT IN SUSTAINING
THE TERMINATION BASED ON THE POACHING
INCIDENT ALONE.
Moon errs in his assertion that for public employment an agency must establish that
a person cannot perform his job in order for "nexus" to exist. This has never been the law
and the Department asserts it is an inapplicable standard in this case. If one's actions "off
duty" are related to one's job or go contrary to the mission of the agency for which he works,
nexus is established.
Utah Code Ann. § 23-14-1(2) (1995) sets forth the mission of DWR:
(a) Subject to the broad policy making authority of the Wildlife
Board, the Division of Wildlife Resources shall protect,
propagate, manage, conserve, and distribute protected wildlife
throughout the state.
(b) The Division of Wildlife Resources is appointed as the
trustee and custodian of protected wildlife and may initiate civil
proceedings, in addition to criminal proceedings provided for in
this title.
DWR and its employees have a unique role in insuring that wildlife is "protected,"
"managed," "conserved," and "distributed." Nexus is established for executive managers of
DWR, such as Moon, who violate that very trust. There can be no public confidence in an
organization headed by those who themselves violate the very laws the organization is
empowered and obligated to enforce. Certainly, the position, responsibility and authority of
employees of DWR determine the culpability involved with disciplinary matters. The Board,
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in its decision, focused on Moon's position with the department and his overall statewide
responsibilities. That is reasonable and rat ional as defined by Kent, supra, in both finding
nexus and sustaining the termination. 860 P.2d at 987-8.
DWR has an obligation to the state and the public to take seriously such activities of
its employees. Each employee cited by Moon in prior argument as having discipline of lesser
severity than termination was likewise "off duty" when hunting. Employees of DWR who
violate the very laws the division is charged to enforce may be disciplined. That is
particularly clear with Moon as a top manager with statewide responsibility.
DWR has established a code of conduct for its employees. Regardless of what Moon
believes, this DWR policy clearly ties Moon's actions to the agency and its mission. Kent
supports application of the doctrine of nexus. 860 P.2d at 988. DWR Policy II -10.5 states
in part:
Employees are members of the local community and are
expected to conduct themselves as respectable citizens. They
should never deviate from strict observance of city, county or
State laws except as absolutely required in the performance of
their official duties.
Personnel shall not engage in hunting and fishing activities for
which a license is required without having in possession the
appropriate license.
(G-67,R.241).
Moon was in violation of this code of conduct and engaged in activities that were
contrary to the very mission of his department. This is sufficient. The Utah Supreme Court
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supports this view of nexus in Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Security, 663
P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). The employee claimed that his "off duty" conduct had no connection
with his employment. The court rejected his argument and set forth the following standard,
applicable to the present case:
It is only necessary that the misconduct have such "connection"
to the employee's duties and to the employer's business that it
is a subject of legitimate and significant concern to the
employer.
Id. at 443.
Moon's actions are connected to the mission of DWR and he is clearly identifiable as
a leader of the division.
Wild v. United States Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, 692 F.2d 1129 (7th
Cir. 1982) is helpful in understanding the propriety of the Board's conclusion. Wild was an
appraiser for HUD for many years. In addition, he was a "slum lord" of apartments he
owned. HUD terminated him. The court discussed at length the fact that Wild's actions
were inconsistent with and mocked the very mission of the agency. The court stated:
We do not think it was the purpose of the Civil Service Reform
Act to make it impossible as a practical matter to get rid of a
civil servant whose off-duty conduct is in direct conflict with the
mission of the agency that employs him. We think the focus of
the protective provisions on which Wild relies is on off duty
conduct that may offend a supervisor or even the public but that
is irrelevant to the agency's mission.
Id. at 1133-34.
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Certainly, executives of DWR who poach and violate the very trust that is placed in
them, meet that criteria. Moon's conduct offends the very essence of what the agency stands
for. Public employment cannot be a protection to employees who engage in such egregious
actions inconsistent and contrary to the mission of their own agency.
The D.C. Circuit court generalized the reasons for nexus as a legal concept:
The nature of the particular job as much as the conduct allegedly
justifying the action has a bearing on whether the necessary
relationship obtains. The question thus becomes whether the
asserted grounds for the adverse action, if found supported by
evidence, would directly relate either to the employee's ability
to perform approved tasks or to the agency's ability to fulfill its
assigned mission.
Doe v. Hampton. 556 F.2d 265, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis added).
Once there is a valid and rational connection between the employee's conduct and that
employee's public job or the mission of the agency for which he/she works, an agency can
act in disciplining employees. As in Clearfield, actual harm or affect on the agency need not
be established. The reason for this distinction in Clearfield is because when agencies rid
themselves of those employees who create such situations, the harm is not forthcoming and
is only a potential. However, if an agency does nothing and allows the situation to remain
unresolved, substantial harm could then cripple an agency or bring such disrespect to an
agency that the focus of the mission is lost because of lack of public support and confidence.
In Aiello v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 551 A.2d 664 (Penn. 1988), a mine
inspector was found guilty of violating copyright infringement laws. The court found that
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sufficient nexus existed because it called into question his integrity. As one who dealt with
the public and was able to exercise discretion, it could affect his ability to perform his job.
Director Kimball testified that Moon's actions were completely contrary to the
Division's mission. DWR has a "stop poaching" program in order to increase awareness and
enforcement in curtailing poaching (R. 356).

Moon not only engaged in poaching

(something the department was trying to curtail) but did not use the very program that had
been set up for that purpose. Indeed it was the Chens, members of the public, who were the
ones who called and reported an executive of the division as a poacher (R. 295, R. 325-6).
DWR employees are expected to enforce the laws of wildlife (R. 360). Moon violated the
laws the division was to enforce. The public has given DWR and its employees a trust that
needs to be honored to administer and manage (R. 362). Moon dishonored that trust through
his actions. Moon was in a high profile position (R. 363), had formerly been over law
enforcement (R. 357) and had participated in at least one poaching enforcement operation
in the Randolf area where his own poaching took place (R. 508-510). The public expects
department employees to act in a responsible and ethical manner (R. 356). The press and the
public scrutinize the division because opportunities to hunt are becoming more limited (R.
355-6). The public is frequently claiming that DWR fixes drawings or Department
employees get special consideration (R. 356). Yet Moon asserts nothing should happen to
him because pleading guilty to violating the poaching laws doesn't have any impact on his
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position. As director Kimball testified: "The public expects us to do better than that" (R.
361).
Kimball further wrote that Moon's actions were "an embarrassment to this office" and
had "a potential of destroying the public's confidence in this division" (Exhibit A-3, R. 160).
He testified that such was the case and the publicity created a situation where there was such
a "furor" he waited to make his final decision. "I wanted the furor to die away so it more a
comfortable environment to make that decision [what discipline to render]" (R. 362-3).
Despain and Kent stand for the proposition that if one's actions off duty are related
to one's job or one's ability to continue in the position, nexus is satisfied. The record is
replete with sufficient testimony and evidence to support the Board's conclusion that nexus
exists. That decision is reasonable and rational and supported by the record.
ARGUMENT ON CROSS PETITION
POINT VI
THE BOARD ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
HOLDING THAT A SUPERVISOR WHO USES HIS
POSITION TO GET LESSER EMPLOYEES TO
VIOLATE RULES FOR THE BENEFIT OF HIS FAMILY
HAS NOT ABUSED HIS POSITION.
The Board at page 3 of its Final Agency Action (R. 135) adopts in their entirety the
factual findings of the hearing officer as they relate to what is titled "Abuse of Position
Incident."

The hearing officer sustained the agency in its assertion that Moon had

misused/abused his position on behalf of his son in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-4(3)
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(1996). She found that Moon had used his official position to secure a special privilege for
his son. The Board (R. 140-1) specifically rejects that conclusion, with the following flawed
reasoning: MRyan had a legal right to have his name on that list" (R. 140). The Board
thereafter states:
The hearing officer stated that "The Department presented
substantial evidence that Grievant used his official position to
secure special privileges for his son in violation of this rule and
statute." However, there is no evidence or factual finding in the
evidentiary decision which supports this erroneous conclusion."
(Emphasis added)
The Board's all encompassing statement that there is no evidence to support the
hearing officer's conclusion is itself erroneous and an attempt to justify its own unfounded
and improper conclusion. The Board totally misconstrues director Kimball's reasons for
finding that Moon abused his position. It concludes that since two PHU permit holders were
the only ones that could violate Rule R657-37-4(8)(a) and (b), Moon could not and did not
violate the rule. Therefore he could not have abused his position for the benefit of his son
(R. 142).
The Board further errs by stating that the hearing officer erred by holding that Moon
needed to place his request in writing because the rule didn't apply to him (R. 142). The
hearing officer ruled no such thing and at no time did Department argue or the hearing officer
hold that Randy Moon had any right to involve himself in the process or request a transfer.
The Board disregards the very issue that director Kimball found constituted an abuse of
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position. In all of this, the Board errs to such a substantial degree that its entire ruling in this
regard is flawed and must be rejected.
Unless one complies with laws, rules and procedure set forth to be followed to obtain
a benefit provided by the state, there is no legal right to that benefit. For the Board to hold
that Ryan had a legal right to have his name on the transfer list and, therefore, no one had to
comply with the rules to get his name on the list belies reason. Taking the Board's reasoning
to its logical conclusion, one could obtain a drivers license, notary certification, dba
certification, professional license, obtain welfare benefits or even vote without complying
with rules and laws by having a family member or friend get the license or certification under
the claim that one had the legal right to it anyway.
No one has a legal right to anything unless the laws and rules to get that item are
complied with. It is nothing but astounding that the Board held as it did. Such a ruling
mocks our system of law. It creates a system of who you know that will do you a favor
instead of whether one complies with statutory or rule procedures.
Exhibit A-17 (R. 201) shows exactly what Ryan Moon was entitled to. It is his
hunting permit to hunt a Bull Moose in the East Fork Chalk Creek PHU. That is the only
thing that Ryan had a "legal" right to. Nowhere in rule or law does he have a "legal" right
to anything else, unless proper procedures established by rule are followed.
The pertinent provisions of the PHU Rule 657-37-4(8)(a) and (b), state as follows:
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(a) A landowner association or posted hunting unit agent must
request an amendment to the original certificate of registration
for any variation of the following:
(i) to allow hunters who have obtained a posted
hunting unit permit to hunt within each other's
posted hunting units;....
(b) Requests for an amendment to a certificate of registration
must be made in writing and submitted to the appropriate
division regional supervisor and wildlife manager.
(Emphasis added, Ex A-4, R. 163).
The rule is clear that no transfer of an individual from one PHU to another PHU can
be made without a written request by the landowner or agent of the PHU holder being
submitted for the change to be made. Unless a written request is made and approved, there
is no legal right to hunt in a PHU different from the one permitted originally. As such, Ryan
Moon could not hunt in any other PHU than what appears on A-17 (R. 201) without the
landowner or agent of the PHU where he wants to hunt submitting a written request and
having the division approve it. There is also no legal right to have one's name on a sheet
requesting the transfer without the written request of the PHU owner or agent. There are
simply no exceptions. The Board's conclusion that leaving Ryan's name off the original
request was simply a mistake that could be corrected without following the rule is not
supported by law or reason.
Cal Haskell (R. 759) and Terry Thatcher (R. 783), the agents for the two PHU units
in question, both testified that they knew requests needed to be in writing for individuals who
they wanted to transfer. Yet, each also testified that he never submitted anything in writing
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for or on behalf of Ryan Moon and that his name never appeared on anything they submitted
(R. 759, R. 787). Lou Cornicelli, DWR's Regional Wildlife Manager also testified that no
written or verbal requests from Haskell or Thatcher had ever come to him on behalf of Ryan
(R. 685). Cal Haskell knowingly left Ryan's name off the transfer list because he was only
thinking of his private hunters (R.772)
Wes Shields, DWR Inspection Chief, testified that the rule was clear; the request had
to be in writing (R. 629). Judy Tutorow, the Division Licensing Coordinator likewise
confirmed that the PHU owners/agents had to request a modification in writing (R. 1130).
Department is not suggesting that Ryan Moon's name could not have been placed on
a written request. In fact, it could have been had the proper procedure been followed. The
Board's ruling basically held as a matter of law that complying with the rule was irrelevant.
Such logic is without foundation.
Further, the rule itself, and director Kimball (R. 322), Wes Shields (R. 595), Lou
Cornicelli (R. 686, R. 689), and Bob Hasenyager, the Ogden District Regional Manager (R.
715) testified that only a PHU agent/owner could request a transfer. Moon himself testified
that Wes Shields told him that both operators had to agree (R. 846) and the transfer
procedure was controlled by rule (R. 846). Haskell (R. 753) and Thatcher (R. 782-3)
testified they were familiar with the rules regarding transfer and had submitted not only the
October 3rd request (R.754), but had submitted another request for other hunters (R. 776-7).
Shields (R.595) and Cornicelli (R. 688) testified that someone not a PHU owner/agent
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could not submit a request either verbally or in writing to transfer the permit. No member
of the public, not even Ryan himself, could transfer a permit from one PHU to another.
Moon provided no evidence or testimony to the contrary. The Board summarily dismisses
all evidence in the simple statement that there is "no evidence."
The Board justifies its faulty conclusion by stating that the two PHU owners left Ryan
Moon's name off the original transfer request by mistake. Department maintains that to
correct an error, one simply complies with the rules and submits the transfer request again.
The Board erred in equating statements by Haskell and Thatcher with the legal
conclusion that he had a legal right to be on the list. If Ryan felt his name should be on a
transfer list and wasn't, his cause of action is to force Haskell and Thatcher to submit a
request in writing with his name on it. The procedure is not to have his father get other
employees to circumvent the rule.
Having improperly concluded that because Ryan had a "legal" right to have his name
on the transfer request without complying with the rule, the Board next erred as a matter of
law that Moon did not use his position to obtain a "special privilege" for Ryan, a violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-4(3) (1996).
The Board incorrectly concluded that Moon did not violate the transfer rule because
this rule applied only to the PHU owners. All he did was "grease the wheels," concluded the
Board (R. 141). "Greasing the wheels" through appropriate procedures is one thing (which
Moon did not do) but "greasing the wheels" by using his position and influence to have his
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son's name placed on the transfer sheet in violation of the prescribed rule is "abuse of
position." The Department would have no problem with any employee, mother, father, or
relative, helping a son through legal channels and by following appropriate procedures, to
obtain permissions or permits granted by the Division. DWR employees are expected to help
people obtain what they want "legally." No one, including Moon, however, has the right to
use his/her position for a special privilege (obtaining a transfer that one is not entitled to
because of one's failure to comply with rule) for private gain (obtaining a moose through an
inappropriately transferred permit). The Department was within its discretion and was
reasonable and rational in affirming that it is improper for employees to do so.
The definition of "special privilege" is not easily found. The Board did, however,
sustain the termination of a Motor Pool Employee in 1986 based on a violation of the
"special privileges" portion of the Ethics Act. In Paul Urry v. Central Services Division, 2
PRB 17 (1986), an employee who was responsible to obtain bids for car repairs prepared a
bogus estimate to go along with an estimate prepared by his friend. The bogus estimate was
always higher than his friend's estimate, hence the business always went to Urry's friend.
The Board stated:
Turning to the Ethics Act, Appellant contends that he did not
violate section 67-16-4(3) of the State Code. The hearing
Officer concluded otherwise.... Section 67-16-4(3) prohibits a
public employee or officer from using one's official position to
secure "special privileges" either for self or others. Hearing
Officer Volker found that Mr. Urry had breached the just-cited
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provision when he used his official position to take State
automobiles to his friend Jonesy....
2PRB 17 at 8.
DWR Rules of Conduct policy number II - 10.5 (R. 241) specifically states that
employees "should never deviate from strict observance of city, county or State laws except
as absolutely required in the performance of their official duties." Yet Moon used his official
position to get lower level employees within DWR to place Ryan's name on the transfer
sheet without proper procedures being followed. No other member of the public could get
a transfer through that process. That is a "special privilege." Paul Urry used his position to
send repair work to his friend by failing to abide by proper procedures for obtaining
competitive bids. Moon used his position to get others to ignore proper procedures to get his
son the right to hunt in a second PHU area.
In Davidson v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission, 703P.2d 417,420 (Or. App.
1985) the court stated:
Petitioner clearly availed himself of his position in purchasing
the automobile. It was only by reason of his employment in a
position that he was aware of the opportunity, and it was only
because of his position that he was able to use SAIF as his
agent. In other words, but for his position, he would have been
unable to purchase the car and thus to obtain a personal financial
gain. To interpret "use" otherwise would effectively make
waste paper out of the statute.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Utah Public Employees Association v. State, 610 P.2d
1272 (Utah 1980), in discussing the efficacy of Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-4(3) (1996) stated
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that "[t]he Governor and all public employees have a responsibility to avoid all actual or
potential conflicts of interest between their public duties and their private interests.... Id. at
1274 (emphasis added). Instead of avoiding the very conflict the court refers to, he
knowingly imposed himself in the dealings of his son through department channels for his
son's benefit.
Ryan testified "so my father had to, because it [Ryan's name] had been left off, go and
talk to some other guy that would be able to authorize my name to be put on the paper" (R.
1012). Department maintains that there was no procedure where Moon could simply "talk"
to someone and get Ryan's name added. Moon "had" to obtain the permit transfer the way
he did because he was going hunting with his son the next day (R. 689) and needed the
approval immediately. That is no justification. No one else could do it that way.
Comicelli and Hasenyager considered Moon a DWR director. Comicelli stated the
request was an "odd request" because it wasn't from an operator but a client or a public
hunter (R. 686). "It seemed kind of strange" (R. 686). Approval was granted because the
request, seeking a PHU change in violation of rule, came from the director's office (R. 687;
R. 690, R. 692, R. 713). Moon, from the directors office, used his position and influence to
request the change. Hasenyager told Comicelli they comply and don't question the request
when it comes from the director's office (R. 672, R. 713). Because of the "improper"
request, Hasenyager told Comicelli to "Cover your butt and make a note" (R. 712-13), which
he did.
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Cornicelli had no contact with Haskell or Thatcher, but only with Moon at his DWR
office in Salt Lake. Moon called Cornicelli from his DWR office in Salt Lake (R. 844) and
left a message for Cornicelli to call him back at his DWR office (R. 685, R.847). Cornicelli
called Moon at his DWR office to discuss the request (R. 686, R. 847).
After "covering his butt" by making a note on G-60 (R. 233), Cornicelli faxed the
letter not to Haskell or Thatcher, but to Moon at Moon's DWR office where a secretary
retrieved it and took it to Moon (R. 849-50, G-60, R. 233).
But for the fact of who he was and what he did, there would have been no transfer of
the permit. Moon used his state office, state phone, state fax machine and his position to
induce lower regional employees to grant a "special privilege," permission that, according
to rule, Ryan was not entitled to unless the proper procedures were followed.
The Board was in err as a matter of law that no special privilege was granted and that
Moon didn't use his position. The Board incorrectly interprets the rules when it concluded,
"There is no showing that Grievant received any personal advantage from having his son's
name placed on the transfer where it belonged" (R. 140). First, Ryan had no legal right to
have his name on the list without going through proper procedures. Second, the Board is in
error in holding that Moon himself had to gain some benefit from what he did. That is not
the standard of Section 4(3) of the Ethics Act. If Moon uses his position to obtain a "special
privilege" for his son, the law is violated. The fact that his son was able to hunt and obtain
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a Bull Moose through Moon getting his son's name inappropriately on a list, meets the
threshold of the statute.
Additionally, the Board erred when it stated that no special privilege had been granted
because Ryan had the right to hunt for the remaining two weeks: "Randy Moon helped to
'grease the wheels' by bringing Ryan's name to the attention of Cornicelli on October 16.
Had he not done so, however, it seems likely that Ryan would not have had any use of the
last two weeks in October to hunt" (R. 141, emphasis added). That is a false, unsupported
conclusion. Ryan had every legal right to hunt in his proper PHU unit the entire hunting
season. There is no testimony or evidence in the record to sustain such an erroneous
conclusion. Whether his permit was changed to another PHU unit or not does not affect his
right to hunt the entire period. The Board again states "Getting Ryan's name on the correct
PHU did not constitute obtaining a 'special privilege'" (R. 141). The "correct" PHU is the
PHU one is assigned, not some other list. Until correctly transferred, the "correct" PHU was
the East Fork Chalk Creek PHU and nothing else.
The Board did acknowledge that Moon "acted unwisely" and could have been "wiser"
(R. 141). The Board's conclusion that because Rule 657-37-4(8)(a)(i) only applies to PHU
owners, Moon could not have violated the ethics act, defies understanding when his behavior
induced lesser employees of the department to place Ryan's name on the list in contravention
to the rule.
The Board repeatedly states that Ryan had a "legal" right to have his name on the list
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and therefore no "special privilege" was granted. Ryan had no more "legal" right to be on
the transfer authorization than any other hunter unless the rules were followed. Moon used
his position to get other employees of the Department to place his son's name on the list in
contravention to rule. This constitutes obtaining a "special privilege" for his son.

This is

an "abuse of position" and the Department was correct in its assertion. The Board is in error
as a matter of law and this Court is urged to reverse the Board and reinstate the ground of
"abuse of position" as a sustainable ground for termination.
POINT VII
WHILE THE POACHING INCIDENT ALONE IS
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE TERMINATION OF
MOON, THE TWO CHARGES OF ABUSE OF POSITION
AND POACHING JUSTIFY TERMINATION.
In Utah Public Employees Association v. State, supra, upholding a restrictive policy
against DWR employees being able to participate in drawings for special permits, the court
stated:
Although there is no evidence of impropriety, it is clearly within
the prerogative of the Governor to adopt a policy so as to avoid
even the appearance thereof... Given the valid public purpose
of maintaining a completely above board drawing and the fact
that the Governor's classification policy was rationally related
to such objective, DWR employees have not suffered a violation
of their constitutional rights to equal protection.
610 P.2d at 1274 (emphasis added).
That concern is the very essence of the severity of the charge of abuse of position.
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The court continued by acknowledging that: "If a DWR employee is not directly involved
in conducting the drawing, at the very least, he has direct contact with those employees who
are." 610 P.2d at 1274. Moon not only had direct access to employees but used his position
and that access to obtain something that no member of the public could obtain, just as the
Supreme Court was concerned about.
Director Kimball testified that
The laws of the state are basically developed to provide as much
opportunity for people to take place in what they value as a very
prized thing. I certainly think it's probably one of our most
serious charges that we deal with in a really responsible and
ethical manner.... One of the things we're frequently chided with
in the press and every place else is the fact that we fix drawings
and we have two or three people in a family over a relatively
brief time happen to draw out or selected in this drawing
process. People ask to have our operation and our program
investigated. To me it's a very responsible situation how we
distribute permits and how we enforce the laws.
(R. 356, emphasis added).
Misusing DWR programs for personal family members is contrary to the mission
Director Kimball testified to. Moon, as an authority figure, had authority over pretty much
anyone in the organization (R. 362). Director Kimball wrote and testified that Moon had
"violated the very trust of your office and department" (A-3, R. 160, R. 362). He continues:
A person in our organization who has at that time the
responsibility to oversee the distribution of hunting permits and
hunting opportunities within our state in my opinion that takes
advantage of his position and directs that a permit be given to
his son without going through the proper procedures is
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something that I think is a compromise to our organization....
It's not fair. We try to be as fair in the distribution of limited
hunting opportunities as we possibly can be. That's why we
have the drawing process. That's why we have a permit
distribution process. That's why we have at times what are
difficult application procedures. It's so that everybody has a fair
chance as possible at taking part in a hunt when there are maybe
only a few hundred people that are going to be able to do this
and several thousand people that want to.
(R. 363-4).
Since Moon worked with the very program area, he had a particularly significant
reason to be held to a higher standard of conduct. Self-serving interests cannot lessen the
need to be above reproach. (R. 367).
Director Kimball testified that "the transfer moose authority or opportunity was as
serious [an] incident as the antelope incident. I considered both of them to be quite serious"
(R. 3 84). Counsel for Moon acknowledged on the record pertaining to the antelope incident:
"The agency is saying this is a very serious offense. We don't deny that it is serious" (R.
409). Kimball testified that the two incidents were more than sufficient to justify the
termination (R. 385).
If this Court finds that the poaching incident alone is not sufficient to justify
termination, it must look at the totality of circumstances of both allegations. The poaching
incident involved Moon violating the very laws that DWR is obligated to enforce. The
transfer of the permit issue deals with the very essence of fairness in the area of permits.
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The Board (R. 143) voided conclusions of law 30 and 31 of the hearing officer's
decision on improper grounds. The hearing officer concluded:
The two incidents show a pattern of conduct which exhibits a
less than high regard for complying with the Division's rules
and policies. The violations are serious. A public servant must
act with a high regard for his position and the public trust. His
actions must promote the public interest and strengthen the
faith and confidence of the public in the integrity of their
government.... Randy Moon's actions did not show a high
regard of honor for the correct process that was supposed to be
followed. Respect for the process reflects good judgment on
the part of an employee; a lack of respect for the process
reflects questionable judgment on the part of an employee who
held a position of trust within the Division.
(R. 52).
The hearing officer is absolutely correct in her analysis and application of the law to
the facts established at the hearing. When the seriousness of both incidents is considered
together, the director's decision that Moon should no longer work for the division for
which he has shown such disrespect and disregard, is not an abuse of discretion, but is
reasonable and rational.
CONCLUSION
Each incident alone is sufficient to sustain the termination of Moon. The
Department did not abuse its discretion in so deciding. The Department therefore agrees
with the Board's ultimate decision to sustain the termination.
If the court determines that the poaching incident alone is not sufficient, the Board
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erred in reversing the hearing officer as to the abuse of position allegation. As a matter of
law the board made a wrong legal conclusion. This court should reinstate the decision of
the hearing officer on this ground.
Each incident individually and especially the two incidents taken together show
such disregard by a top management employee of the division that the director's decision
to terminate Moon was not an abuse of discretion but was reasonable and rational. This
Court is urged to sustain the termination.
DATED this

of September, 1998.

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Cross-Petitioner and
Respondent, Department of Natural
Resources
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A D D E N D U M S

ADDENDUM A
Hearing Officer decision, Randy G. Moon v. Utah Department of Natural
Resources. 15 CSRB/H.O. 218, issued June 23, 1997, (R. 34-52).

BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

RANDY G. MOON,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND DECISION.

Grievant,

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,
Case No. 15 CSRB/H.O. 218
Hearing Officer: Sherri R. Guyon

Agency.
AUTHORITY

In compliance with Utah Code, Section 67-19a-406 (1996), an administrative hearing at
step 5 was held May 16, 19. 27. and 28. 1997. in Conference Rooms 2112 and 1116 of the State
Office Building. Salt Lake City, Utah. Randy G. Moon (Grievant) was present and was represented
by Erik Strindberg, Attorney at Law. The Utah Department of Natural Resources (Department) was
represented by

Stephen Schwendiman, Assistant Attorney General, and

William Woody,

Investigator, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR and Division), was the Department
Representative. A court reporter made a verbatim record of these evidentiary proceedings: testimony
and documentary evidence were received into the record. Witnesses were placed under oath. This
Hearing Officer (Presiding Officer. Utah Code. Section 63-46b-2(l)(h)(1996)) now makes and enters
the following:
ISSUES
1. Was Grievant's dismissal for: (a) the good of the public service? or (b) just cause?
2. If not. what is the appropriate remedy?
FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Wildlife-Related Violations
1. Randy G. Moon became a career service employee with the state of Utah on March L
1993. At the time of his termination. Grievant held the position of Programs and Field Operations
Administrator. Division of Wildlife Resources. Department of Natural Resources. His areas of
responsibility included budget, hunting licenses and permits, hunter information and education,
information services, and pilots. Grievant had no record of prior discipline. Randy G. Moon had
served in several responsible positions, including being former Assistant Director.

00T*

2. On December 7. 1996, Grievant and his two sons. Nathan and Ryan, went hunting for doe
antelope in the Crawford Mountain Hunting Unit in Rich County. Grievant's older son. Nathan (also
a Division employee), had the antelope permit. Earlier in the day the three Moons hunted in the
southern portion of the unit around Woodruff. Utah. Later in the day, they went to the northern
portion of the unit around Sage Junction.
3. The Moons drove east on Highway 30; they passed the Utah border sign on the north side
of the road and the Wyoming border sign on the south side of the road: then they passed a power
substation, and turned south on a dirt road. (See Grievant Exhibit 1.) They saw a herd of antelope
to the west of the road which was being chased by a white Suburban: the antelope ran across the
road. Nathan fired a shot at an antelope while the antelope continued running east. The hunters
drove on a road that turned to the east.
4. Grievant talked to a man in a white Suburban who said he had not seen the antelope.
Grievant testified that the man said he thought the Utah/Wyoming border was either the road or the
fence to the east. Grievant, in a Toyota 4Runner, and the man in the white Suburban headed west
on the road.
5. Two hunters. Glen and Jane Chen, had turned off Highway 30 where they had passed the
Utah and Wyoming border signs and onto the dirt road: they had turned onto the road to the east
where they saw a silver Geo. They saw a hunter fire a shot at some antelope in a bowl-like area to
the south of them and to the east of the main dirt road. The Chens told the hunter they were not in
Utah and the hunter left in his vehicle.
6. Shortly thereafter, the Chens saw the Toyota and the Suburban travel down the road
heading west. Mr. Chen said to the driver of the Toyota: "Aren't we in Wyoming?" Mr. Chen
testified that Grievant answered: "Yes." Grievant testified that he. himself said: "According to the
man in the truck, we are." The Toyota traveled west on the road and turned back onto the dirt road
and drove to the south.
7. The Chens on the side road saw that one antelope in the bowl-like area was lying down.
Also, the Moons, who were on the dirt road, saw that one antelope was lying down. Mr. Chen saw
two hunters approach the antelope. The hunter with the gun, Nathan Moon, fired three shots. He
fired the first shot from a hill overlooking the bowl-like area. Nathan fired another shot in the bowllike area, and finally, he fired another shot point-blank at the antelope. (See Agency Exhibit 2.)
Grievant said he thought the road or the fence was the Utah/Wyoming border. Nathan said he
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thought they were in Utah and west of the power station. Ryan said he thought they were east of the
power station, but he didn't know which state they were in: however, he thought probably Utah
because he thought the din road paralleled the highway.
8. Grievant. who had remained with the Toyota on the dirt road, motioned to his sons to
return to the vehicle. The sons dragged the antelope near to the vehicle and gutted the animal.
Grievant helped them get started gutting the animal until the sons buried the gut pile under the snow.
The Moons returned to their home in Bountiful with the antelope marked with Utah tags.
9. The Chens drove down the dirt road which the Moons had been on until they found the
orange markers that marked the point where the road went back into Utah. The Chens noted a
description of the shooter (Agency Exhibit 1) and the approximate time. 2:25 p.m.. and then drove
to Randolph to report to the Poaching Hotline about what they considered to be an illegal activity.
Ms. Chen talked to William Woody of DWR. who directed them to go to the court house to report
the incident to the DWR Conservation Officer.
10. Jim Gregory, a Conservation Officer with DWR in Rich County, had been patrolling the
area that day, accompanied by Bob Hasenyager from the Ogden Regional Office.- Mr. Woody told
Gregory and Hasenyager to go to the court house in Randolph to meet with the Chens. The Chens
gave the information they had about the shooting of the antelope to the officer. Officer Gregory and
Mr. Hasenyager went to examine the site of the antelope shooting at about 3:30 to 3:45 p.m. That
same day. they examined tire tracks and footprints, and made notes and took photographs. They did
not see a gut pile. Officer Gregory contacted Neil Hymas. a Wyoming Game Warden in Cokeville.
Wyoming, and made an appointment with Mr. Hymas to visit the shooting site the following day.
11. On December 8. 1996. at about 11:00 a.m.. Officer Gregory and Wyoming Game
Warden Hymas examined the site of the alleged violation. Officer Hymas testified that the Utah and
Wyoming state signs were clearly marked on Highway 30 and that the dirt road to the south was
Wyoming's Lincoln County Road 220. Warden Hymas stated that there was no open hunt in
Wyoming in this area. He also stated that a shooting for a mercy killing was not allowable under
Wyoming law. They documented tracks and bullet paths in the snow, uncovered a gut pile, and
made plans to interview Randy and Nathan Moon on December 10. 1996.
12. On December 10. 1996. Officer Hymas interviewed Randy Moon at the Wildlife
Building in Salt Lake City. Grievant drew a map of the area (Agency Exhibit 7) and indicated to the
officer that he thought the road was the state line. Grievant said he had told his son not to shoot at
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the power station. Grievant also said that he thought the antelope might have already been hit. but
he didn't tell his son so the hunt would not be spoiled.
13. On December 10. 1996, Officers Hymas and Gregory interviewed Nathan Moon at the
Wildlife Building in Salt Lake City. The Miranda Warning was given and signed by Nathan.
Nathan Moon drew a map of the area (Agency Exhibit 8 and Grievant Exhibit 59) and prepared a
written statement (Grievant Exhibit 58). Nathan told the officers that his party had crossed the state
line and had turned south. Nathan said he thought they were in Utah and he saw people on the hill
watching them. Nathan explained about the three shots that he had fired. He wrote that they had
returned to Bountiful through Garden City and down Logan Canyon. Nathan testified at the hearing
that Officer Gregory made notations on the map. Nathan testified that he felt coached about drawing
the map. After the interviews. Officer Hymas went to the Moon's residence in Bountiful and got the
antelope marked with Utah tags and took it to the evidence office in Green River. Wyoming.
14. Randy Peck, a retired DWR Conservation Officer, testified that in his opinion the
Utah/Wyoming border was hard to determine in the Crawford Mountain area. The road crossed over
the border and there were no geographical formations constituting the border. Peck said that he had
not been in the area, however, since 1994 and would not know how well the border was marked in
December of 1996. The 1996 Proclamation and Hunting Guide contains a clear description of the
hunting unit boundary. It states: Crawford Mtn. Rich County—"Boundary begins at the UtahWyoming state line and Highway SR-16; then north on SR-16 to Highway SR-30 (Sage Creek
Junction): north on the Rich County road toward Cokeville. Wyoming to the Utah-Wyoming state
line: south along this state line to SR-16." (See Grievant Exhibit 5.)
15. Randy G. Moon. Nathan R. Moon, and Stephen G. Rasmussen were cited by Wyoming
Game Warden Hymas. (See Agency Exhibit 9.) Randy G. Moon was cited for violation of
Wyoming Statute 23-6-205, specifically: "Did aid and/or counsel in taking an antelope in Wyoming
during a closed season." Nathan R. Moon was cited for violation of Wyoming Statute 23-3-402.
specifically: "Did take an antelope in Wyoming during a closed season/* Stephen G. Rasmussen
was cited for violation of Wyoming Statute 23-3-402. specifically: "Did attempt to take antelope
in Wyoming during a closed season." The court records show that the citations were filed on
January 6, 1997. and a forfeiture was paid on January 30. 1997. Similar charges were dismissed by
Rich County on April 14, 1997. (See Agency Exhibits 10,11.)
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16. On December 30. 1996. Nathan Moon's employment with the Division of Wildlife
Resources was terminated.
17. Around December 12 or 13. 1996. John F. Kimball. Director. DWR. then Acting
Director, became aware of the investigation of Mr. Moon. The investigation covered the antelope
incident and a Posted Hunting Unit ( PHU) moose incident (the latter incident is set forth below)
along with some other issues. DWR Director Kimball was briefed about the matters, reviewed the
issues, and determined to place Randy Moon on administrative leave (suspension with pay) effective
January 6, 1997, pending a final recommendation in the matter.
18. On January 30. 1997. DWR Director John Kimball sent a Notice of Disciplinary
Consideration to Randy Moon. (See Agency Exhibit 6.) The memo stated: "I am notifying you of
my intent to impose disciplinary action for wildlife-related violations and the abuse of your position
as related to the transfer of a moose permit, which were brought to my attention, and which must be
explored. Because of the seriousness of your actions, the options I am considering include
termination of your employment." The Notice included an opportunity to respond.
19. On February 6,1997, Randy Moon wrote a memo to John Kimball in response. Grievant
responded to: (1) the citation issued to him as an accessory in the antelope taking, (2) the transfer
of a moose permit on behalf of his son. and (3) general considerations for review. Grievant said that
his hunting group had made a mistake in shooting the antelope and should have contacted an officer.
Grievant also said that he did not think he had acted improperly in the PHU moose transfer incident
(discussed below) because he was not involved in the original request by the PHU operator of the
Northern Region. (See Agency Exhibit 5.)
20. On February 11. 1997. DWR Director Kimball informed Randy Moon of his intent to
terminate Grievant"s employment effective immediately. (See Agency Exhibit 3.) Kimball cited
various reasons, including: violating the laws Grievant was obligated to enforce, violating the trust
of his office, having the potential of destroying the public's confidence in the DWR and its mission.
discrediting the DWR. engaging in activities which are not in the best interests of the public or
public service, and generally lessening the faith and confidence in the DWR.
21. At the hearing, evidence and testimony regarding the consistent application of discipline
were introduced. The DWR has had a number of employees who have previously received wildliferelated citations: the disciplinary action taken has varied from case to case. (See Grievant Exhibit
18-19. 34. 37-39. and 65.)
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B. Abuse of Position
22. On or about July 10, 1996, Grievant's younger son, Ryan Moon, drew a public hunting
moose permit in the Utah Big Game drawing for the East Fork of Chalk Creek Posted Hunting Unit
(PHU). Certain standards and procedures are provided by Division regulations that apply to posted
hunting units organized for the hunting of big game. (See Agency Exhibit 4.) The moose hunt took
place September 1 to October 31, 1996.
23. The Certificate of Registration (COR) for East Fork Chalk Creek PHU lists as the
operator Mr. Cal Haskell (Agency Exhibit 12). The COR for South Fork of Chalk Creek lists as the
operator Mr. Terry Thatcher. (See Agency Exhibit 13.)
24. The landowners file an application with the State biologists to determine the number of
permits that will be issued for the PHU. (See Agency Exhibit 12-13.) The DWR biologists make
recommendations and the Regional Wildlife Council and State Wildlife Board ultimately decide the
number of permits.
25. After the Big Game Drawing, Randy Moon and Ryan Moon had conversations with
Cal Haskell about hunting on the East Fork Chalk Creek PHU. Hunters are required to make
reservations with the office of the PHU to schedule their hunts.
26. On October 3, 1996, a written request to allow three private hunters on the East Fork
Chalk Creek PHU to use their permits on the South Fork Chalk Creek PHU wras signed by the two
operators and Lou Cornicelli. an employee of the DWR Ogden Regional Office. (See Agency
Exhibit 14 and Grievant Exhibit 60.) DWR rules allow a transfer of a permit from one unit to
another if the rules are properly followed. Mr. Haskell testified that he got a copy of the typed
portion of this document which had a United Sportsmen letterhead.
27. Grievant testified that about the middle of October Cal Haskell called Grievant and told
him that the name of Ryan Moon, a public hunter, had been left off the October 3, 1996 request for
transfer of the three private hunters. Mr. Haskell said that Mr. Thatcher had told him that Ryan's
name should be added to the list.
28. In October of 1996, Grievant had a conversation with Wes Shields. Wildlife Section
Chief in the Salt Lake Office, who handled the PHUs, about transferring permits from one PHU to
another. The rules had been modified in 1995-96 and Wes Shields told Grievant that there were
rules allowing for transfers.
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29. At the hearing, Wes Shields was questioned about an incident involving his son when
he was allowed to kill an animal on a hunting area that had been expanded. Mr. Shields explained
that the Regional-staff made the decision to expand the hunting area, that it had been extended to the
general hunting population, and that he personally was not involved in requesting the change.
30. On October 16. 1996. Randy Moon called Lou Cornicelli at the DWR Ogden Regional
Office. Mr. Cornicelli said that they had two or three conversations. Grievant requested that
Ryan Moon's name be added to the October 3, 1996. written request for transfer. Grievant said that
Cal Haskell wanted this done but Mr. Haskell couldn't get through on the phone. Mr. Cornicelli said
that he had received no messages from Mr. Haskell. Furthermore. Mr. Cornicelli said that Grievant
said nothing about Mr. Terry Thatcher. Mr. Cornicelli testified that he received no written request
to add Ryan Moon's name to the list.
31. Furthermore. Mr. Cornicelli said that he needed to check on this because he felt the
request was made on behalf of the hunter and not the operator. Mr. Cornicelli checked with
Robert Hasenyager of the DWR Main Administration Office. Mr. Hasenyager did not check the
specific rules about transfers of permits for PHUs. Mr. Hasenyager told Mr. Cornicelli that they
often try to carry out requests that come from the Director's office. Moreover. Hasenyager told
Mr. Cornicelli to make the change, but also to make a notation about it.
32. Mr. Cornicelli made a handwritten notation on the written request for transfer. It was
dated 10/16/96 and stated: "As per conversation w/ Randy Moon. I am adding Ryan Moon to
authorization list." Mr. Cornicelli signed the notation. (See Agency Exhibit 14 and Grievant
Exhibit 60.) Mr. Cornicelli faxed this document to Grievant at about 3:35 p.m. on October 61.19%.
Randy Moon said that he made copies of this document. Mr. Haskell testified that he did not get a
copy of the handwritten portion of this letter until January of 1997.
33. Mr. Cornicelli said that he did not send copies of this document to the DWR Salt Lake
Office and that he had called Steve Kearl. Leslie Rock of the DWR Salt Lake Office testified that
she did not receive copies of the request for transfer document.
34. Grievant testified that Ryan Moon and he had hunted five times and on October 26.
1996. Ryan shot a moose on the South Fork of Chalk Creek PHU. Ryan testified that the request for
a transfer document was in their vehicle and that Terry Thatcher helped them get the animal out.
35. On November 15.1996. Lenny Rees. the Hunter Education Coordinator under Grievant.
informed Grievant of a disciplinary action that he took against an employee who had violated a rule
Randy G Moon v UDNR. 15 CSRB/H.O. 218
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concerning abuses of authority. (See Grievant Exhibits 66-67.) For improperly issuing a hunter
education certificate of completion card. Education Coordinator Rees. assessed the following
discipline on the-employee: (1) ordered him to retrieve the card, (2) ordered him to take five days
off without pay, and (3) ordered him not to wear his uniform for three months.
36. On December 27,1996, Judi Tutorow, the Licensing Coordinator at the DWR Salt Lake
Office, had a meeting with former DWR Director Bob Valentine and Acting Director John Kimball.
Ms. Tutorow testified that Valentine and Kimball told her they were doing a thorough investigation
on Randy Moon. They told her she would need to terminate Nathan Moon. Ms. Tutorow testified
about a situation she knew about where someone was on another PHU without authorization in the
Morgan area and this person had received a warning citation for the incident. Ms. Tutorow also told
about a situation where she had made a correction for her sister-in-law on a licensing application.
Her sister-in-law had mixed the debit card and credit card numbers and Ms. Tutorow corrected the
data so the process could continue. She had not received any discipline for doing so.
37. On January 13, 1997, a written request for transfer of public hunters from East Fork of
Chalk Creek to South Fork of Chalk Creek was prepared and signed by the two operators and
Lou Cornicelli. (See Grievant Exhibit 11.)
38. On February 19, 1997, Mr. Hasenyager received a written notice from Director Kimball
concerning the October 16,1996 incident where the handwritten addition of Ryan Moon's name was
made to the typewritten request of transfer dated October 3, 1996. Director Kimball indicated that
he thought Mr. Hasenyager should have questioned the wisdom or legality of Grievant's request and
should have contacted the Director's Office before making a decision to act on the request.
Director Kimball characterized this notice as a reprimand. (See Grievant Exhibit 62.)
39. On March 4. 1997, William Woody received a letter from the Summit County Attorney
declining to prosecute Randy Moon, Cal Haskell and Terry Thatcher for the PHU moose incident.
(See Grievant Exhibit 20.)
40. On March 12.1997, William Woody received a letter from the Salt Lake County District
Attorney's Office declining to prosecute Randy Moon for the PHU moose incident. (See Grievant
Exhibit 21.)
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Wildlife-Related Violations
1. A grievance filed in response to dismissal from career service employment is a
disciplinary grievance. The agency bears the burden of proof in disciplinary grievances (Utah Code.
Section 67-19a-406(2)(a)(1996)).
2. The evidentiary standard by which an agency must meet its burden of proof is "substantial
evidence" {Utah Code. Section 67-19a-406(2)(c)( 1996)). "Substantial evidence" means "more than
a mere scintilla of evidence." but less than "the weight of the evidence." "Substantial evidence" is
such quantum and type of "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." ( Zissi v. State Tax Commission. 842 P.2d 848, 853 (Utah 1992); Grace
Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
3. An employer, the Utah Department of Natural Resources in this case, "has the initial
burden to show that the discipline was not disproportionate to the misconduct. Once the [Agency]
fulfills that initial burden, it is incumbent on the employee to raise any due process concerns,
including consistency, so that due process*issues can be dealt with properly." James M. Lunnen v.
Utah Dept. of Transportation, and the Career Service Review Board of the State of Utah. 886 P.2d
70 (Utah App. 1994).
4. "Once the Agency fulfills its initial burden of providing a factual basis for its allegations
and its burden of demonstrating that its sanction is not disproportionate, the employee must then
raise due process concerns and/or rebut the Agency's evidence. If the employee fails to do so, there
is no basis on which to find that the Agency's sanction amounts to an abuse of discretion.'" Lunnen.
citing Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Despain. 824 P. 2d 439, 443 (Utah App. 1991). Thus, the
standard to be applied in this case regarding the consistency of discipline analysis is whether the
Department's sanction of dismissal is so disproportionate that it amounts to an abuse of discretion.
5. The Department cites the following sources of authority that apply to the wildlife-related
violations.
a. DHRMR477-ll-l.(l)(a) states:
11-1 Disciplinary Action
(1) Agency management may discipline any employee for any of the following
reasons:
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(a) Noncompliance with these rules, agency or other applicable policies,
including out not limited to safety policies, agency professional standards
and workplace policies.

The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant did
violate Department rules and that the discipline of termination was
proportionate to the seriousness of the violations and that the
Department official used reasonable discretion in determining the
discipline.
b. 1996 Proclamation 23-19-1 and R657-5-3 state:
License. Permit, and Tag Requirements
(1) A person may not engage in hunting protected wildlife or in the sale,
trade, or barter of protected wildlife or their parts without first having
procured the necessary licenses, certificates of registration, permits and
tags and having at the same time the licenses, certificates of registration,
permits, and tags on his or her person.

The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant" s son
violated the above-cited policy and rule with the taking of an antelope
in Wyoming and tagging it with Utah tags. The Department also
presented substantial evidence that Grievant violated this policy and
rule by aiding and counseling his son.
c. Utah Code. Section 23-20-23 states:
Aiding or assisting violation unlawful.
It is unlawful for any person to aid or assist any other person to violate any
provisions of this code or any rules or regulations promulgated under it.
The penalty for violating this section is the same as for the provision or
regulation for which aid or assistance is given.

The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant aided
or assisted his son in the taking of an antelope in Wyoming.
6. Grievant and his son. Nathan, received citations from the state of Wyoming for the taking
of the antelope in Wyoming and they paid their fines. The Department disciplined Grievant with
termination for this incident and for another serious incident involving the transfer of a moose
permit. Director Kimball determined that termination would be proper because Grievant held a
supervisory position with DWR. basically a managerial position, within the organizational structure.
Grievant had under his supervision several areas of responsibility that were directly related to
hunting activities, specifically: licenses and permits, information and education, and information

Ranch' G. Moon v. UDNR. 15 CSRB/H.O. 218

Page 10

i

no/i

services. He held a managerial position in DWR: he would be seen as an example by others and
could reasonably be expected to adhere strictly to the policies and rules of DWR and the State. His
position would carry with it a degree of trust.
7. Wildlife resources are highly regarded in this State and the public carefully watches how
these resources are handled and administered. DWR may certainly expect one of its own managers
to act with utmost prudence and care in a situation involving wildlife. Grievant later acknowledged
that he had made a mistake in not reporting the shooting incident to an official. However, at the time
of the shooting incident, he did not try to stop the incident which took place to the east of the road,
nor did he report the incident, contact an official, or turn in the animal. Grievant says that he and
his sons were confused about the location of the Utah/Wyoming border, but it is the responsibility
of a hunter to be aware of his location and know where he is hunting. The rules require hunters to
have the proper licenses and permits for the area in which they are hunting. Grievant had time after
the incident to report or take some action; he said he wanted to check into the boundary question,
but the time to have remedied the matter was immediately after the incident.
8. Grievant contends that his discipline was disproportionate because his off-duty conduct
lacked two characteristics: (1) that there must by a continuing course of off-duty misconduct, and
(2) that there must be a nexus between the off-duty conduct and Grievant* s employment. Grievant
cites Walck v. City of Albuquerque. 828 P. 2d 966 (N.M. App. 1992) in which a police officer's
termination was overturned. The officer was guilty of trespassing and criminal damage to propertyresulting from striking his wife's car in her male companion's driveway. The Court upheld a district
court ruling reinstating Walck after finding that this one incident did not relate "to the reputation,
efficiency or operations of the police department." Walck. 828 P. 2d at 968. Similarly, in Romero
v. Employment Security Dept.. 691 P. 2d 72 (N.M. App. 1984). an employee was told three times to
stop interrupting and yelling during a staff meeting. The employee received a five-day suspension
and a 45-day probationary period for her actions which were found "in direct contravention of her
superior's instructions." Romero, 691 P. 2d at 75. The Court stated that "mere inefficiency, ordinary
negligence, or isolated instances of good-faith errors in judgment do not rise to the level of
misconduct although such may be evidence going to the provisions of [state personnel rule]." Id.
at 75.
9. The Department cites Clearfield Cin* v. Department of Employment Security. 663 P. 2d
440. (Utah 1983) in which the nexus issue is addressed. In Clearfield, the employee claimed that
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his conduct was "off duty" and it had no connection with his employment. The court rejected his
argument as it analyzed the individual situation and set forth the following standard:
It-is only necessary that the misconduct have such "connection " to the employee's
duties and to the employer's business that it is a subject of legitimate and significant
concern to the employer (663 P. 2d at 443).

10. The Department cites another case which examines the nexus issue. The D.C. Circuit
Court generalized the reason for nexus as a legal concept in light of federal statutes. Among other
things, the federal appellate court stated:
The nature of the particular job as much as the conduct allegedly justifying the
action has a bearing on whether the necessary relationship obtains. The question
thus becomes whether the asserted grounds for the adverse action, if found
supported by evidence, would directly relate either to the employee's ability to
perform approved tasks or to the agency's ability to fulfill its assigned mission (Doe
v. Hampton. 556 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1977) at 272).

11. In Kent v. Utah Department of Employment Security, 4 CSRB 40 (1992) the CSRB
discussed what is related to one's job.
There are certain moral standards, such as integrity, trustworthiness, and honesty,
which need not be written into ^n employer's policies and work place rules. The
public employing agency may reasonably expect adherence to such unwritten
universal moral standards, which if breached, would substantially tarnish an
employee's reputation and strain if not rupture the employment relationship (4
CSRB 40, p. 9).

12. Hunting activities are at the heart of both incidents for which Grievant was dismissed.
The two incidents occurred from October through December 1996. Grievant's judgment and actions
in relation to the hunting activities and in relation to the rules and statutes governing hunting
activities are the issues in the violations Grievant is charged with. The two incidents comprise a
pattern of violations. The nexus that exists between the off-duty hunting activities and Grievant's
ability to perform responsibly on his job concerns Grievant's judgment and trustworthiness in
adhering strictly to the very rules and statutes he is required to uphold and promulgate in his work
responsibilities. To operate efficiently and fulfill its mission, DWR must have employees who
exhibit sound judgment and strictly adhere to all the rules and statutes governing hunting activities.
An employee who is in a supervisory position must also serve as an example and encourage his
subordinates to strictly administer and comply with the rules and statutes governing hunting
activities. DWR's employees must exhibit the highest respect for the rules and statutes at all times.
Grievant's actions in the two incidents did not demonstrate the necessary high respect for the rules
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and statutes governing hunting activities. The compromising of the credibility of a high-level
employee of DWR will necessarily compromise the credibility of DWR itself. Such a situation
creates a potential of destroying the public confidence in a public agency and its mission.
13. Grievant presented examples of incidents where other employees in DWR had received
wildlife citations in the past and had not been terminated from employment, thereby questioning the
consistency of discipline in his case. Mr. Kimball the then acting DWR Director, was the person
who handled disciplinary matters for DWR. He had been involved in some of the examples
mentioned but not all of them. DWR's director has discretion to assess each individual case and
weigh many relevant factors in making disciplinary decisions. An example was cited about an
employee who killed an elk outside of the legal area. He received a one-day suspension and a letter
of reprimand. However, the facts show that he was not in a high supervisory position and that he
turned himself in when saying he had made an honest mistake. Another example was given of two
biologists who were cited for taking two pheasants improperly. They turned themselves in and were
not in supervisory positions and thus, were not terminated. An example was given of two
employees who received two citations in 1989 for attempting to take crows when shooting across a
highway. They were not in supervisory positions and received letters of warning. Another example
was that of an employee in 1979 who was given a citation for taking sage grouse. He wrote himself
the citation and gave himself no discipline. Another example was given of a citation for an unlawful
taking of two elk in 1986. The employee paid the fine and no disciplinary action was taken by
DWR. This employee was not in a supervisory position. Grievant cites the case of Dennis Weaver
who was reinstated to his position by the PRB (predecessor of the CSRB) in 1987. (See Division of
Parks and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson and D. Dennis Weaver. 3 PRB 22 (1986).) Weaver
was terminated for not reporting the killing, the mutilating, and the hiding of a bear shot by
Anderson, another hunter. The culpability of Weaver was seen as less than that of Anderson and
Weaver was given a six-week suspension. Grievant contends that his own culpability as aiding and
counseling is less than the culpability of the ones who actually shot the antelope. However.
Grievant held a highly responsible position in DWR and is expected to act with greater care,
compliance, and propriety in an incident involving wildlife. Also, Grievant and his sons tagged the
antelope, transported it and began steps for processing it.

Such actions combined with his

responsible position constitute very serious infractions.
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14. Substantial evidence shows that, notwithstanding examples of discipline for other
employees. Director Kimball exercised reasonable discretion in determining a sanction that was
proportionate to-the seriousness of Grievant's actions. Grievant administered programs under his
supervision and had responsibilities for procedures and policies that directly related to hunting
activities. The employees under him. the managers and supervisors over him. and the general public
have reasonable expectations that Grievant will uphold the trust of his office. The Department has
met its burden in showing by substantial evidence that the alleged violations occurred and that
Director Kimball exercised reasonable discretion in determining that Grievant's actions violated the
trust of Grievant's office, and that he had not acted in the best interest of the public.
15. Based on the seriousness of the incident the discipline of termination for this action is
reasonable based on the totality of the facts and circumstances and is for the good of the public
service and for just cause.
B. Abuse of Position Violations
16. The same first four legal conclusions under the previous incident apply to this incident.
17. The Department cites the following rules and statutes that apply to the abuse of position
violations.
a. Utah Administrative Code. R477-9-2.(l)(2) states:
Employees shall not use their state position or any influence, power, authority or
confidential information they receive in that position, or state time, equipment,
property, or supplies for private gain.

b. Utah Code, 67-16-4.(3) states:
A public officer or public employee may not: use or attempt to use his official
position to secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others.

The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant used his
official position to secure special privileges for his son in violation of
this rule and statute.
18.

a. Utah Code. Section 67-16-2. Purpose of Chapter states:
The purpose of this chapter is to set forth standards of conduct for officers and
employees of the state of Utah and its political subdivisions in areas where there are
actual or potential conflicts of interest between their public duties and their private
interests. In this manner the Legislature intends to promote the public interest and
strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of Utah in the integrity of their
government. It does not intend to deny any public officer or employee the
opportunities available to all other citizens of the state to acquire private economic
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or other interests so long as this does not interfere with his full and faithful
discharge of his public dunes.
bA Natural Resources Policy Number 2-03-009B states:
Declaration of Conflict of Interest
No employee of the Department shall accept any full-time, part-time, or contract
employment of any kind, or voluntary work related to your position resulting in
a direct conflict of interest or potential for conflict of interest. [Emphasis added.]
The above policy further states:
There are several criteria that determine if there is a conflict of interest or potential
for conflict of interest. Any one of these criteria by itself may constitute a conflict
or potential for conflict:
******
3. Using, or attempting to use. Department position to secure
special privileges or exemptions for self or others.
The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant's
actions in the moose permit PHU transfer for his son constituted a
conflict of interest between his public duties and his private interests
in violation of this statute and policy.
19.

a. Utah Administrative Code. R657-37-3.(5)(a) states:
A person who has obtained a posted hunting unit permit through the big game
drawing shall be provided an opportunity to hunt big game on a specific posted
hunting unit commensurate to the opportunity provided to a person who has
otherwise obtained a posted hunting unit permit.
b. Utah Administrative Code. R657-37-4.(8)(a) states:
A landowner association or posted hunting unit agent must request an amendment
to the original certificate of registration for any variation of the following:
(i) to allow hunters who have obtained a posted hunting unit permit to hunt
within each other's posted hunting units.
c. Utah Administrative

Code. R657-37-4.(8) states:

(b) Requests for an amendment to a certificate of registration must be
made in writing and submitted to the appropriate division regional
supervisor and a wildlife manager.
(c) Upon approval, an amendment to the original certificate of registration
shall be issued in writing.
The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant verbally
requested an amendment to the certificate of registration rather than
in writing by the proper parties as required by the above-cited rules.
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20. Utah Code. Section 67-16-10. Inducing others to violate chapter states:
No person shall induce or seek to induce any public officer or public employee to
violate any of the provisions of this chapter.

The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant induced
a public employee to fulfill a request based upon Grievant's position
in the Division.
21. Grievant requested an employee of DWR to make a change based on a verbal request
by him. DWR maintains that the request should have been in writing by the appropriate parties and
that the proper procedure should have been followed. The rules and policies governing PHUs have
specific requirements so that a proper procedure is followed in making changes. The employees of
DWR must adhere carefully and prudently to the rules and policies so that the public will have
confidence in the Division. Employees with responsible positions must act with a high standard of
care in their actions.
22. The rules and policies require that employees not act in a way that will create a conflict
of interest between their public duties and their private interests or that will secure special privileges
or exemptions for themselves or others. Grievant obtained permission for his son to hunt in an
expanded area based upon a verbal request and not one obtained by a written request submitted by
the proper parties. That was a special privilege or exemption for his son. The direct employee
Grievant talked to and the person that employee talked to. in turn, complied with the request based
upon Grievant's position in DWR. The employee who complied with Grievant* s request was
induced to do so because of Grievant's higher position of responsibility.
23. Grievant argues that he did not gain a special privilege for his son because the son had
a right to hunt on the other PHU because he was a public hunter and because the private hunters
already had permission to do. The process requires approval, however, and the process must be
allowed to operate so that the wildlife resources are managed properly and that everyone has equal
opportunities. The three private hunters were on a written list with the proper signatures. The public
hunter. Ryan Moon, should have also been on a written list with the proper signatures. Other public
hunters at a later date were on a written list with the proper signatures.
24. Grievant cites two cases in which officials of the State misused their positions in an
attempt to gain special privileges and contends that his actions were not as serious as those in the
other two cases. In Discharge of Jones. 720 P.2d at 1362, a police officer deceived an arrestee into
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selling the officer his vehicles in lieu of bail. The Court found that Jones' conduct was only possible
as a result of his official position and the trust and confidence that accompany it. In Despain. 824
P. 2d at 445. a correctional officer tried to avoid arrest by virtue of his position as a certified prison
guard. He appealed to the responding police officers to understand that his arrest would jeopardize
his employment.
25. The Department presented cases concerning abuse of position issues. In Paul Urry v.
Central Services Division, 2 PRB 17 (1986), an employee who was responsible to obtain competitive
bids for State car repairs prepared a bogus estimate to go along with an estimate prepared by his
friend. The bogus estimate was always higher than his friend's estimate. The State's auto repair
business always went to Urry's friend. The employee did it solely because it was his friend. The
Board stated:

Turning to the Ethics Act, Appellant contends that he did not violate Section
67-16-4(3) of the State Code. The Hearing Officer concluded otherwise . . . Section
67-16-4(3) prohibits a public employee or officer from using one's official position
to secure "special privileges" either for self or others. Hearing Officer Volker
found that Mr. Urry had breached the just-cited provision when he used his official
position to take State automobiles to his friend Jonesy. . . . (2 PRB 17 at 8).

26. In State v. Rou. 366 So.2d 385 (Florida 1978), the Supreme Court interpreted "special
privilege" in a statute very similar to Utah's Section 67-16-4(3). The Court said:

The term "special privilege" as used in the context of the state's code of conduct for
puolic officers has a meaning which is readily apparent to a person of common
understanding. Viewed in their plain and ordinary sense the words of the statute
"give reasonable notice that a person's conduct is restricted by the statute." The
words themselves are simple enough and contain no inherent complexities or
ambiguities. Webster's Dictionary defines "special privilege" as a "privilege
granted . . . to an individual or group to the exclusion of others and in derogation
of common right."

27. In Davidson v. Oregon Government Ethics Commission. 703 P.2d 417. 420 (Or. App.
1985). the court applied a common and ordinary meaning of "use" to its ethics code. "The ordinary
dictionary definition o f use' is 'to make use of: to avail oneself of. .. .,M The court continued:
Petitioner ciearly availed himself of his position in purchasing the automobile. It
was only by reason of his employment in a position that he was aware of the
opportunity, and it was only because of his position that he was able to use SAIF
as his agent. In other words, but for his position, he would have been unable to
purchase the car and thus to obtain a personal financial gain. To interpret "use"
otherwise would effectively make waste paper out of the statute. (703 P.2d at 420.)
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28. Grievant circumvented the established process when he verbally requested and received
a transfer of permit to another PHU for his son. Ryan. The established process required a written
request by three-specific parties. Grievant's action was a very serious misuse of his position for
special privilege.
29. Grievant raised the consistency of discipline issue and presented examples of other DWR
employees who had not been disciplined as severely or who had not been disciplined at all for
incidents in which they had been involved. These employees' incidents were distinguishable from
Grievant's incident of an abuse of position. Wes Shields' son was allowed to hunt on a limited area
that was extended. However, Mr. Shields did not make the request for this action; the Region staff
made the decision to extend the area to the general hunting population. Mr. Shields did not secure
a special privilege by using his position and he was not disciplined. Mr. Hasenyager received a
written reprimand for not checking with Director Kimball before complying with Grievant's verbal
request to add Mr. Moon's son's name to the list of hunters. The discipline Mr. Hasenyager received
was not as serious as Grievant's discipline because his actions were not as serious. Grievant made
the request to add his son's name based on a verbal request rather than a written request by the
proper parties; Mr. Hasenyager decided to grant the request based upon the belief that it was a
request from the Director's Office, and based upon Grievant's position in the Director's Office.
Grievant's violations were much more serious than those of Mr. Hasenyager. Ms. Tutorow told
about the hunter who was on the wrong PHU and who received a warning citation for the incident.
There was no showing that the hunter misused his position to obtain permission to be on the PHU
or that he did not follow the proper procedures to obtain permission to be on the PHU. Ms. Tutorow
also told about helping her sister-in-law change some mixed credit card and debit card numbers on
a license. Ms. Tutorow was not disciplined but there was no showing that this particular process
required a written request and approval by a certain process including board approval. Mr. Rees
cited an example of discipline he imposed for an incident involving abuse of authority which
included, among other things, a five-day suspension. The facts did not show that the disciplined
employee used his position to secure a special privilege or exemption for himself or for a relative.
They did not show that he was in a high supervisory position. The evidence did not show that he
induced another employee to act upon his request. The Rees* incident is distinguishable in several
important aspects from Grievant's actions.
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30. Grievant was involved in two separate, and serious incidents. The two incidents show
a pattern of conduct which exhibits a less than high regard for complying with the Division's rules
and policies. The violations are serious. A public servant must act with a high regard for his
position and the public trust. His actions must promote the public interest and strengthen the faith
and confidence of the public in the integrity of their government. Director Kimball found that
Grievant's actions were not proper for an employee in a high-level position in the Division. The
examples of discipline of other employees in DWR did not show the same degree of seriousness of
violations and the same high supervisory position of employment. The evidence did not show that
the discipline for this Grievant was disproportionate given the serious violations that occurred.
Grievant contends that he was not involved in the original written request for transfer of permits for
the three private hunters and that his verbal request on behalf of his son Ryan was not. therefore, a
serious enough incident to merit the discipline of termination. However, Randy Moon's actions did
not show a high regard of honor for the correct process that was supposed to be followed. Respect
for the process reflects good judgment on the part of an employee; a lack of respect for the process
reflects questionable judgment on the pai-t of an employee who held a position of trust within the
Division.
31. The Department has met its substantial evidence burden by showing that Grievant was
in a high position in DWR and that his violations of rules and policies were the very rules and
policies for which he. himself, was responsible. He was responsible for budgets, hunting licenses
and permits, hunter education, information services, and pilots. Grievant's violations dealt with
hunting permits, transfers of permits, and use of public position for private gain. The public
scrutinizes the actions of those State employees who administer the hunting activities, and the State
employees' actions must be beyond reproach or the efficiency of DWR and its mission are
compromised. Director Kimball exercised reasonable discretion in determining that termination was
a proportionate discipline for Grievant's two very serious violations.
32. Substantial evidence shows that Grievant was dismissed for the good of the public
service and for just cause.
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DECISION
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Grievant's appeal is
hereby respectfully denied.
DATED this 3 3

day of C W r ^ -

. 1997.
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VO AAA/

Sherri R. Guyon
Hearing Officer/Presiding Officer

RECONSIDERATION
Any request for reconsideration must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten working days
upon receipt of this decision. Utah Administrative Code R137-l-21(12)(b).
APPEAL
Any appeal of this formal adjudicative decision must be filed with the Career Service Review Board within ten
working days upon receipt of this decision according to Utah Code §67-19a-407(l)(a)(i).
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ADDENDUM B
Career Service Review Board decision, Randy G. Moon v. State of Utah
Department of Natural Resources. 6 CSRB 59, issued February 9, 1998, (R.
133-157)

BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
RANDY G. MOON,

:
:
:

Grievant and Appellant,
v.

DECISION AND
FINAL AGENCY ACTION

:

STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

:
:
:
:

Agency and Respondent

Case No. 6 CSRB 59 (Step 6)
Case No. 15 CSRB/H.O. 218 (Step 5)

The Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) conducted an appellate review of the
above-entitled case on November 24,1997. The following Board Members heard oral argument and
then deliberated

in an executive

session:

Gloria Eileen Wheeler and Dale L. Whittle.

Paul

G. Maughan,

Chair, Tim Moran,

Excused absence: Kathleen Hirabayashi.

Randy G. Moon (Grievant and Randy Moon) brings this appeal before the Board. Randy Moon
appeals from the evidentiary/step 5 hearing officer's decision which upheld his dismissal from the
Department of Natural Resources (DNR and the Department). Grievant was present and represented
by Erik Strindberg, Attorney at Law. DNR was represented by Assistant Attorney General
Stephen G. Schwendiman, and assisted by Joanne M. McHugh as the Department's designated
management representative.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. Two Separate, Unrelated Charges
Grievant raises

two issues on appeal: Did Randy Moon engage in an abuse of his

employment position regarding the Posted Hunting Unit (PHU) incident? Second, did Grievant
commit a serious wildlife violation on December 7. 1996, which alone would be cause for his
dismissal?
The record evidence as a whole does not support the Department's allegation that
Randy Moon abused his position with respect to the PHU incident. Therefore, the evidentiary/step 5
decision is reversed on the PHU issue. However, conversely, the record evidence clearly shows that
1

Grievant knowingly aided and assisted (also "counseled" and "abetted") his son Nathan in the
"taking" of an antler less antelope or pronghorn within Wyoming during a closed hunting season and
without a license for hunting in that state. This violation is sufficiently serious enough standing
alone that it supports the Department's dismissal of Randy Moon.
B. The Board's Appellate Standards of Review
We review the Grievant's appeal under provision of the Utah Administrative Code
(Supp. 1997) at R137-l-22(4)(a) through (c), which read as follows:
1. The board shallfirstmake a determination of whether the factual findings of the
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational in accordance with the
substantial evidence standard. If the board determines that the factual findings of
the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its discretion, correct
the factual findings, and/or make new or additional factual findings.
2. Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the CSRB
hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the factual findings
based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then determine
whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules,
and statutes in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being
granted to the evidentiary /step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer.
3. Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing
officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable
and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of
relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined in accordance with the above
provisions.

AUTHORITY
The Board's statutory authority is set forth at Utah Code §§67-19a-101 through -408
{Supp. 1997) of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures, which is a sub-part of the
Utah State Personnel Management Act at §§67-19 et seq. The CSRB's administrative rules are
published in the Utah Administrative Code at R137-1-1 through -23 (Supp. 1997). This Board-level
or step 6 appeal hearing constitutes the final administrative review in the State Employees'
Grievance and Appeal Procedures for Randy Moon's appeal from dismissal. Both the Board's
evidentiary/step 5 and this appellate/step 6 proceeding are properly designated as formal
adjudications pursuant to Rl 3 7-1-18(2)(a) (as amended May 16,1997). Therefore, those provisions
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) pertaining to "formal adjudications" are
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applicable to the CSRB's step 5 and step 6 hearings (§§63-46b et seq.)
THE ABUSE OF POSITION INCIDENT
Grievant has not challenged any of the hearing officer's factual findings by alleging a defect
or error regarding the Agency's abuse of position charge. The Board finds neither reversible nor
harmful error in these step 5 factual findings. As Grievant has not challenged any of the findings
nor has he marshaled1 the evidence against any of these statements of fact, the Board hereby accepts
all 18 factual findings from numbers 22 through 40, as set forth in the step 5 decision pertaining to
the abuse of position allegation. We hold that the step 5 decision's factual findings are correct as
stated as well as being both reasonable and rational, according to our appellate standard of review
atR137-l-22(4)(a)(1997ed.).
A. Factual Background
Ryan Moon (Ryan) is one of Randy Moon's five children. During fall of 1996, Ryan was
an 18-year-old high school senior. In July of 1996, Ryan had won a big game hunt animal drawing
which allowed him to participate in the State's moose hunting season during September-October.
The Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR) regulates all big game hunting activities in Utah.
Big game hunting in Utah takes place on a PHU. A PHU is a privately-owned large section
of land on which hunting is permitted by a few public hunters, but mainly private hunters. Typically,
the private hunters on a PHU belong to a sportsmen's club or a hunting association. In DWR's July
drawing, Ryan won a public permit to hunt a moose on the East Fork Chalk Creek PHU (East Fork
PHU) near the Coalville-Upton area of Utah. Although PHUs are owned and controlled by private
hunting clubs, DWR rules require that in addition to those private-paying, client-members of a
particular sporting association or hunting club, a few public hunters (selected through an annual
random public drawing) must be given permission free of membership fees and other related private
fees to hunt on PHUs. DWR issues authorized lists of public and private hunters for PHUs which
are known as Certificates of Registration, or CORs for short. CORs contain the names and total
numbers of private hunters as well as public hunters that may hunt on a PHU during a particular
hunting season. Hunting on PHUs is controlled by DWR through the requirement of a COR. CORs
list each hunter's name and type of animal that each listed hunter is permitted to shoot during the big
game hunting season on a designated PHU. Hence, teenaged Ryan had proper authorization to hunt
3

for and ''take" one bull moose on the East Fork PHU during September-October of 1996
(Exht.A-12).
B. Transferring Hunters Between PHUs
During fall of 1996, Cal Haskell owned and operated the East Fork PHU; similarly, Terry
Thatcher was Haskell's counterpart for the South Fork PHU. Haskell and Thatcher are the coowners of the United Sportsmen's [Hunting] Club which owns and operates these two adjoining
PHUs. Neither PHU operator, Haskell nor Thatcher, observed bull moose or cow elk on the East
Fork PHU during the 1996 big game hunting season. Moreover, while Haskell received the assigned
hunters' names on copies of their hunting permits for his East Fork PHU, he did not receive the
approved COR from DWR until May 1997 (T. II, 506, 507). This long delay evidences serious
processing problems between DWR officials and PHU owners during this period. A similar COR
amendment processing problem caused Grievant to become involved in behalf of his son, Ryan.
During September 1996, Haskell realized that hunters were not finding cow elk or bull moose
on his East Fork PHU. Therefore, he proposed to his partner and counterpart, Terry Thatcher, that
they transfer three private/United Sportsmen hunters with East Fork PHU permits to the South Fork
PHU where these animals, both cow elk and bull moose, were known to be (T. II, 507, 508-09; III,
592). In early 1996, DWR amended the big game hunting rules to specifically allow transfers from
one PHU to another, and set forth procedures necessary for a transfer to take place. All PHU owneroperators, such as Haskell and Thatcher, had to submit their requests in writing to DWR when
contemplating a transfer of hunters from one PHU to another (T. II, 371, Exht. A-4, R657-37-4(8)(a),-(b)and-(c)).
Haskell refers to a PHU transfer request which lists hunters' names being reassigned from
one PHU to another as a ''reciprocal," which is his shortened term for a ''reciprocal agreement," as
DWR staff refer to it. On October 2, Haskell filled out a reciprocal or PHU transfer: he included the
three private hunters' names who would be allowed to change their cow elk hunting area from the
East Fork to the South Fork PHU. Thatcher accepted this transfer of hunters as proposed by his
business partner, Haskell (T. II, 543, 545). After Haskell signed his name, he gave the reciprocal
document to Thatcher to sign, which the latter did (Exht. A-14; T. II, 53 8,544).2 However, Thatcher
noticed that Haskell had left off young Ryan's name from the reciprocal request and brought that
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omission to Haskell's attention (T. II. 526, 541).
As Haskell had already faxed the reciprocal copy to DWR's regional office in Ogden, he tried
numerous times to telephone Lou Comicelli. DWR's Northern Regional Manager in Ogden.
Comicelli had to approve all PHU reciprocals in the Northern Region. Consequently, Ryan's name
had to be officially added to the reciprocal document, thus authorizing Ryan's big game hunting
transfer from the East Fork to the South Fork PHU (T. II, 512, 541). Haskell was not able to
establish telephone contact with Comicelli despite his attempts over nearly two weeks. Because of
his strong dislike of using telephone answering machines, Haskell left no recorded message for
Comicelli regarding his effort to amend his reciprocal to include Ryan's name. Haskell did not even
leave a recorded request for a return call from Comicelli.3
During the step 5 hearing, the Department's counsel asked Haskell if he was familiar with
the rule which states that any request to amend a COR must be in writing—referring to DWR's rule
provision at R657-37-4(8)(b). ("Requests for an amendment to a certificate of registration must be
made in writing and submitted to the appropriate division [DWR] regional supervisor and wildlife
manager.") In response to counsel's question, Haskell replied, "Yes," he knew of the rule and that
is why he faxed his reciprocal to Comicelli (T. II, 513). However, Haskell had not succeeded in
contacting Comicelli, nor even Comicelli's subordinate, DWR biologist Steve Kearl (T. II, 515-16,
524). Because Haskell had not been able to reach Comicelli after many days of trying, he finally
telephoned a person he knew at DWR who he believed would be able to resolve his problem by
making direct telephone contact with Comicelli. Hence, Haskell initiated a phone call to Randy
Moon, whom Haskell had known for about ten years and with whom he had even done some
hunting, and fittingly enough from Haskell's perspective—was Ryan's father (T. II, 507,512; T. Ill,
590).
Haskell had previously initiated several telephone conversations with Grievant during the
September 1996 hunting season (T. Ill, 590-92). When Haskell explained his difficulty contacting4
Comicelli on the telephone, Grievant asked him, "Do you want me to call him?" Haskell replied,
"Yes, if you will, because I haven't been able to get hold of him [Comicelli]" (T. II, 513). During
this Grievant-Haskell phone conversation, Haskell admitted that he had left Randy's son's name
(Ryan) off of the PHU transfer request (T. Ill, 593). Upon Haskell's request to Randy Moon for
5
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assistance in contacting Cornicelli. Randy Moon responded: "Well, I'm around today. Let me see
if I can get a call through to Lou [Cornicelli]" (T. Ill, 594).
Clearly, Haskell very much wanted Grievant to telephone Cornicelli rather than he himself,
because when Haskell learned that young Ryan had won the big game moose drawing in July,
Haskell was excited and testified that he "called and talked to Randy and congratulated him [on
behalf of his son, Ryan]." It was Haskell who initiated this congratulatory telephone call (T. II, 520).
In fact Haskell called Grievant "two or three times [in September] and told him that we just weren't
seeing the moose" this season on East Fork PHU (T. II, 521). Haskell's telephone call to Randy was
a goodwill gesture between two long-time hunting-friends. In times past, both Randy Moon and his
brothers had hunted on Haskell's PHU as club members of United Sportsmen. Moreover, Haskell
testified that he and Randy Moon had hunted together once already during the 1996 fall big game
season (T. II, 522). Further, Haskell testified that he knew Randy Moon better and he felt more
comfortable calling Randy, rather than Ryan, about his PHU's hunting conditions (T. II, 522).
C. PHU Transfer Approval Authority
Cornicelli acknowledged that Haskell had called him on October 2, and talked with him
about transferring three private hunters from Haskell's PHU to Thatcher's adjoining PHU (T. II,
435). Cornicelli told Haskell how to compose the reciprocal agreement and the information required
on it (T. II, 431). At the time Cornicelli had never previously had experience amending a COR or
reciprocal for the purpose of a PHU transfer; therefore, he reviewed the PHU transfer rule at
R657-37-4(8)(a) through -(c). The rule provision required that the transfer agreement be submitted
in writing. Cornicelli, employed less than a year with DWR at that time, inquired of his subordinate.
Biologist Steve Kearl, whether it would be appropriate for him (Cornicelli) to approve the HaskellThatcher transfer request (T. II, 431-32). Kearl told Cornicelli that he had authority to do so.
Cornicelli also called Mike Welch, Program Manager for DWR's Wildlife Section, and asked him
whether it was the Northern Region or the DWR headquarters in Salt Lake City that had authority
to review and approve Haskell and Thatcher's reciprocal agreement. Welch, too, said that
Cornicelli had authority to make the decision. With both Kearl and Welch having told Cornicelli
that he as Northern Regional Manager had the authority to approve Haskell's reciprocal agreement,
Cornicelli approved it on October 3 (T. II, 433). Thus, the three private-client hunters were now
6
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officially transferred from East Chalk to South Chalk PHU.
As a result of Randy Moon's October 16 telephone conversation with Comicelli, Comicelli
first learned of Ryan's name being omitted from the PHU transfer request (T. Ill, 593). Comicelli
then inquired of his supervisor, Robert Hasenyager, regarding the propriety of Grievant's request.
Also, on October 16 Comicelli added his approving comment5 and signature, thereby finally adding
Ryan's name to the Haskell-Thatcher PHU transfer request (T. II, 441). Comicelli testified that if
Haskell had sent him merely a written request to add Ryan's name to the transfer, that he (and
DWR) would have easily approved it (T. II, 448-49). Alternatively, Comicelli could have told
Grievant to tell Haskell or Thatcher to put their request about adding Ryan's name in writing and
send it to him by fax transmission or by mail. Clearly, according to the rule provision the
responsibility to amend a COR or request a PHU transfer was the PHU owner/agent's responsibility.
Such an instruction by Comicelli, or even Hasenyager, would have placed the responsibility back
where it properly belonged, with Haskell and Thatcher, and they could have been instructed to place
it in writing as a learning opportunity.
In retrospect,6 Hasenyager said that he later regretted not having looked up the PHU transfer
rule following Grievant's telephone conversation with Comicelli. Hasenyager stated that in his
opinion, he had erred by not looking at the transfer rule which requires a PHU owner/operator to
place his request in writing (T. II, 469). According to DWR rule, a transfer had to be initiated by
the PHU owner/operator, not by the affected hunter(s). (T. II, 344-45; Exht. A-4 R657-37-4(8)). The
evidence shows that a PHU transfer must be accomplished according to the existing rule provisions
(Exht. A-14). Importantly, DNR witness Wes Shields testified that DWR does not have a written
procedure, rule or guideline to deal with Ryan's situation where a name is negligently omitted from
a PHU transfer request (T. II, 366-67).
D. The Board's Legal Conclusions on the Abuse of Position Charge
The Board does not agree with all of the step 5 decision's legal conclusions. Some of the
evidentiary legal conclusions are erroneous. Therefore, we must void the erroneous conclusions in
their entirety based upon reversible error.
The step 5 decision inaccurately concludes in legal conclusion 17 that, "The Department
presented substantial evidence that Grievant used his official position to secure special privileges
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for his son in violation of this rule [R477-9-2(2)] and statute [Utah Code, 67-16-4.(3) (Supp. 1996\."
The just-mentioned DHRM R477-2(2) administrative rule provision states:
Employees shall not use their state position or any influence, power, authority or
confidential information they receive in that position, or state time, equipment,
property, or supplies for private gain.

The above-referenced subsection of Utah Code, §67-16-4(3) (Supp. 1996) states:
A public officer, employee, or legislator may not:...
(3) use or attempt to use his official position to:
(a) further substantially the officer's or employee's economic interest; or
(b) secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others.

The evidentiary record contains no evidence showing that Randy Moon misused or received
for personal benefit any "'state time, equipment, property, or supplies for private gain/' Grievant's
telephone call to Cornicelli resulted at most in his son Ryan's name being placed on the October 2/3
PHU transfer request (Agency Exht. 14). However, Ryan had a legal right to have his name on that
list Haskell and Thatcher properly determined that Ryan's name should have been on the reciprocal
agreement but that it had been negligently omitted. They had authority as the governing PHU
landowners/agents to amend their PHU transfer's listing of hunters' names by including Ryan's
name along with the three private hunters' names. By correcting the PHU transfer request by
inserting including Ryan's name, Ryan only received permission to hunt on the South Fork PHU in
place of the North Fork PHU due to his winning the big game drawing in July. There is no showing
that Grievant received any personal advantage from having his son's name placed on the transfer
where it belonged.
In legal conclusion 17, the step 5 decision cites no example or incident of "state time,
equipment, property, or supplies for private gain*' that accrued to either Grievant or his son Ryan.
There is no record evidence to support the proposition that Randy Moon or Ryan gained any "state
time, equipment, property, or supplies for private gain." Consequently, Grievant did not violate Utah
Administrative Code R477-9-2(2) (1996).
The step 5 decision further states that Randy Moon violated Utah Code, Subsection 67-164(3) (Supp. 1996), of the Utah Public Officers' and Employees' Ethics Act. That statutory provision
states in part that, "A public officer . . . may not: . . . (3) use or attempt to use his official position
8
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t o : . . . (b) secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others."7 The hearing officer stated
that "The Department presented substantial evidence that Grievant used his official position to
secure special privileges for his son in violation of this rule and statute/' However, there is no
evidence or factual finding in the evidentiary decision which supports this erroneous conclusion.
Ryan received the right to hunt on the East Chalk PHU through the random big game
drawing. Randy Moon had no connection to Ryan's drawing a hunting permit for that area. Also,
when Haskell and Thatcher decided to switch PHUs, the three private hunters and the sole public
hunter, Ryan, Grievant had no direct connection to this transfer between PHUs. For our hearing
officer to legally conclude that somehow Grievant obtained a special privilege or exemption for Ryan
to hunt on either PHU is legal error. No example, illustration or incident of a special privilege or
exemption is given in the evidentiary decision. And that is because no such benefit was bestowed
on Ryan. Admittedly, Randy Moon helped to ""grease the wheels"' by bringing Ryan's name to the
attention of Cornicelli on October 16. Had he not done so, however, it seems likely that Ryan would
not have had any use of the last two weeks in October to hunt. During the nearly two weeks from
October 3 through 16, Haskell had failed to get Ryan's name on the reciprocal agreement. By
DWR's rules, Ryan was entitled to the entire hunting period of September 1 through October 31.
Getting Ryan's name on the correct PHU did not constitute obtaining "special privilege" for Ryan.
Rather, the addition of Ryan's name merely remedied an error made by Haskell, which Haskell
acknowledged having made, and of which Thatcher had knowledge.
Concededly, Grievant acted unwisely after Haskell called him on October 16 and told him
that Ryan's name had been erroneously omitted from the Haskell-Thatcher reciprocal agreement.
Randy Moon could have been more diplomatic and wiser to have told Haskell that because Haskell's
request concerned Grievant's son, Haskell should therefore contact another person at DWR
headquarters or at the Northern Region Office other than himself. Randy Moon did, indeed, act in
an "'unwise" manner regarding Haskell's call for assistance with contacting Cornicelli. Nonetheless,
acting unwisely is not the same as engaging in a conflict of interest, for example, by requesting
Cornicelli to add Ryan's name to the PHU transfer request to which it rightfully belonged. Thus,
Randy Moon's acting on Haskell's behalf by contacting Cornicelli and in the interests of his high
school-age son did not violate the State's conflict of interest provisions in either the State's Ethics
9
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Act at §67-19-4(3), in the Department's Policy Number 2-03-009B or in R477-9-2(2). Grievant
secured no special privileges or exemptions for himself or for others. That Grievant did not refrain
from involvement in Ryan's transfer problem—just for the sake of appearance—worked out to his
own detriment albeit there was no violation of rule or law. The record evidence does not support
an allegation that Grievant abused his position as claimed by DWR.
This Board concludes that Haskell and Thatcher properly initiated their written amendment
to their existing CORs on October 2/3. Their PHU transfer request or reciprocal agreement (as they
call Exht. A-14) was their responsibility and theirs alone according to R657-37-3(4)(a). They
correctly transferred the three private hunters but erred by overlooking and omitting Ryan's name
on that document. Haskell and Thatcher had complied with R657-37-4(c) by placing their transfer
request in writing to Cornicelli on behalf of the three private hunters. But they failed to submit a
follow-up written amendment that added Ryan's name to their October 2/3 amendment which
contained the three private hunters' names in writing. It is dispositive that this error is Haskell and
Thatcher's, not Randy Moon's.
Hence, our hearing officer legally erred by requiring that Grievant should have placed his
request in writing and not made a verbal request to Cornicelli. Whether Grievant should have used
a written process instead of a verbal process is a moot point. DWR places responsibility for
amending CORs solely upon the PHU landowners, not upon any third person or party (R657-373(4)(a), -(b), and R657-37-4(8)(a)). Thus, Randy Moon should not be faulted for not making a proper
written request instead of his verbal request.
We conclude that Grievant did not violate §67-16-10 which prohibits anyone (such as
Grievant) from inducing a public officer (such as Cornicelli) by persuading or influencing the person
to do or not do something that is requested. Cornicelli did not immediately approve Randy Moon's
request for his son's name to be added to the Haskell-Thatcher PHU request. Instead, he first
inquired of his two knowledgeable DWR supervisors and one subordinate. They each told him that
he had authority to decide the issue of the PHU amendment generally, and the status of Ryan's name
specifically. Thus, Cornicelli had not been directly "induced" by Grievant to sign the PHU agreement
because he based his decision on what his three experienced DWR colleagues had told him. By
including Ryan's name on Haskell and Thatcher's reciprocal agreement, Cornicelli acted with
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correctness.
There is no evidence in the record to support the hearing officer's proposition that Randy
Moon obtained a special privilege or exemption either for himself or for Ryan. Grievant* s
involvement was limited to assisting Haskell in having Ryan's name added to the reciprocal
agreement—where it lawfully belonged. The element of Ryan's ''permission*' arose from the big
game drawing and from Haskell and Thatcher's exchange of hunters from the former's to the latter* s
PHU. Randy Moon obtained no hunting privilege or benefit for Ryan that Ryan had not previously
received through the July big game drawing.
Evidentiary conclusions 24-27 are quotations from and citations to case law examples which
deal with ethics and special privilege. We find no fault with these cases, other than they do not apply
to the facts and circumstances of Grievant's situation regarding the PHU reciprocal agreement.
Conclusion 29 is a lengthy, detailed discussion on the subject of the Department's
consistency of applying discipline in similar cases. This issue is moot inasmuch as the Board legally
concludes that Grievant's limited participation in the PHU transfer controversy did not merit the
discipline that he received for this incident Additionally, it is not reasonable to fault Randy Moon
for improperly submitting a verbal PHU transfer request (rather than a written request) when by
DWR rule only the PHU owners/mangers may submit transfer requests.

Manager Cornicelli

carefully inquired of his supervisors for direction on this problem. Based on the above and on our
prior legal conclusions, the Board hereby nullifies evidentiary conclusion 29.
Step 5 conclusions 30 and 31 are hereby voided. Pertaining to the PHU transfer incident
Randy Moon was charged with "knowingly transferring a permit authorized on behalf of [his] son/'
allegedly violating R657-37-(4)(8)(a)(i). This specific provision relates only to a "landowner
association or posted hunting unit agent." Grievant held neither status at the time of this PHU
incident. Nevertheless, this provision plainly states that hunters may be allowed on other PHUs in
an exchange of hunting privileges between PHUs. As a matter of law, Grievant did not violate the
foregoing rule provision; he was not in a situation or status where it applied to him—he was not a
PHU agent nor was he a public hunter with a permit to hunt. Both as a father and as a DWR senior
administrator. Randy Moon sought to correct that error. Grievant was brought into this PHU
incident by Haskell for the purpose of rectifying the omission of Ryan's name from the amendment.
11
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A legitimate problem existed. However, as stated above, Grievant should have tactfully declined
from attempting to cure the problem himself. Moreover, Grievant did not gain any personal or
family benefit, privilege or advantage, nor did Ryan receive any benefit, special privilege or
advantage that he was not entitled to by law.
Contrary to the step 5 decision's conclusions, the evidence as a whole does not show a
violation of a rule, a statute or an abuse of authority or position by Randy Moon regarding his son's
right to hunt moose on either Haskell's or Thatcher's PHU. As the Board legally concludes that no
violation of rule or statute occurred, then Randy Moon was not culpable of any abuse of position nor
an abuse of his authority in this PHU incident.
Our hearing officer linked both incidents, the PHU matter and the Wyoming antelope killing
episode, together and essayed that their total combined alleged misconduct justified Grievant's
dismissal for both just cause and for the good of the public service (Step 5 conclusions 30. 32; see
Utah Code. §67-19-18(1) (Supp. 1997)). Albeit we have concluded as a matter of law that Randy
Moon did not violate any particular statute, and neither a DWR nor a DHRM rule provision
regarding the Department's allegation of an abuse of his position or of his authority as a senior DWR
administrator. The CSRB hearing officer did not separate these two allegations to determine their
individual assessment of a penalty, if one of the allegations were not upheld. Rather, the step 5
decision states in conclusion 30 that the ''two incidents [together] show a pattern of conduct" relating
to serious violations. However, having reversed the step 5 decision's ruling on the PHU incident,
we now turn to the Wyoming antelope killing incident as the single determining factor in Grievant7 s
dismissal.
THE WYOMING ANTELOPE KILLING INCIDENT
A. Factual Background
The following events are based upon the step 5 decision's factual findings, including some
additional facts taken from testimony in the four transcript volumes and from the case exhibits.
On December 7. 1996, Randy Moon took his sons Nathan (19) and Ryan (18) to hunt
antelope in the Crawford Mountain Hunting Unit in Rich County, Utah. Nathan was the only one
of the three who had a permit to hunt an antelope (or pronghorn). During the afternoon the Moon
party drove north to Sage Junction, Utah. From there, they drove east on U.S. Highway 30 and
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arrived at the north-south running Utah/Wyoming border. Both the Utah and Wyoming border signs
were visible on the east-west highway. Close to the Utah-Wyoming border and just off
U.S. Highway 30 was an electrical power substation on the south side of the roadway. Randy Moon
turned his vehicle southward, left U.S. Highway 30, and drove down a dirt road. This dirt road is
Wyoming's Lincoln County Road 220. The Moons spotted an antelope herd to the west of the
Lincoln County Road 220. The antelope herd was also positioned west of a north-south running wire
fence. This wire fence designates the Utah/Wyoming border. The Moons observed that the antelope
were being pursued eastward by a man driving a white Suburban. Nathan fired his gun at one
antelope in the running herd. Grievant then drove his Toyota 4-Runner down the left fork of the dirt
road in a southeasterly direction.
When the white Suburban came alongside, Grievant spoke with the driver. The latter said
he had not seen where the antelope went. Randy Moon testified that the Suburban driver said that
he thought the Utah/Wyoming border was either the main branch of the dirt road (Lincoln County
Road 220) or it was the fence west of that road. Both Grievant in his 4-Runner and the Suburban
driver turned around on the left fork dirt road and headed west to the main branch of the dirt road
(Finding of Fact 4).
A married couple, Glen and Jane Chen, turned off the highway, drove south on the main dirt
road, then took the southeastern fork behind the Moons. The Chens observed a hunter in a silver
Geo shoot at some antelope in a bowl-like or depression area. The Chens told this hunter that he was
not in Utah (implying that he was in Wyoming, instead). Soon the Chens resumed driving and saw
the Grievant's Toyota 4-Runner and the Suburban heading west. Mr. Chen inquired of the Toyota
driver (Randy Moon), *'Aren't we in Wyoming?" Grievant responded: 4fcYes, according to the man
in the truck, we are/' Chen also testified that Grievant stated to him (Chen) that "[WJe're in
Wyoming and that the border was back behind us at the fence line'' (T. 74). Grievant next drove
down the western or main branch of the forked dirt road, turned around, headed northwards, and then
parked along the roadside by a draw. The draw led from the edge of Lincoln County Road 220
down into the bowl area.
Both the Chens in their same position and the Moon brothers in their new location observed
an antelope lying down in the bowl-like depression between some low hills. Nathan and Ryan left
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Grievant's 4-Runner and moved toward the downed antelope. Nathan fired three shots at the
antelope from different positions as he moved toward the downed antelope. When Nathan arrived
at the antelope, which was still alive, he fired a point-blank shot which killed the animal. Upon later
questioning by the Department's officials, Nathan stated that he thought his group was in Utah and
west of the nearby power substation. Ryan was not sure which of the two states they were in when
the antelope was shot by Nathan and killed. At Randy Moon's urging, Ryan and Nathan dragged
the antelope's carcass to their 4-Runner. Grievants' sons ''gutted" the dead animal and covered their
"gut pile" with snow at the edge of the dirt road. Grievant participated in the gutting by giving
instruction. Shortly after the gutting, the Moon party returned to their home in Bountiful with the
antelope's carcass in their vehicle. They had affixed a Utah hunting tag to the antelope.
The Chens reported Nathan's shooting of the antelope and its gutting. That afternoon they
spoke with DWR law enforcement personnel. Both Glen and Jane Chen were subsequently
interviewed about Nathan's shooting of the antelope. The Chens related what they had seen and their
brief discussion with Grievant as to his location. They described the position of the Moon party's
location both before and during Nathan's shooting of the antelope.
On December 8,1996, Wyoming Game Warden Neil Hymas and his Utah counterpart, DWR
Conservation Officer Jim Gregory, investigated together the site of the antelope killing. They
examined tire tracks, found footprints, documented bullet paths in the snow, uncovered the gut pile,
noted the local topography, observed the clearly marked Utah and Wyoming border signs along
U.S. Highway 30, and noted that Wyoming's Lincoln County Road 220 ran directly southward from
the shooting site and eventually angled westward further down the road.
At the time of Nathan's shooting of the antelope, Wyoming law prohibited open hunting
on antelope and even any mercy killing of them. On December 10, Officer Hymas interviewed
Randy and Nathan Moon at DWR headquarters in Salt Lake City. Following the investigatory
interviews, Officer Hymas retrieved the antelope carcass from Randy Moon's residence. On the
carcass, Officer Hymas found a Utah hunting tag. Randy and Nathan Moon each received a citation
for unlawful hunting activities in Wyoming during a closed hunting season.
Nathan Moon, then a probationary employee with DWR, was dismissed on December 30,
1996.
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On January 30, 1997. DWR Director John Kimball served a Notice of Disciplinary
Consideration upon Randy Moon which contemplated disciplinary options, including his dismissal.
Director Kimball provided an opportunity for Grievant to respond and rebut the allegations.
Grievant responded with a February 6 memo explaining his version of the PHU moose transfer
incident and the Wyoming wildlife violation over the antelope killing. On February 11, DWR
Director Kimball notified Randy Moon of his dismissal from the division. Director Kimball's letter
cited three reasons for Grievant's dismissal. These reasons are summarized in the step 5 decision's
Finding of Fact 20, which states:
. . . Kimball cited various reasons including: violating the laws Grievant was
obligated to enforce, violating the trust of his office, having the potential of
destroying the public's confidence in the DWR and its mission, discrediting the
DWR, engaging in activities which are not in the best interests of the public or
public service, and generally lessening the faith and confidence in the DWR.

B. Substantial Evidence Against Grievant
During the evidentiary hearing, both parties' witnesses provided considerable testimony and
both counsel offered argument about whether certain sites at the antelope killing scene were inside
Utah's border or within Wyoming's. Grievant has not sufficiently shown evidence during his step 6
appeal that the step 5 decision erred by placing this incident within Wyoming's border and under its
jurisdiction. Many of the witnesses drew numerous maps or portions of maps which became exhibits
for offering their various perspectives on the hunting scene's topography, the location of the UtahWyoming border, the nature and location of the dirt roads in proximity to the power substation and
the location of the north-south running wire fence. The witnesses' descriptions included the hills,
the bowl-like depression, the actual shooting site and the disposal site of the animal's gut pile.
Additionally, both the Department and Grievant offered their own respective sets of enlarged photos
in support of their claims as to whether Nathan's antelope killing took place within Utah or
Wyoming. Finally, numerous witnesses testified for both parties regarding their opinions as to the
antelope having been taken within Utah or Wyoming. After reviewing the evidence (including the
case exhibits and testimony), reading the step 6 briefs, listening to and considering the oral argument
offered during the step 6 proceeding, this tribunal supports our hearing officer's determination that
substantial evidence adequately supports the findings that Nathan* s killing of the antelope took place
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in Wyoming.
Grievant had in his possession at the time of the hunt a Utah Hunting Proclamation for 1996,
which describes the Crawford Mountain area hunting boundaries in the Sage Junction area
(Exht. G-5. p. 51). Hunters may also utilize a DWR telephone call-in number to the Ogden DWR
office to resolve their questions on hunting matters; this information is found in the Proclamation
booklet (Ibid.)
Further, the three Moons each admitted to driving east on U.S. Highway 30 past the
Wyoming border sign before turning south onto the dirt road (T. Ill, 614; 726; 778). A person with
reasonable understanding would realize that he was now in Wyoming or at least so close to the UtahWyoming board as to exercise extreme care as to his actual hunting location. West of the power
substation there is the north-south running fence which defines the Utah-Wyoming border in the area
where Grievant and his sons intended to take an antelope. In addition to the boundary-fence line,
there were also painted steel posts, boards, cement markers and signs designating the border line and
a noticeable paint spot on U.S. Highway 30 (T. I, 197-98, IV, 922; Exht. A-19 which shows all of
the foregoing items). In their testimony, both Grievant and Nathan admitted that when they turned
south from U.S. Highway 30 onto Wyoming's Lincoln County Road 220 they each believed that they
were in Wyoming (T. Ill, 687, 744). The Moons observed an antelope herd run from well west of
the border fence, jump the wire fence, and continue eastwards into Wyoming. The location where
Nathan did his shooting as he faced east was "'several hundred yards" east of the boundary fence,
according to Glen Chen's testimony (T. L 75). After the antelope herd jumped the Utah-Wyoming
boundary fence, they continued running easterly. Nathan fired one shot, missed and the antelope
continued running easterly further into Wyoming. Soon after parking near the draw, Nathan fired
three more shots and killed the antelope with his last round.
There is ample substantial evidence in the record to show that Grievant either knew or should
have known that he and his sons were within Wyoming when Nathan was shooting at the antelope.
The evidence introduced in the evidentiary hearing, including both parties' several handdrawn maps and their enlarged, colored photographs regarding the Utah-Wyoming border, more
strongly and credibly weigh in favor of the Department's version of the facts. Had Grievant any
doubts—any reservations whatsoever—regarding his and his sons' whereabouts, he should have
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interrupted Nathan's hunting and determined with specificity their exact location with respect to the
borderline. Randy Moon should have been alerted to the likely possibility that he and his sons were
in Wyoming when both the Suburban driver and Mr. Chen opined that they were in Wyoming as they
conversed with him.

Grievant's failure to marshal the facts as required also requires us to find in

favor of the Department on this issue.
The evidence is dispositive in showing that Nathan did, indeed, kill the antelope within
Wyoming, not Utah. Wyoming Game Warden Neil Hymas cited Grievant for violating Wyoming
Statute 23-6-205 which prohibits either the aiding or counseling in the taking of an antelope during
a closed season in Wyoming. Nathan Moon was similarly cited for taking an antelope during a
closed season in Wyoming, according to Wyoming Statute 23-3-402. Neither Grievant nor Nathan
contested their citations in court; they paid their respective fines on January 30,1997. By paying his
fine in court. Randy Moon entered a guilty plea. Grievant's guilty plea in court settles all discussion
and argument regarding whether this incident took place as a legal hunting activity in Utah or as an
unlawful hunting activity in Wyoming. Grievant's paying of the forfeiture fine is dispositive on the
issue of his guilt and his conviction of a misdemeanor-level legal violation for participating in an
unlawful hunting activity within Wyoming.
C. Aiding, Assisting and Counseling in Wyoming
The CSRB hearing officer concluded that Grievant specifically aided and assisted Nathan in
the taking of a doe antelope in Wyoming (Step 5 Decision, p. 10). DWR Director Kimball
characterized the illegal act in the following terms in his dismissal letter to Randy Moon:
. . . [Y]ou counseled, aided and assisted in the unlawful possession of protected
wildlife (transportation of a doe antelope unlawfully taken in the State of
Wyoming). These actions are a criminal violation of Section 23-20-23 U.C.A.
1953, as amended, placing you in the category of a Class B Misdemeanor in the
State of Utah (Exht. A-6).

In his termination letter to Grievant, DWR Director Kimball used the word "counseled" in
addition to "aided" and "assisted." Utah law contains only "aided" and "assisted." "Counseled" is
not found in the Utah statute (§23-20-23), but "counseling" is found in Wyoming's statute.
Wyoming's Lincoln County Court Record alleges that Randy Moon, "Did aid and/or counsel in
taking antelope . . . during a closed season" (Exht. A-9).
The CSRB e1 identiary examiner stated with specificity that it was Nathan's fault for taking
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the antelope in Wyoming and then "tagging it with Utah tags" which violated Utah's law. However.
Randy Moon also violated Utah law when he "aided and assisted" in the antelope's taking by
Nathan. Accordingly, Utah hunting law states:
A person may not aid or assist another person to violate any provision of the
Wildlife Resources Code or any rule or proclamation promulgated under it. The
penalty for violating this section is the same as for the provision for which aid or
assistance is given. (Exht. G-5, p. 17).

Grievant aided, assisted and counseled in the antelope's taking by his actions when: he drove
his vehicle around the hunting area to get Nathan situated to shoot: he got Ryan and Nathan's
attention (by whistling, waiving and calling out to them) to bring the carcass back to the vehicle
when they left the carcass on the ground and started back to the 4-Runner without it; he assisted in
the animal's gutting; he conveyed the carcass in his 4-Runner to his own home; and he saw to the
hanging of the carcass outside on his property. Randy Moon told D WR Officer William Woody that
it was his intent ''to process'' the animal until it was unexpectedly retrieved by Wyoming Game
Warden Hymas. All of the foregoing factual statements are documented in the record. As a matter
of law, Grievant aided and counseled (i.e., assisted) in the unlawful taking of an antelope for which
he was fined by a Wyoming court. Grievant's hunting citation and his guilty plea in court are
conclusive evidence of his wildlife violation in Wyoming.
D. Grievant's Arguments
First, Grievant argues that he "did not know that the act [of Nathan's shooting the antelope]
was illegal at the time.'' The reason, avers Randy Moon, is that he did not know it was an illegal act
because he "did not know where the Utah border ended" (Grievant's Step 6 Brief, pp. 7-8).
Grievant's circular argument that he did not know he was participating in an illegal act because he
did not know which state he was in at the time of Nathan's shooting is defective in its reasoning.
Hunters are responsible for knowing where they are hunting. State law makes hunters responsible
for their actions. Randy Moon was the responsible driver of his hunting party's vehicle. After
Nathan fired his first shot at the antelope heard, Grievant drove his 4-Runner southwards on the
eastern fork of the dirt road, stopped and viewed the topography. Next, Grievant had two brief
conversations: one with the white Suburban driver and one with Mr. Chen, both of whom suggested
they were in Wyoming, not Utah (T. 1,185; 38,42, 52). Shortly afterwards. Randy Moon drove his
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vehicle along the western or main fork of the dirt road which is Wyoming's Lincoln County Road.
Grievant is solely responsible for having placed his hunting party within Wyoming rather than in
Utah as his hunting party proceeded to take the antelope. Randy Moon aided, assisted and counseled
Nathan in the unlawful killing of the antelope; that it was Nathan who shot the gun and killed the
antelope does not exculpate Grievant from his illegal actions.
Second, Randy Moon asserts that according to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Kehl
v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985), there must be shown ''culpability, knowledge and
control" on the alleged offender's part to substantiate just cause for an employee's dismissal. The
Utah Supreme Court first analyzed these three "just cause" components in a case which upheld the
Utah Department of Employment Security's (UDES) triad of standards for determining whether just
cause exists for eligibility of receiving unemployment insurance (UI). The court affirmed UDES's
application of these three standards for determining eligibility for UI. The only case in which this
Board relied upon the three Kehl standards was that of Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert
O. Anderson and D. Dennis Weaver, 3 PRB 22, at p. 21 (1987). The Utah Supreme Court did not
rely upon the Kehl standards in its decision of In the Matter of the Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d
1356(1986), nor in any subsequent case based upon the "just cause" criterion. Neither has the Court
of Appeals applied the Kehl standards subsequently in its decisions concerning CSRB disciplinary
and dismissal cases, not even for other public employees or private sector employees. After issuing
the Anderson and Weaver decision in 1987, this Board has not relied subsequently upon the three
Kehl standards for establishing whether just cause is present or not in disciplinary or dismissal cases.
It soon became clear that Utah's appellate courts were reserving the Kehl triad of standards only for
UDES' UI appeals.8 Thus, the elements of culpability, knowledge and control are used by Utah's
appellate courts only for determining UI cases, not for general disciplinary or dismissal cases.
Third, Randy Moon likens his dismissal to that of Dennis Weaver in the Board's step 6
decision in Division of Parks and Recreation v. Robert O. Anderson andD. Dennis Weaver, 3 PRB
22, at p. 21 (1987). This case concerned two Parks and Recreation Division regional managers who
held peace officer authority. The Board overturned its hearing officer and reinstated Anderson's
dismissal after the hearing officer had first reinstated both managers in his step 5 decision. With
Weaver, the Board imposed a more severe penalty than that imposed by the hearing officer, although
19

01

the Board's overall sanction was less than dismissal.
More especially, Grievant likens himself to Weaver and draws an analogy to the latter's
lesser misconduct than to Anderson's greater misconduct. Weaver did not shoot the bear; Anderson
did. (Grievant argues that he did not kill the antelope, his son Nathan did.) Neither Anderson nor
Weaver reported the bear killing to DWR as required by law. (Grievant says that he did not deny
the shooting of the antelope once he was found out on December 10.) Weaver suggested concealing
the dead bear cub, but did not do it. (Randy Moon claims he did not physically gut the antelope, but
just offered advice to his sons.) Also, Weaver suggested the taking of souvenirs from the bear's
carcass, but did not do it himself. (Randy Moon only "allowed" a Utah hunting tag to be placed on
the antelope's ear, and "allowed" the carcass to be placed in his vehicle.) Weaver, did participate
in the hunting party's cover-up of the bear cub's killing. However, the Board drew a distinction
between Anderson's greater culpability in shooting the bear cub and his fundamental legal
responsibility to disclose to DWR authorities what he had done. Thus, Weaver was found to be
marginally less culpable, and the Board did not conclude that his dismissal was warranted.
Nevertheless, this tribunal concludes that Randy Moon has a greater culpability than did
Weaver. Grievant's greater culpability is more analogous to Anderson's, than to Weaver's lesser
culpability. Grievant had received two oral warnings by fellow hunters that he was likely in
Wyoming, not Utah. A reasonable person would have carefully verified his location before having
his party engage in potentially illegal hunting (poaching) activities. Grievant was the person in his
party who urged that the carcass be brought back. Randy Moon is the person who hung the illegally
taken antelope at his residential property. Grievant is the one who was a senior administrator and
former assistant director of DWR who received a citation and was fined for his party's hunting
activities on December 7, 1996. Randy Moon was one of only a handful of persons in the top
managerial positions at DWR. Grievant brought embarrassment to DWR because Wyoming Game
Warden Hymas drove to Salt Lake City, talked with DWR Director Kimball and others on Kimball's
staff, and went out to Grievant's residence to retrieve and return the antelope's carcass to Wyoming.
Grievant pleaded guilty to breaking Wyoming's hunting law while holding the office of a senior
administrator directly under the supervision of Director Kimball. In breaking Wyoming's hunting
law. Randy Moon brought serious disrespect to his division and his coworkers. The December 7
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antelope hunting incident involved many hours of investigation by Inspector William Woody and
Conservation Officer Jim Gregory as well as the efforts of Wyoming Game Warden Neil Hymas.
Finally, citizens Jane and Glen Chen spent many hours being interviewed, traveling to DWR
sites and later testifying that one of Utah's senior administrators had participated in breaking
Wyoming's closed hunting law. The above people spent their time in the investigation, in being
interviewed, in traveling to designated locations, and in testijEying at the step 5 proceeding. All of
these peoples' time and efforts were necessary due to Grievant's illegal activity and his employment
status with DWR as a senior divisional administrator.
During his term as an assistant or deputy DWR director, Grievant had assigned to him
responsibility for the Law Enforcement Section of DWR. In that capacity Randy Moon was the
manager over those DWR staff who held sworn peace officer status. These are the people, who like
Conservation Officer Jim Gregory, enforce Utah's hunting laws and had the duty to curtail or prevent
illegal hunting activities. Randy Moon knew or should have known that he may not become involved
with the illegal killing of an antelope within Wyoming's border.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we find that Grievant's misconduct and dismissal based
upon the single incident of the Wyoming antelope killing (poaching) is supported by just cause and
serves to advance the good of the public service, according to the Utah statutory provision at §67-1918(1).
E. The Antelope Killing as a Single Disciplinary Incident
Randy Moon held a very responsible managerial position in DWR from 1993-95. During that
period, Grievant served as an Assistant Director (a.k.a. Deputy Director) of DWR. For a time
Randy Moon was the Assistant Director over the division's Law Enforcement Program. More
recently, from 1995 until his dismissal in February 1997, Grievant was the DWR's Administrator
of Programs and Field Operations. With this position title, Grievant had oversight over fiscal
activities and over the Information and Education Programs. In the latter capacity, he held
responsibility for issuing permits and licensing activities in the division. Having previously held
responsibility for DWR's Law Enforcement section and over permits and licenses at the time of the
antelope killing incident, Grievant knew or should have known that if he and his sons were hunting
on the Wyoming side of the border—and caught— their actions would constitute a flagrant wildlife
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violation.
Randy Moon compared himself with many other D WR employees who had been disciplined
with far fewer sanctions than he. However, when these comparisons are scrutinized, Grievant's
actions: (1) were committed by a person in a higher DWR managerial position than the other
employees, (2) compare unfavorably because many of the other employees voluntarily turned
themselves in and some even wrote themselves citations, and (3) constituted big game poaching in
a neighboring state and then upon being found out, being subjected to Wyoming's judicial
punishment—which resulted in disgracing Utah's DWR staff in particular, and the division in
general. All things considered, the antelope incident on its own was a very serious, even an
egregious, incident. Grievant's culpability is substantial.
Grievant argued during the evidentiary hearing, in his Step 6 Brief and in oral argument, that
without the PHU moose transfer incident, there is not sufficient wrongdoing to justify his dismissal.
Grievant cites Director Kimball's testimony to support this opinion (T. 1,144). Grievant's counsel
asked Director Kimball:
QUESTION: I know what bothers you. I'm asking if the antelope incident alone would have
been enough to terminate him?
ANSWER:

It wasn't alone. [So] I can't tell you that.

Grievant's attempt to get Director Kimball to say that the antelope incident on its own was not
sufficient to justify termination did not succeed. Thus, the record evidence through Kimball's
testimony does not state that even if the antelope incident were the only incident considered, that
incident by itself would not merit dismissal. That extrapolation is a distortion of what Director
Kimball stated under oath.
Randy Moon was deeply involved in the antelope poaching incident. He was not an idle
bystander as he would let people believe. He had ample warnings through geographical markers and
from fellow hunters that he was in Wyoming or on the borderline before Nathan shot and killed the
antelope. Grievant organized the effort to take the carcass home to his family. He took it to his
residence. When picked up by Game Warden Hymas, the antelope was about to be processed by
Randy Moon at his residence. Although Grievant is a 15-year9 State employee (a mitigating factor),
the nature of his participation in the antelope incident along with his senior status at DWR are so
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compelling (as aggravating factors), that his dismissal is neither excessive, disproportionate nor
otherwise constitute an abuse of discretion {Utah Admin. Code, Rl37-1 -21 (3)(b)). The hearing
officer's factual findings regarding the antelope killing incident are reasonable and rational. As a
matter of law, the Board makes an ultimate conclusion that the Department's dismissal of Randy
Moon is reasonable and rational.
DECISION
Grievant's appeal to the Board is denied based upon the foregoing factual findings and legal
conclusions concerning the Wyoming antelope killing incident.
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DATED this 7 dav of February 1998.

[MAJORITY OPINION.
Paul G. Maughan, Chairman
Tim Moran, Board Member
Dale L. Whittle, Board Member

Paul G. Maughan
Chairman
Career Service Review Board

DISSENTING OPINION.
Gloria E. Wheeler, Board Member
The majority decision in this case upholds the Department's decision to terminate Mr. Moon's
employment. My dissent is based on the harshness of the penalty. Mr. Moon was first employed
by the state of Utah in the Governor's Office as a Science Advisor. He served the State under three
governors and for 11 years in that capacity (1982-93). In 1993 Grievant became the DWR Assistant
Director within the Department of Natural Resources. He served in the latter capacity until his
dismissal in February 1997. For nearly all of his 15-plus years with the State, Randy Moon had an
apparently exemplary record. He progressed in his career to an extremely responsible position, and
must have been held in esteem by both his supervisors and his peers over that extended period in
order to have advanced to such a position. Granted that his error in helping his son Nathan to violate
State hunting laws was a serious one, but it still seems excessively harsh that one such error is
sufficient to destroy a person's career. Had the Department's position been based solely on the
argument that this error was sufficient to terminate Mr. Moon, I might have been somewhat inclined
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to uphold the decision, although still finding it troublesome. However, the Department tried to
bolster its position through accusing Mr. Moon of an earlier indiscretion with respect to an assigned
hunting area. This accusation had the flavor of someone in the Department being "out to get" Mr.
Moon. That is, the accusation was not raised at the time the alleged indiscretion occurred, but was
searched out after the violation involving Mr. Moon's son, Nathan. In the PHU incident, Mr. Moon
seems actually to have taken a very logical approach to solving a problem within a rather restrictive
time frame. I found it troublesome that the Department was accusing Mr. Moon of violations of
policy and using the accusation to help justify the termination in the antelope hunting incident.
ENDNOTES
1. The correct procedure for "marshaling the evidence" in challenging the veracity of factual findings is set forth in
the Agency's Step 6 Brief at pp. 11-12, along with supporting case law from Utah Court of Appeals' decisions. We
do not think it necessary to cite those same cases again or to even cite additional cases on this point.
2. Haskell and Thatcher testified that they did not receive a copy of the reciprocal agreement with Cornicelli's
signature affixed until January 1997. No reason was given for such a long delay even though the hunting season had
ended on October 31.
3. It is reasonable to assume that if Haskell had followed through and contacted Cornicelli, or left a message for
him, or faxed him or requested his return call, that Grievant's alleged abuse of position incident would not have
arisen to his detriment as it did.
4. Testimony revealed the numerous problems with the telephone connections to DWR's Northern Regional Office
in Ogden. Haskell and Grievant described theirfrustrationsat times in trying to deal with the "phone system in
Ogden" because "we have problems getting through from our own [DWR SLC] office" (T. Ill, 593).
5. Cornicelli's approval comment reads: "As per conversation w/ Randy Moon. I am adding Ryan Moon to [the]
authorization list." This comment was added to Exht. A-14, then signed by Cornicelli and dated October 16.
6. Hasenyager received what he unofficially called "a letter of reprimand" (T. II, 480-81) from DWR Director John
Kimball regarding Grievant's telephone request to Cornicelli. Kimball charged Hasenyager with not complying
with the DWR rule which states that a PHU transfer request must be made in writing, according to Hasenyager
(T. II, 469). But Kimball's letter to Hasenyager is titled "Notice to address a personnel problem" (Exht. G-62). The
rule provision referred to by Hasenyager is DWR's R657-37-3(4)(b). This rule provision states that "written
permission from the landowner association must be in the person's possession while hunting." R657-37-3(5)(a)
further states that the holder of a big game drawing must be accorded the same "opportunity to hunt big game on a
specific posted hunting unit" as that available to a private hunter. Because Hasenyager viewed Grievant's "request"
as coming from the Director's Office (i.e., DWR Director Kimball's Office), through Randy Moon, he testified that
he mistakenly assumed at that time "that the details have been dealt with" (T II, 472).
Admittedly, it is puzzling how Hasenyager and DWR officials applied the above rule provision regarding
"written permission," which must originate with the PHU agent [meaning, Haskell and Thatcher], and "must be in
the person's possession while hunting." Clearly, DWR rule R657-37-3(4)(a) made it Haskell and Thatcher's
responsibility to provide "written permission" which must be in Ryan's possession in order for him to hunt on the
South Fork PHU. It is reasonable to suppose that Haskell and Thatcher submitted their "written permission" request
of October 2/3 to Cornicelli for the sole purpose of transferring the three private hunters from East Chalk to South
Chalk PHU, as stated in Exht. A-14. Accordingly, Exht. A-14 should reasonably satisfy the above rule because: (1)
it was in writing, (2) it came from the two PHU agents, Haskell and Thatcher. When Thatcher told Haskell that they
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had erroneously left off Ryan Moon's name, Haskell expected to have their "written permission" authorization, i.e.,
Exht. A-14, amended per their request, by having Ryan's name added to their existing transfer request, that is,
Exht. A-14. Grievant's telephone call to Cornicelli on October 16 regarding the disposition of Ryan's name on the
PHU transfer request resulted only because Haskell failed in his attempts to contact Cornicelli. Grievant was only
acting as an intercessor on behalf of Haskell and Thatcher. Grievant had no duty to place in writing Haskell and
Thatcher's transfer of permits request for Ryan, whose name should have been on the PHU agents' October 2/3
written request. Grievant only served as a go-between on behalf of Haskell and Thatcher, not as the initiator of a
privileged request which would provide a distinct advantage, special privilege or benefit to Ryan Moon.
7. The step 5 decision did not accurately quote the statutory sub-provision which it cites. The correct text is given
in this step 6 decision.
8. The following case citations show that Utah's two appellate courts have only applied the Kehl standards (700
P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985) to UDES' (since July 1, 1997, the Utah Department of Workforce Services) UI appeals. For
example, see Green v. Board of Review, 45 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, at 29, 728 P.2d 996 (Utah 1986); Department of the
Air Force v. Swider, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 75, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App. 1991); Wagstajfv. Department of
Employment Security, 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 32-34, 826 P.2d 1069 (Utah App. 1992), at pp. 32, 33-34.
9. Counsel for both parties made reference to Randy Moon's 20-year service as a State employee. Grievant's
testimony is that he worked for five years at Research Park in Salt Lake City (1977-82). Next, he became the State
Science Advisor from 1982 till March 1993. At the latter time, he served as an assistant director and later as a senior
administrator for DWR (March 1993 till February 1997). Grievant has approximately 15 years' tenure as a State
employee.

RECONSIDERATION

A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 format adjudicative decision and final agency action
by complying with Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(10), and Utah Code §63-46b-13, Utah Administrative
Procedures Act.
JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to
Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
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ADDENDUM C
Utah Code Ann. § 67-16-4(3) (1996)

67-16-4

STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

67-16-4. Improperly disclosing or using private, controlled, or protected information — Using position to secure privileges or exemptions — Accepting employment which would impair
independence of judgment or ethical performance.
A public officer or public employee may not:
(1) accept employment or engage in any business or professional
activity which he might reasonably expect would require or induce him to
improperly disclose controlled information which he has gained by reason
of his official position;
(2) improperly disclose controlled, private, or protected information
acquired by reason of his official position nor use such information for his
or another's private gain or benefit;
(3) use or attempt to use his official position to secure special privileges
or exemptions for himself or others;
(4) accept other employment which he might expect would impair his
independence of judgment in the performance of his public duties; or
(5) accept other employment which he might expect would interfere
with the ethical performance of his public duties.
History: L. 1969, ch. 128, § 4; 1989, ch.
147, § 14; 1991, ch. 259, § 69; 1992, ch. 280,
§ 60.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, substituted "controlled" for "confidential" in Subsections (1) and
(2).
Cross-References. — Division of Securities,
confidential information, misuse of information, § 61-1-18.3.
Evidentiary privilege as to communications
to public officers, § 78-24-8(5).
Evidentiary privilege, generally, Rule 501,
U.R.E.

Government records, Title 63, Chapter 2.
Insurance commissioner, confidential information, § 31A-16-109.
Officers not to profit out of public moneys,
Utah Const., Art. XIII, Sec. 8.
Official misconduct an offense, §§ 76-8-201,
76-8-202.
Personal property audits and records confidential, § 59-2-705.
Tax returns confidential, §§ 59-7-537, 59-10545, 59-12-109.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Prosecution of insurance fraud cases.
Special hunting permits.
Prosecution of insurance fraud cases.
A public prosecutor who is involved with a
corporation that investigates possible arson
and insurance fraud cases for insurance companies should not also be representing the state
in the prosecution of similar cases. State v.
Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah 1986).
Special hunting permits.
Governor's policy statement barring Division

of Wildlife Resources employees from participating in future drawings for "once-m-a-lifetime" hunting permits for buffalo, big horn
sheep and moose did not violate employees'
right of equal protection of the law; even though
there was no evidence of impropriety, it was
within the prerogative of the governor to adopt
a policy to avoid the appearance of impropriety
apparently prompted by previous disproportionate distribution of permits within the division. Utah Pub. Employees' Ass'n v. State, 610
P.2d 1272 (Utah 1980).

392

ADDENDUM D
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5)(e) (1996)

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

67-19-18

67-19-17. Reappointment of employees not retained in
exempt position.
Any career service employee accepting an appointment to an exempt
position who is not retained by the appointing officer, unless discharged for
cause as provided by this act or by regulation, shall:
(1) be appointed to any career service position for which the employee
qualifies in a pay grade comparable to the employee's last position in the
career service provided an opening exists; or
(2) be appointed to any lesser career service position for which the
employee qualifies pending the opening of a position described in Subsection (1) of this section. The director shall maintain a reappointment
register for this purpose and it shall have precedence over other registers.
History: C. 1953, 67-19-17, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 139, § 23.
Meaning of "this act." - The term "this
act," in the preliminary language, means Laws
1979, ch. 139, §§ 1 to 35, which amended

§ 34-35-5 and enacted §§ 67-19-1 to 67-19-6,
67-19-7 to 67-19-12, 67-19-13, 67-19-15, and
67-19-16 to 67-19-29.
Cross-References. — Grievance and appeals procedure, § 67-19a-301 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Holland v. Career Serv. Review Bd.,
856 P.2d 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds — Disciplinary action — Procedure — Reductions in
force.
(1) Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted:
(a) to advance the good of the public service; or
(b) for just causes such as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to
the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in
office.
(2) Employees may not be dismissed because of race, sex, age, disability,
national origin, religion, political affiliation, or other nonmerit factor including
the exercise of rights under this chapter.
(3) The director shall establish rules governing the procedural and documentary requirements of disciplinary dismissals and demotions.
(4) If an agency head finds that a career service employee is charged with
aggravated misconduct or that retention of a career service employee would
endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the public
interest, the employee may be suspended pending the administrative appeal to
the department head as provided in Subsection (5).
(5) (a) A career service employee may not be demoted or dismissed unless
the department head or designated representative has complied with this
subsection.
(b) The department head or designated representative notifies the
employee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal or demotion.
(c) The employee has no less than five working days to reply and have
the reply considered by the department head.
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67-19-18

STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

(d) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department
head or designated representative.
(e) Following the hearing, the employee may be dismissed or demoted if
the department head finds adequate cause or reason.
(6) (a) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of
workload, or lack of work are governed by retention rosters established by
the director.
(b) Under those circumstances:
(i) The agency head shall designate the category of work to be
eliminated, subject to review by the director.
(ii) Temporary and probationary employees shall be separated
before any career service employee,
(iii) (A) Career service employees shall be separated in the order of
their retention points, the employee with the lowest points to be
discharged first.
(B) Retention points for each career service employee shall be
computed according to rules established by the director, allowing
appropriate consideration for proficiency and for seniority in state
government, including any active duty military service fulfilled
subsequent to original state appointment.
(iv) A career service employee who is separated in a reduction in
force shall be:
(A) placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsection 67-19-17(2); and
(B) reappointed without examination to any vacancy for which
the employee is qualified which occurs within one year of the date
of the separation.
(c) (i) An employee separated due to a reduction in force may appeal to
the department head for an administrative review.
(ii) The notice of appeal must be submitted within 20 working days
after the employee's receipt of written notification of separation.
(iii) The employee may appeal the decision of the department head
according to the grievance and appeals procedure of this act.
History: C. 1953, 67-19-18, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 139, § 24; 1983, ch. 332, § 9; 1991,
ch. 204, § 5; 1995, ch. 130, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added subsection
designations and substituted "service" for "interest" in Subsection (1), substituted "disabillty" for "physical handicap" in Subsection (2),
and made related and stylistic changes.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this

act," at the end of Subsection (6)(c)(ui), literally
means Laws 1983, ch. 332, §§ 1 to 9, which
appear as various sections throughout this
chapter (see Table of Session Laws in Tables
volume). However, given the context m which it
is used, it seems that the term is meant to refer
to Laws 1979, ch. 139, §§ 1 to 35. See note
under same catchhne following § 67-19-17.
Cross-References. — Grievance and appeal
procedure, § 67-19a-301 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Dismissal of employee.
State employee accountant who pleaded
guilty to forging U.S. Treasury checks and who
had failed to keep his supervisor informed of
the progress of the case was properly dismissed

by procedures conducted within the bounds of
this section and Utah Rule Admin P R468-11
Kent v Department of Emp. Sec, 860 P2d 984
Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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ADDENDUM E
Utah Admin. Code Rl37-1-20(1) (1994)

State of Utah

GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL
PROCEDURES MANUAL
January 1,1994

[ATTORNEY GENERAL,
^ C I 0 1993
RECEIVED

STEPHEN G SCHWENDIMAN
ATTORNEY GENERALS OFFICE
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
236 STATE CAPITOL

Career Service Review Board

B.

Sealing Evidence. The administrator, the board, or the hearing officer may exercise authority to
seal the record when circumstances so warrant.

C.

Media Presence. All hearings at the evidentiary/step 5 and appellate/step 6 levels are open to
the media, unless otherwise closed due to R137-1-19A above, except that television cameras shall
not be permitted at the evidentiary/step 5 proceedings.

D.

Dissemination. The administrator has discretion to release copies of legal decisions, orders, and
rulings to a media representative upon the latter's request. Portions of or entire legal decisions
and orders may be withheld if deemed to be of a privileged or confidential nature, or if the
record is sealed.

R137-1-20. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearings.
A.

B.

C.

Authority of Hearing Officers. The hearing officer is empowered to:
1.

maintain order, insure the development of a clear and complete record, rule upon offers
of proof, and receive relevant evidence;

2.

set reasonable limits on repetitive and cumulative testimony and exclude any witness
whose later testimony might be colored by the testimony of another witness or any person
whose presence might have a chilling effect on another testifying witness;

3.

rule on motions, exhibit lists, and proposed findings;

4.

require the filing of memoranda of law and the presentation of oral argument with respect
to any question of law;

5.

compel testimony and order the production of evidence and the appearance of witnesses;
and

6.

admit evidence that has reasonable and probative value.

Conduct of Hearings. A hearing shall be confined to those issues related to the subject matter
presented in the original grievance statement.
1.

An evidentiarv proceeding shall not be allowed to develop into a general inquiry into the
policies and operations of an agency.

2.

An evidentiary proceeding is intended solely to receive evidence that either refutes or
substantiates specific claims or charges. It shall not be made an occasion for irresponsible
accusations, general attacks upon the character or conduct of the employing agency or the
employee or others, or for making derogatory assertions having no bearing on the claims
or specific matters under review.

Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing. An evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new hearing for the record,
held de novo, with both parties being granted full administrative process as follows:
1.

The CSRB hearing officer shall first make factual findings based solely on the evidence
presented at the hearing without deference to any prior factual findings of the agency.
The CSRB hearing officer shall then determine whether: (a) the factual findings made
from the evidentiary/step 5 hearing support with substantial evidence the allegations made
by the agency or the appointing authority, and (b) the agency has correctly applied
relevant policies, rules, and statutes.
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2.

When the CSRB hearing officer determines in accordance with the procedures set forth
above that the evidentiary/step 5 factual findings support the allegations of the agency or
the appointing authority, then the CSRB hearing officer must determine whether the
agency's decision, including any disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive,
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. In making this latter
determination, the CSRB hearing officer shall give deference to the decision of the agency
or the appointing authority unless the agency's penalty is determined to be excessive,
disproportionate or constitutes an abuse of discretion in which instance the CSRB hearing
officer shall determine the appropriate remedy.

D.

Discretion. Upon commencement, the hearing officer shall announce that the hearing is
convened and is henceforth on the record. The hearing officer shall note appearances for the
record and shall determine which party has the burden of moving forward.

E.

Closing of the Record. After all testimony, documentary evidence, and arguments have been
presented, the hearing officer shall close the record and terminate the proceeding, unless one or
both parties agree to submit a posthearing brief within a specified time.

F.

Posthearing Briefs. When posthearing briefs or memoranda of law are scheduled to be
submitted, the record shall remain open until the briefs are received by the hearing officer and
incorporated into the record, or until the time to receive such briefs has expired. After receipt
of posthearing documents, or upon the expiration of the time to receive posthearing documents,
the case is then taken under advisement, and the tolling period commences for the issuance of
the written decision.

G.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. Following the closing of the record, the hearing officer
shall make and enter a written decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
decision and order is filed with the administrator and without further action becomes the decision
and order of the evidentiary hearing.

H.

Disseminating Decisions. The administrator shall disseminate copies of the decision and order
to the persons of record for each party.

I.

Past Work Record. In those proceedings where a disciplinary penalty is at issue, the past
employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of cither mitigating or sustaining the
penalty in the event that the employee is found guilty of the disciplinary charge alleged.

J.

Scope of Remedy/Relief. If the hearing officer finds that the action complained of which was
taken by the appointing authority was too severe, even though for good cause, the hearing officer
may provide for such other remedy or relief as deemed appropriate and in the best interest of
the respective parties.

K.

Compliance and Enforcement. State agencies and officials are expected to comply with decisions
and orders issued by a hearing officer, unless an appeal is taken to the appellate/step 6 level.
Enforcement measures available to the board include: (1) involving the governor, who may
remove most state officers with or without cause ,and with respect to those who can only be
removed for cause, refusal to obey a lawful order may constitute sufficient cause for removal; (2)
a mandamus order to compel the official to obey the order; and (3) the charge of a Class A
misdemeanor.

L.

No Rehearings. Rehearings are not permitted.
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ADDENDUM F
Division of Wildlife Resources, Administrative Procedures, Rules of
Conduct, II-10.5, January 1982, R. 241.

Administrative Procedures
Rules of Conduct

II - 10.4

January 1982

Debts

Public confidence is impaired when employees manage their affairs so loosely
as to be in debt constantly. All personnel should, therefore, pay as promptly
as possible all just obligations and legal liabilities incurred,

II - 10.5

Abuses of Authority

The authority a Division employee may exercise is specified by law. These
bounds should not be transgressed bocause it places an employee in a position
where he/she has no legal protection and exposes the employee and the Division
to serious criticism and possible civil suit. Employees are members of the
local community and are expected to conduct themselves as respectable
citizens. They should never deviate from strict observance of city, county or
State laws except as absolutely required in the performance of their official
duties.
Personnel shall not engage in hunting and fishing activities for which a
license is required without having in possession the appropriate license*

II - 10.6

Rumors

Malicious rumors about other members of the Division should netrer be
repeated. Critical or personal remarks which might tend to cause dissension
or rumors about other employees should be avoided. Such remarks will be
interpreted as marks of disloyalty.
Employees are encouraged to privately resolve personal differences and to help
maintain a spirit of unity and cooperation. Publicly criticizing the laws and
regulations which they are required to enforce, but about which they may have
a contrary personal opinion, must be avoided.

II - 10.7

Use of Intoxicants

The use of intoxicants while on duty is strictly forbidden. In addition,
"off-hours" drinking to excess seriously reflects on the entire Division.
use of intoxicants while driving a State vehicle is strictly forbidden.

The

The employee's reputation, as well as the reputation of the Division, is at
stake whenever intoxicants are involved. Excessive use of intoxicants at any
time, shall constitute grounds for dismissal.
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ADDENDUM G
Utah Admin. Code Rl37-1-22(4) (1997)
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(11) Rehearings. Rehearings are not permitted.
(12) Reconsideration.
(a) Section 63-46b-13 of the UAPA is incorporated by reference within this rule, and
requests for reconsideration of an evidentiary/step 5 decision will be conducted in
accordance with that section, except for the time period which is stated below.
(b) The written reconsideration request must contain specific reasons why a
reconsideration is warranted with respect to the factual findings and legal conclusions
of the evidentiary/step 5 decision. The same CSRB hearing officer shall decide the
propriety of a reconsideration. A request for reconsideration is filed with the
administrator. To be timely the written request for reconsideration shall befiledwithin
ten working days upon receipt of the evidentiary/step 5 decision according to the time
period at Subsection 67-19a-407(l)(a)(i), not Section 63-46b-13.
(c) An appeal to the appellate/step 6 level from a CSRB hearing officer's reconsideration
decision and order must be filed within ten working days upon receipt of the
reconsideration or within ten working days after expiration of the time for receipt of
the reconsideration, whichever is first.
R137-1-22. The Board's Appellate/Step 6 Procedures.
(1) Transcript Production. The party appealing the CSRB hearing officer's evidentiary/step 5
decision to the board at the appellate/step 6 level shall order transcription of the
evidentiary/step 5 hearing from the court reporting firm within ten working days upon
receipt of acknowledgment of the appeal from the administrator.
(a) The appellant shall share an equal fee payment with the CSRB Office to the court
reporting firm. Transcript production cost-sharing applies equally only to the appellant
and to the CSRB Office. The CSRB Office receives the transcript original; the
appellant receives a transcript copy.
(b) The respondent may inquire of the CSRB Office about obtaining a transcript copy, or
may directly purchase a copyfromthe court reporting firm.
(2) Briefs. An appeal hearing before the board at step 6 is based upon the evidentiary record
previously established by the CSRB hearing officer during the evidentiary/step 5 hearing.
No additional or new evidence is permitted unless compelled by the board.
(a) The appellant in an appellate/step 6 proceeding must obtain the transcript of the
evidentiary/step 5 hearing. After receipt of the transcript, the appellant has 30 calendar
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days to file an original and six copies of a brief with the administrator. Additionally,
the respondent must be provided with a copy of the appellant's brief.
(b) After receiving a copy of the appellant's brief, the respondent then has 30 calendar days
to file an original and six copies of a brief with the administrator. The appellant may
file an original and six copies of a reply brief which addresses the respondent's brief.
(c) After receiving both parties' briefs, the administrator distributes the briefs and the
CSRB hearing officer's evidentiary/step 5 decision to the board members.
(d) Each party is responsible forfilingits original and six copies with the CSRB Office and
for exchanging a copy with the opposing party.
(e) Briefs shall be date-stamped upon their receipt in the CSRB Office.
(f) The time frame for receiving briefs shall be modified or waived only for good cause
as determined by the CSRB chair or vice-chair, or the administrator.
(3) Rules of Procedure. The following rules are applicable to appeal hearings before the board
at the appellate/step 6 level:
(a) Dismissal of Appeal. Upon a motion by either party or upon its own motion, the board
may dismiss any appeal prior to holding a formal appeal hearing if the appeal is clearly
moot, without merit, improperly filed, untimely filed, or outside the scope of the
board's authority.
(b) Notice. The board shall distribute written notice of the date, time, place, and issues for
hearing to the aggrieved employee, to the employee's counsel or representative, to the
appropriate agency official, to the agency's counsel or representative, and to the
agency's management representative, at least five working days before the date set for
the hearing.
(c) Compelling Evidence. The board may compel evidence in the conduct of its appeal
hearings, according to Subsection 67-19a-202(3).
(d) Oral Argument/Time Limitation. The board grants up to 20 to 25 minutes to each party
for oral argument. The board may grant additional time when deemed appropriate.
(e) Oral Argument Set Aside. If the board determines that oral argument is unnecessary,
the parties shall be notified. However, the parties' representatives may be expected to
appear before the board at the date, time, and place noticed to answer any questions
raised by the board members.
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(f) Argument or Memoranda. The board may require the parties to offer oral argument or
submit written memoranda of law.
(4) The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards of review are based upon the
following criteria:
(a) The board shallfirstmake a determination of whether the factual findings of the CSRB
hearing officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial evidence
standard. When the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing
officer are not reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a
whole, then the board may, in its discretion, correct the factualfindings,and also make
new or additional factual findings.
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing
officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the factual findings based upon the
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then determine whether the CSRB
hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes according
to the correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the evidentiary/step 5
decision of the CSRB hearing officer.
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing officer,
including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational
based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant policies,
rules, and statutes determined according to the above provisions.
(5) Appeal Hearing Record. The proceeding before the board shall be recorded by a certified
court reporter, or in exceptional circumstances by a recording machine.
(6) Appellate Review. Upon a party's application for review of the CSRB hearing officer's
evidentiary/step 5 decision, the board's appellate/step 6 decision is based upon a review of
the record, including briefs and oral arguments presented at step 6, and no further
evidentiary hearing will be held unless otherwise ordered by the board. Section 63-46b-10
of the UAPA is incorporated by reference.
(7) Remand. Until the board's decision is final, the board may remand the case to the original
CSRB hearing officer to take additional evidence or to resolve any further evidentiary issues
of fact or law with instructions or may make any other appropriate disposition of the appeal.
(8) Distribution of Appellate Decisions. The board's decision and order is issued on the date
that it is signed and dated by the CSRB chair, vice-chair or another board member. After
the board's appellate/step 6 decision is issued, it is distributed according to Rl37-1-8(3).
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ADDENDUM H
Utah Personnel Review Board State Employees' Grievance and Appeals
Procedure. Rule 19.8.2 (1983)

UTAH

P E R S O N N E L

STATE
G R I E V A N C E

REVIEW

E M P L O Y E E S
AND

BOARD

1

A P P E A L S

P R O C E D U R E
1983

E D I T I O N

The statutory basis for the Utah State Employees1 Grievance and Appeals
Procedure is set forth in the Utah Personnel Management Act, which originated
as Senate Bill 179 (1979). That act became effective July 1, 1979. Senate
Bill 73, enacted during the 1980 legislative session, provided further
amendments to the original legislation; as did Senate Bill 271 in 1981. The
1983 Legislature enacted S.B. 85 and H.B. 196 both of which again amended the
grievance and appeals process.
Statutory references may be found at Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18, and
Sections § 67-19-25 through § 67-19-29, 1953, as amended, and in the
corresponding annual volumes of Laws of Utah.

19.5.4 The Board shall employ an administrator who shall serve as
Executive Secretary to the Board and such additional staff as necessary.
19.5.5 Employees of the Board shall serve as exempt from the career
service of the State.
19.6

Authority

19.6.1 The Board shall have authority to subpoena witnesses,
documents, or other evidence in conjunction with any inquiry, investigation,
hearing or other proceeding.
19.6.2 Any Board member may administer oaths, certify official acts,
and subpoena witnesses, documents or other evidence in conjunction with any
inquiry, investigation, hearing or other proceeding.

19.6.3 The Board may, at its discretion, order that an Employee be
placed on the reappointment roster as provided for at Utah Code Ann. 67-19-17
for assignment to another Agency.
19.7 Rules of Procedure:
19.7.1 Written notice of the date, time and place for hearing by the
Board shall be given to the aggrieved Employee, to the Employee's
Representative, to the Agency, and to the Agency's counsel or representative
at least 5 days before the date set for the hearing.
19.7.2 Informal evidentiary procedural rules are applicable in
appeals before the Board.
19.7.3 The Board may compel evidence in the conduct of its appeals
and can remand cases back to the Hearing Officer for additional evidence and
testimony.
19.7.4 Hearings before the Board may be reported either by a
certified court reporter or by a recording machine. The complete transcript
of the hearing shall constitute the record of the hearing together with all
written decisions, orders, exhibits and written briefs.
19.8

Standards of Review:

19.8.1 The Board's decision shall be supported by credible
substantial evidence.
19.8.2 The Board's standards of review consist of determining
whether the Hearing Officer's decision was supported by substantial evidence
and whether that decision is warranted by the facts.
19.9 Board Decisions:
19.9.1 The Board shall render a written decision and order within 40
working days after the close of the hearing.
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ADDENDUM I
Utah Admin. Code R477-1 l-l(3)(e) (1996)

State of Utah

Human Resource Management Rules
July 1996

Mso Mailable at tatp.ffawN.dtonvnt-u%

pursuant to 67-19-6(1) Utah Code Annotated, as amended

R477-11. Discipline.
11-1. Disciplinary Action.
(1)

Agency management may discipline any employee for any of the following reasons:
(a)

noncompliance with these rules, agency or other applicable policies, including but not limited to
safety policies, agency professional standards and workplace policies;

(b)

work performance that is inefficient or incompetent;

(c)

failure to maintain skills and adequate performance levels;

(d)

insubordination or disloyalty to the orders of a superior;

(e)

misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance or failure to advance the good of the public service;

(f)

any incident involving intimidation, physical harm or threats of physical harm against
co-workers, management, or the public.

(2)

All disciplinary actions of career service employees shall be governed by principles of due process.
In all such cases, except as provided under Subsection 67-19-18(4), the disciplinary process shall
include all of the following:
(a)

The agency representative notifies the employee in writing of the proposed discipline and the
reasons.

(b)

The employee must reply within five working days in order to have the agency representative
consider the reply before discipline is imposed.

(c)

If an employee waives therightto respond or does not reply within the time frame established
by the agency representative or withinfivedays, whichever is longer, discipline may be imposed
in accordance with these rules.

(3)

After a career service employee has been informed of the reasons for the proposed discipline and
has been given an opportunity to respond and be responded to, the agency representative may
discipline that employee, or any non-career service employee not subject to the same procedural
lights, by imposing one or more of the following:
(a)

Written reprimand

(b)

Suspension without pay up to 30 calendar days per incident requiring discipline

(c)

Demotion of any employee through one of the following methods:
(i)

An employee may be moved from a position in one class to a position in another class
having a lower entrance salary if the duties of the position have been reduced for
disciplinary reasons.

(ii)

A demotion within the employee's current pay range may be accomplished by lowering the
employee's salary rate back on the range, as determined by the agency head or designee.

(d)

Dismissal
(i)

An agency head shall dismiss or demote a career service employee only in accordance
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with the provision of Subsection 6 7 - 1 9 - 1 8 ( 5 ) . S e e R 4 7 7 - 1 1 - 2 of these rules.
(e)

(4)

W h e n deciding the specific type and severity of the discipline to administer to any employee,
the agency representative may consider the following factors:
(i)

Consistent application of rules and standards

(B)

Prior knowledge of rules and standards

(iii)

T h e severity of the infraction

Civ)

T h e repeated nature of violations

(v)

Prior disciplinary/corrective actions

(vi)

Previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions

(vii)

T h e employee's past work record

(viii)

T h e effect on agency operations

(ix)

T h e potential of the violations for causing d a m a g e to persons or property.

If an agency determines that a career service employee endangers or threatens the peace and
safety of others or poses a grave threat to the public service or is charged with aggravated or
repeated misconduct, the agency m a y impose the following actions, a s provided by 67-19-18-(4),
pending an investigation and determination of facts:
(a)

Paid administrative leave

(b)

Temporary reassignment to another position or work location at the s a m e rate of pay

(5)

At the time disciplinary action is imposed, the employee be notified in writing of the discipline, the
reasons for the discipline, the effective date and length of the discipline.

(6)

Disciplinary actions are subject to the grievance and appeals procedure as provided by law for
career service employees only. T h e employee and the agency representative may agree in writing
to waive or extend any grievance step, or the time limits specified for any grievance step.

11-2. Dismissal o r D e m o t i o n .
An employee m a y be dismissed or demoted for cause as explained under R477-10-2 and
R477-11-1 of these rules, and through the process outlined in this rule.
(1)

An agency head or appointing officer m a y dismiss or demote a non-career service status employee
without right of appeal by providing written notification to the employee specifying the reasons for
the dismissal or demotion and the effective date.

(2)

No employee shall be dismissed or demoted from a career service position unless the agency
head or designee has observed the Grievance Procedure Rules and law cited in R137-1 -13 and
Title 6 7 , Chapter 19a and the following procedures:
(a)

T h e agency head or designee shall notify the employee in writing of the specific reasons for the
dismissal or demotion.

(b)

T h e employee shall have up to five working days to reply. T h e employee must reply within five
working days for the agency representative to consider the reply before discipline is imposed.

(c)

T h e employee shall have an opportunity to be heard by the agency head or designee.
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ADDENDUM J
Utah Admin. Code R657-37-4(8)(a) and (b) (1996), R.162-167

R657. Natural Resources, Wildlife Resources,
R657-37. Posted Hunting Units for Big Game.
R657-37-1. Purpose and Authority.
(1)
Under authority of Section 23-23-3, this rule provides
the standards and procedures applicable to posted hunting units
organized for the hunting of big game.
(2) Posted hunting units are established to:
(a) provide income to landowners;
(b) create satisfying hunting opportunities;
(c) increase wildlife resources;
(d) provide adequate protection to landowners who open their
lands for hunting; and
(e) provide the general public access to private lands for
hunting big game.
R657-37-2. Definitions.
Terms used in this rule are defined in Sections 23-13-2 and
23-23-2.
R657-37-3. Operation by Landowner Association.
(1)(a) Posted hunting units must be operated by a landowner
or landowners who own land within the posted hunting unit or a
posted hunting unit agent who leases or otherwise controls hunting
on land within the posted hunting unit.
(b) A landowner or landowner association may appoint posted
hunting unit agents to protect private property and operate the
posted hunting unit, however the landowner or landowner association
must assume ultimate responsibility for the operation of the posted
hunting unit.
(2) (a)
The minimum allowable acreage for a posted hunting
unit is 10,000 contiguous acres.
(b) The Wildlife Board may approve a posted hunting unit that
is less than 10,000 contiguous acres only if it is in the best
interest of wildlife, landowners, and the public.
(3) (a) Posted hunting units shall consist of as much private
land as possible.
(b) All public lands, including federal or state lands, may
be included within a posted hunting unit only if:
(i) the public land is completely surrounded by private land;
(ii) the public land is otherwise inaccessible to the general
public; and
(iii)
the landowner complies with all federal and state
requirements applicable to operating the posted hunting unit on
public lands.
(c) The Wildlife Board may grant variances to land which may
be included within a posted hunting unit.
(4) (a) A landowner association or posted hunting unit agent
may enter into reciprocal agreements with any other landowner
association or posted hunting unit agent to allow hunters who have
obtained a posted hunting unit permit to hunt within each other's
posted hunting units as provided in Subsection R657-37-4(8).
(b) If a person is authorized to hunt in one or more posted
hunting units as provided in Subsection (a) , written permission
from the landowner association must be in the person's possession

olG?

while hunting.
(5) (a) A person who has obtained a posted hunting unit permit
through the big game drawing shall be provided an opportunity to
hunt big game on a specific posted hunting unit commensurate to the
opportunity provided to a person who has otherwise obtained a
posted hunting unit permit.
(b) A person who has obtained a posted hunting unit permit
may hunt only in the posted hunting unit for which the permit was
issued, except as provided under Subsection (4)(b).
R657-37-4. Application for Certificate of Registration.
(1) Applications for posted hunting units are available from
division offices and division game biologists.
(2) In addition to the application, the landowner association
shall provide:
(a)
a management plan specifying the big game management
objectives for the posted hunting unit which must be consistent
with division objectives for the respective big game units;
(b) a petition containing the signature and acreage of each
participating landowner agreeing to establish and operate the
posted hunting unit as provided in this proclamation, Title 23,
Chapter 23 of the Wildlife Resources Code and Rule R657-37;
(c)
a 1:100,000 USGS land ownership map of the proposed
posted hunting unit;
(d) the name of the designated posted hunting unit agent; and
(e) a $5 non refundable application fee.
(3)
The division shall, upon request of the applicant,
provide assistance in preparing the management plan and map for the
proposed posted hunting unit.
(4)
Applications must be completed and returned to the
division game biologist in the region in which the posted hunting
unit is to be established prior to August 1.
(5)
The division may return any application that is
incomplete or completed incorrectly.
(6) The division shall forward the application and required
documentation to the Wildlife Board for consideration.
(7) Upon receipt of the application, required documentation
and appropriate fee the Wildlife Board may:
(a)
issue a certificate of registration authorizing the
landowner association to operate a posted hunting unit; or
(b)
deny
the
application
and
provide
the
landowner
association with reasons for the denial.
(8) (a) A landowner association or posted hunting unit agent
must
request
an amendment
to the
original
certificate
of
registration for any variation of the following:
(i) to allow hunters who have obtained a posted hunting unit
permit to hunt within each other's posted hunting units;
(ii) season dates;
(iii) method of harvest;
(iv) permit and tag allocation;
(v)
additional property to be included within the posted
hunting unit; and
(vi) any other matter related to the management and operation
of the posted hunting unit not originally
included in the

certificate of registration.
(b) Requests for an amendment to a certificate of registration
must be made in writing and submitted to the appropriate division
regional supervisor and wildlife manager.
(c) Upon approval, an amendment to the original certificate
of registration shall be issued in writing.
(9)
The Wildlife Board shall consider any violation of the
provisions of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code and any information
provided by the division, landowners, and the public in determining
whether to issue a certificate of registration for a posted hunting
unit.
(10)
Posted hunting unit certificates of registration are
issued on an annual basis and shall expire on January 31.
R657-37-5. Renewal of a Certificate of Registration.
(1) The landowner association may request the Wildlife Board
to renew a certificate of registration for a posted hunting unit by
completing and submitting a renewal
application
and a non
refundable $5 renewal fee.
(2)(a)
Any changes from the previous year's certificate of
registration must be indicated on the renewal application.
(b)
The Wildlife
Board
shall
consider
the
previous
performance of the posted hunting unit including the actions of the
landowner, landowner association and posted hunting unit agent when
reviewing renewal of the certificate of registration.
(3) (a) If the landowner association requests additional land
to be included in the posted hunting unit, the application must
contain the signatures of the additional
landowners
and a
1:100,000 USGS land ownership map showing the new proposed
boundary.
(b)
If the landowner association requests land to be
withdrawn from the posted hunting unit, the application must
include:
(i)
a copy of the previously submitted petition with the
appropriate landowners' signatures deleted; and
(ii)
a 1:100,000 USGS land ownership map showing the new
proposed boundary.
(4)
Renewal applications must be submitted to the division
prior to September 1.
(5) The division shall forward the renewal application to the
Wildlife Board for consideration.
(6) Upon receipt of the application, required documentation
and appropriate fee the Wildlife Board may:
(a)
issue a certificate of registration authorizing the
landowner association to operate a posted hunting unit; or
(b)
deny
the
application
and
provide
the
landowner
association with reasons for the denial.
(7)
The Wildlife Board shall consider any violation of the
provisions of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code, Rule R657-37, any
of the stipulations specified on the certificate of registration,
and any information provided by the division, a member of a posted
hunting unit, or the public in determining whether to renew a
certificate of registration for a posted hunting unit.
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R657-37-6.

Posted Hunting Unit Agents.

(1)
A landowner association may appoint one posted hunting
unit agent per 1000 acres, up to a maximum of 15 agents, to monitor
access and protect the private property of the posted hunting unit.
(2) Each posted hunting unit agent shall wear or have in his
possession a form of identification prescribed by the Wildlife
Board which indicates he is a posted hunting unit agent.
(3)
A posted hunting unit agent may refuse entry into a
posted hunting unit to any person, except owners of land within the
unit and their employees, who:
(a)
does not have in his possession a posted hunting unit
permit;
(b) endangers or has endangered human safety;
(c) damages or has damaged private property within a posted
hunting unit; or
(d) fails or has failed to comply with reasonable rules of a
landowner association.
(4) In performing the functions described in this section, a
posted hunting unit agent shall comply with the relevant laws of
this state.
R657-37-7, Permit Allocation.
(1) The division shall issue posted hunting unit permits for
hunting big game to permittees:
(a) qualifying through a general public drawing; or
(b) named by the posted hunting unit agent or landowner.
(2)
Permits shall not be issued to a landowner, landowner
association or posted hunting unit agents.
(3)
The division and the landowner association shall, in
accordance with the tables provided in Subsection (4) , jointly
determine:
(a) the total number of permits to be issued for the posted
hunting unit, including the number of permits issued through the
big game drawing; and
(b)
the number of permits that may be offered by the
landowner association
to the general public
as defined
in
Subsections 23-23-2(4) and 23-23-2(5).
(4) Permits may be allocated as follows:
TABLE 1
MOOSE AND PRONGHORN
Posted Hunting Unit's Share
Option
Antlered

1
2
Public's Share
Option
1
2

60%
60%
Antlered
40%
40%
TABLE 2

Antlerless

0%
40%
Antlerless
0%
60%

ELK AND DEER
Posted Hunting Unit's Share
Antlereci
Option

1
2
3
4
5
Public* s Share
Option
1
2
3
4
5

90%
85%
80%
75%
50%
Antlered
10%
15%
20%
25%
50%

Antlerless
0%
25%
40%
50%
0%
Antlerless
100%
75%
60%
50%
0%

(5)
If the division recommends that antlerless deer or elk
should not be taken within a posted hunting unit because of
decreased or declining populations, up to 90% of the permits
recommended for that posted hunting unit may be allocated to the
landowner association.
At least 10% of the permits allocated to
the posted hunting unit shall be offered to the public through the
big game drawing.
(6) If public land is included within the unit boundaries the
public shall receive additional permits based on the percentage of
public lands included within the unit.
(7)
Landowner associations shall provide access free of
charge to any person who has received a posted hunting unit permit
through the general public big game drawing, except as provided in
Section 23-23-11.
(8) If the division and the landowner association disagree on
the number of permits to be issued, the number of permits allocated
for a species or sex of big game, or the method of take, the
Wildlife Board shall determine the number of permits to be issued
based on the biological needs of the big game herds, including
available forage, depredation, and other mitigating factors.
(9) A posted hunting unit permit entitles the holder to hunt
the species and sex of big game specified on the permit and only in
accordance with certificate of registration and the rules and
proclamations of the Wildlife Board.
(10) Antlerless permits may be sold by landowner associations
to any eligible person regardless of whether the person has
obtained a bull or a buck permit through the general public big
game drawing.
(11)
A person may not obtain more than one permit for each
species of big game, except antlerless deer permits.
(12) A complete list of the current posted hunting units, big
game hunts, and the date, time, and number of permits available for
public drawing shall be published in the annual proclamation of the
Wildlife Board for taking big game.
R657-37-8. Permit Cost.
The fee for permits allocated to any posted hunting unit is
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the same as the cost of the applicable limited entry, premium
limited entry or once-m-a-lifetime permit available through the
general public big game drawing.
R657-37-9,
Possession of Permits and License by Hunters
Restrictions.
(1) A person may not hunt m a posted hunting unit without
having in his possession:
(a) a valid posted hunting unit permit; and
(b) the necessary hunting licenses, tags, and stamps.
(2) A posted hunting unit permit:
(a) entitles the holder to hunt only in the unit specified on
the permit pursuant to the rules of the Wildlife Board and does not
entitle the holder to hunt on any other public or private land,
except as provided under Subsection R657-37-3(4) (b) ;and
(b) constitutes written permission for trespass as required
under Section 23-20-14.
(3) Prior to hunting on a posted hunting unit each permittee
must:
(a) contact the relevant landowner association and request
the posted hunting unit rules and requirements; and
(b) make arrangements with the landowner association for the
hunt.
R657-37-10. Season Lengths.
(1) A landowner association or posted hunting unit agent may
arrange for permittees to hunt on the posted hunting unit during
the following dates:
(a)
general season buck deer, general season bull elk,
pronghorn, and moose seasons may be established September 1 through
October 31;
(b) archery buck deer and archery bull elk seasons may be
established beginning with opening of the general archery deer
season through October 31;
(c)
muzzleloader deer and elk seasons may be established
September 1 through the end of the state muzzleloader season;
(d)
antlerless elk seasons may be established August 15
through January 31; and
(e)
antlerless deer seasons may be established August 15
through December 31.
(2)
The Wildlife Board may make variances to the seasons
provided in Subsection (1) for good cause.
R657-37-11. Rights-of-way.
Landowner associations may not restrict established public
access to public land enclosed by the posted hunting unit.
KEY: wildlife, posted hunting unit
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ADDENDUM K
Career Service Review Board decision, Division of Parks and Recreation v.
Robert O. Anderson and D. Dennis Weaver, 3 PRB 22, issued February 13,
1987.
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Office of A(TOiiNEv GENERAL
BEFORE THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTffld STATE CAPITOL

I n the Matter of t h e Appeal o f :

:

DIVISION OF PARKS and RECREATION,

:

Appellant,

D E C I S I O N

v.

AND

ROBERT 0. ANDERSON AND

*

D. DENNIS WEAVER,
Respondents/Grievants.

:

ORDER

CASE No. 3 PRB 22 (1986)

The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument before the Personnel
Review Board ("Board11) as an appeal hearing, pursuant to notice, on December
18, 1986. The following Board members were present: Bruce T. Jones,
Chairman; Anita C. Bradford; Dalmas H. Nelson; Mary Graham-Payne; and Jose L.
Trujillo.
The Division of Parks and Recreation ("Appellant" and "Division") was
represented by Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. Schwendiman, Chief, Tax
and Business Regulation Division, and Assistant Attorney General J. Stephen
Mikita, both of the Attorney General's Office. Division director Jerry A.
Miller and Department of Natural Resources' personnel manager, Margo
Silvester, were present. L. Zane Gill, Attorney at Law and legal counsel to
the Utah Public Employees' Association represented Mr. Anderson ("Anderson,"
"Grievant"), who was not present.

John T. Caine, Attorney at Law, served as

legal counsel for Mr. Weaver ("Weaver," "Grievant"), who was present.
A certified court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceeding before
the Board, which has not been transcribed.
transcript

However, a two-volume

was transcribed and typed from the record established at the

Step 5 or evidentiary level hearing.

Both parties, the Division and the

Grievants, had access to the Step 5 transcript for the purposes of submitting
legal briefs and for making oral argument before the Board.

Thus prior to

this Step 6 appeal hearing, Board members received each Grievant's brief
together with Hearing Officer John Paul Kennedy's Finding of Facts,
Conclusions of Law and Decision ("Step 5 Decision").
The Board's statutory authority is found under provision of the State
Personnel Management Act, at Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Sections
67-19 et seq., especially sections 67-19-20 through 67-19-25 which set fortn
the Board1s responsibilities and appellate jurisdiction.

The Board's

regulatory provisions are published as the State Employees' Grievance and
Appeals Procedure (1983 ed.), commonly cited as Board Rules.

This case

proceeded properly and timely before the Board which has jurisdiction over the
Division's appeal.
Subsequent to hearing oral argument on December 18, 1986 the Board took
the case under advisement and then deliberated in an executive session with
all members present on December 29.

Now being fully apprised of the facts and

issues as well as both the oral and written arguments, the Board hereby makes
and enters its conclusions, decision and order.

I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

A. Dismissal.
At the time of his dismissal from the Division, Robert 0. Anderson had
served with that agency for nearly twenty-four years.

His most recently held

position was that of Regional Manager II, for the agency's Northern Region.
Anderson was issued a letter of dismissal, dated March 10, 1986 under the
signature of Division director Jerry A. Miller, which stated in part:
Based on the fact that you hold the position
of Regional Manager II (a top leadership position
in the Division), you are a member of the
Management Team and a Category I Peace Officer,
you should have been a leader in reporting the
bear killing to proper authorities. Instead you
proceeded to take parts of the bear as souvenirs,
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watched as others took parts of the bear and
moved the bear to conceal it. You then agreed to
the "cover up" of the entire incident. MDU are
guilty of malfeasance and nonfeasance in office.
I cannot trust you to use sound judgment to
faithfully execute your individual responsibility
let alone your duty and responsibility to lead
subordinates. You have violated the trust placed
in you by the Division of Parks and Recreation,
the Department of Natural Resources and the State
of Utah (Mgt. Exh. #5).
Similarly, D. Dennis Weaver had accrued sixteen years of service with the
Division at the time of his dismissal on March 14, 1986. Prior to his
termination from the agency, Weaver had been serving as a Regional Manager II,
with the Division's Central Region.

In his March 10 letter of dismissal to

Weaver, Division director Jerry A. Miller stated:
Based on the fact that you hold the position
of Regional Manager II (a top leadership position
in the Division), you are a member of the
Management Team and a Category I Peace Officer,
you should have been a leader in reporting the
bear killing to proper authorities. Instead you
suggested taking the bear hide as a souvenir,
watched as others took parts of the bear and
moved the bear to conceal it. MDU then agreed to
"cover up" the entire incident. You are guilty
of malfeasance and nonfeasance in office. I
cannot trust you to use sound judgment to
faithfully execute your individual responsibility
let alone your duty and responsibility to lead
subordinates. MDU have violated the trust placed
in you by the division of Parks and Recreation,
the Department of Natural Resources and the State
of Utah (Mgt. Exh. #6).
In respective letters dated March 20, 1986 the Department of Natural
Resources' Executive Director, Dee C. Hansen, sustained both Grievants'
terminations (Mgt. Exh. // 7, 8 ) . Both employees appealed their penalties
through the State's grievance and appeals procedure for career service
employees.

An evidentiary hearing was held on May 8-9, 1986 before a Board

hearing officer. Hearing Officer John Paul Kennedy issued his Step 5 Decision
under date of June 4, 1986. Therein the trier of facts determined that
substantial evidence was lacking to support a finding that either of the
Grievants had been discharged for just cause. Specifically, the hearing
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officer concluded that the penalties of dismissal for not reporting the
killing of the bear were too severe in light of prior service records and that
the evidence did not support a finding that either Grievant was guilty of
malfeasance.

However, he did conclude that both were guilty of nonfeasance

for failing to report the incident of the bear being shot and killed and thus
imposed a six calendar weeks1 suspension without pay for Anderson and a four
calendar weeks1 suspension without pay for Weaver. These suspension
penalties, concluded the hearing officer, were justifiable given the Grievants
non-reporting of the bear-killing incident. Thus, hearing officer Kennedy
ordered Grievants1 retroactive reinstatement with full benefits and salary,
minus his imposed suspension penalties (Step 5 Decision, pp.

5-6).

Pursuant to the issuance of the Step 5 determination, the Division
initiated a timely appeal for an appellate level review with the Board.
B. Step 5 Level Issues and Conclusions of Law.
The "Notice of an Administrative Hearing Before the hearing officer at
Step 5" placed the following two issues before the Hearing Officer for his
adjudication:
1.

Were the Grievants dismissed from State employment for just
cause?

2.

If not, what is the appropriate remedy?2

In addressing these two particular issues, we take particular notice of
hree of the hearing officer's Conclusions of Law:
1. The evidence does not support a finding that
either Grievant was guilty of malfeasance in
office. Neither Grievant was on duty at the time
of the incident. There was no showing that there
is a duty under any statute or regulation to
report the killing of an animal out of season
without a permit (despite the Hearing officer's
specific request for such a citation). Utah Code
Annotated 23-20-4, cited by the State, does not
stand for the proposition that an off-duty peace
officer has a duty to report the unlawful taking
of an animal.
•

*

*
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3. Both Grievants were guilty of "nonfeasance,"
both having failed to report the incident and
such failure continuing into their normal working
hours. The hearing officer concludes that it is
reasonable for Management to have expected that
responsible supervisors such as the Grievants
should have reported an incident like the killing
of a bear out of season. Such report should have
been made within a reasonable time to appropriate
authorities.
*

*

*

6. Management was justified in determining that
the high level positions of the Grievants
constituted adequate reason for more severe
discipline of the Grievants than that which was
given to the other State employees involved in
the incident. Moreover, because Anderson had
primary responsibility for killing the bear and
reporting the incident, Management would have
been justified in issuing more severe discipline
to Anderson than to Weaver. However, the hearing
officer concludes that the degree of additional
severity of discipline issued to the Grievants as
compared to the other State employees is not
justified in these cases.
Pursuant to the foregoing conclusions the hearing officer reduced both
Grievants1 dismissals to suspensions.
C. Division's Appeal.
The Division's brief on appeal sets forth four points which, it claims,
constitute reversible error or prejudicial error of a magnitude sufficient to
warrant a reversal of the Step 5 determination.

Appellant's stated four

points are quoted as follows:
1. The hearing officer erred when he acted as if
he were the primary decision maker instead of
management. This is the wrong standard. He
ignored important and critical evidence as to the
punishment meted out. All such is prejudicial to
the division's decision and grounds for reversal.
2. In ruling that the grievants were off-duty
peace officers and therefore had no obligation to
report the bear killing incident and that this
meant no malfeasance is reversible error.
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3. The hearing officer made significant errors
in his Findings of Fact which led to prejudicial
and reversible errors in his Conclusions of Law.
4. The hearing officer has found an obligation
to report the Bear incident, yet held no
malfeasance because there is no obligation to
report. Such is an irreconcilable conflict which
is reversible error.

D.

Standard of Review
In reaching a decision, the Board must first consider its standard of

review (Board Rules, 19.8.1 and 19.8.2) and the standard of review for the
hearing officer, as follows:

1.

It is appropriate to set forth the standard of review of a step 5

hearing officer.
different.

The roles of the step 5 hearing officer and the Board are

The hearing officer shall have "an ability to arbitrate and

resolve personnel administration disputes and to handle employment relations
in a large work force." Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-20(6).

It is intended

that the hearing officer conduct a hearing de novo for the purpose of taking
and weighing the evidence, making conclusions of law and reaching a decision.
The hearing officer, following the full and complete hearing and the closing
of the record, will make and enter a written decision and order containing
findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The hearing officer's decision and

order will be filed with and distributed to the parties by the Executive
Secretary and shall, without further action, become the decision and order of
the Board (Board Rules, 18.16.1 and 18.16.3).

The hearing officer is not

bound by the factual determinations of the agency.

However, upon making

factual findings, a hearing officer must then decide if such findings
constitute just cause for the agency action.

In regard to this latter duty of

the hearing officer, latitude and discretion should be given to the agency's
decision if made in good faith and if supported by the findings of fact based
on the evidence.

The function of a hearing officer in regard to a decision based on the
factual findings is not to ignore the decision of the agency, which is
presumed to be equipped and informed by experience to deal with a specialized
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field or area of knowledge which the hearing officer should respect. Even
though the hearing officer is not bound by the agency decision, the decision
should be accorded considerable weight and deference if it is supportable by
substantial evidence as elicited by the hearing officer in making factual
findings. More particularly, this means that after making factual findings de
novo, a hearing officer should set aside an agency decision only if the
hearing officer then finds that the factual findings and evidence supporting
the agency decision are not adequate to justify the decision of the agency to
a reasonable person in light of evidentiary facts including, without
limitation, the substantiality of the evidence supporting the factual findings
of the hearing officer, the determination of which party has the burden of
proof (the agency in disciplinary cases and reductions in force), the presence
of mitigating and/or extenuating circumstances, an employee's service record,
any disparity of treatment or selective enforcement of rules, the adequacy of
forewarning or guidance, the consistency in the application of rules and
procedures, the presence of discriminatory or preferential treatment,
longevity of employment, and past rules' violations, etc. The agency decision
then, if supported by substantial evidence, should be given deference by the
hearing officer and considered together with all of the evidentiary factors
noted above in reaching a decision.
2.

The Board is statutorily empowered to serve as a "quasi-judicial"

tribunal to hear cases taken on appeal to "the final administrative appeal
body" of the state employees' grievance procedure.

(See Utah Code Annotated

1953, as amended, Section 67-19-20(5), subsections (a) and (b).) The Board's
review of an appeal encompasses both questions of law and fact or mixed
questions of law and fact, as determined solely on the record made by the
parties at the evidentiary or Step 5 proceeding. Thus, the findings of facts
and conclusions made by hearing officers at Step 5 will not be disturbed on
appeal unless they are (i) not adequately supported by credible substantial
evidence, or (ii) unless they are clearly erroneous, or unsupported, or
(iii) unless they are unwarranted by the facts and circumstances, as e.g.,
where prejudicial error of a harmful nature or reversible error is present
(Board Rules, 19.8.1 and 19.8.2).

As stated previously, in Utah Department of

Transportation v. Thomas V. Rasmussen 2 PRB 19 (1986), this Board recognizes
the established principle of according considerable weight and deference to
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the hearing officer's Step 5 findings and conclusions.

Those findings and

conclusions are entitled to a presumption of correctness and should not be
overturned so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the
record, and the Board in its appellate review should not substitute its
judgment on matters of evidence for that of the hearing officer —
harmful prejudicial or reversible error is present.

unless

(See 73A C.J.S., Public

Administrative Law and Procedure, Section 225, "Harmless or Prejudicial
Error," p. 300.) It is further noted, however, that an evidentiary examiner's
findings and conclusions are not necessarily

unassailable and may even be

reversed by an appellate board when those findings and conclusions are not
clearly erroneous. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 492 (1951).

The

Board has authorized the Executive Secretary to appoint impartial and
qualified hearing officers (Board Rules, 19.5.3).

As noted in the just-cited

Rule and Rule 18.16.3 cited above, the hearing officers represent the Board in
making factual findings, conclusions of law, and reaching a decision.

In

addition, the Board itself "may compel evidence in the conduct of its appeals
and can remand cases back to the hearing officer for additional evidence and
testimony" (Board Rules, 19.7.3).

In summary, the first level of review of

the Board is to determine whether its hearing officers have made factual
findings which are supported by substantial evidence (Board Rules, 19.8.2),
meaning that the evidence must be adequate to a reasonable person to support
said findings. As noted above, if the Board determines that the factual
findings are not or may not be based on substantial evidence, or are otherwise
inadequate, the Board can itself compel evidence or remand the case back to
the hearing officers as its fact finding representatives.
Once the factual findings are established, whether by acceptance of the
hearing officer's findings, by compelling additional evidence, or by reversal
of the hearing officer's findings, it is next in the purview of the Board to
review the decision of the hearing officer based upon the factual findings.
In this regard, the Board's standards of review consist of determining whether
the hearing officer's decision was supported by substantial evidence and
whether that decision is warranted by the facts (Board Rules, 19.8.2).

In

order for a decision to be warranted by the facts and supported by substantial
evidence, the Board must consider and determine questions of law, including
whether factual findings are warranted by law and whether conclusions of law
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and the decision are warranted by the findings of fact, 73A C.J.5., Public
Administrative Law and Procedure, Section 242 "Law Questions in General." The
Board is "entitled to review the record, receive additional information, make
findings of fact, and make its decision based thereon," Ron v. Office of
Community Operations, Memorandum Decision C-86-3311 of Third Judicial District
Court of Utah. Thus, in our review of a decision of a hearing officer,
neither the agency action nor the decision of the hearing officer is
necessarily conclusive. The Board must determine whether its representative,
the hearing officer, correctly reviewed the agency action and whether the
hearing officer applied the appropriate standard of review in the evidentiary
level decision.

In making its review the Board must, like the hearing

officer, consider all of the evidentiary factors noted in Paragraph Dl above.
In essence, the Board must review the decision of the hearing officer to
determine if the hearing officer applied the correct standard of review to the
agency action and whether the agency action and the decision of the hearing
officer are warranted by the credible facts. This does not constitute a
reweighing of the evidence, but it is a question of law as to the standard of
review applied by the hearing officer of the agency action and as to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the hearing officer's decision. If
this were not so, the Step 6 Board review would be unnecessary except for the
purpose of establishing that there is some credible evidence in support of the
decision of the hearing officer. We believe this to be a much too restrictive
interpretation of Rule 19.8.2 of the State Employees1 Grievance and Appeals
Procedure.
This Board —

as an administrative appellate body —

is properly entitled

to attach value and credit to the evidence adduced at Step 5 (which is not the
same as re-weighing that evidence), but it is a process which does consider
the competency and adequacy of the evidence in support of the hearing
officer's findings, conclusions and determination. Hinkson v. Bonannie, et
al. , 205 P. 2d 242, 115 Ut. 376 (1949).

Whether there is sufficient evidence

to support the hearing officer's findings (or whether those findings are
contrary to the evidence) is a question of law which is reviewable by this
Board. Strader v. Kansas Public Employees1 Retirement System, 479 P. 2d. 860,
(Kan. 1971).
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Notwithstanding the above-stated appellate principles and accompanying
case c i t a t i o n s , the Board understands that i t i s not a regular t r i b u n a l w i t h i n
the s t a t e ' s j u d i c i a l system.

I t i s , as noted previously on p. 7, a

q u a s i - j u d i c i a l body, one with essentially administrative powers and
functions.

Thus, the Board i s not subject to the formal rules of evidence nor

to the standard rules of c i v i l procedure.

III.
ANALYSIS OF FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
As required by the above discussion, the Board will first review below the
factual findings and conclusions of the hearing officer to determine if there
is substantial evidence in support thereof, and then review the decision of
the hearing officer in light of the credible factual findings and the facts
contained in the record.
A. The Bear-Killing Incident:
During October 1985 Messrs. Anderson and Weaver were part of a
thirteen-member elk hunting party situated at a place called "Barton's
Country" on East Mountain, near Joe's Valley Reservoir, in the Manti-La Sal
Mountains of Emery County, Utah.

In addition to Anderson and Weaver, five

other members of the hunting party were State employees with the Division:
Blaine Luke, Rod Hunsaker, Ray Keith, Kean Luke and Dave Lucchesi.

The job

titles of the just-named employees included maintenance supervisor, park
manager and park ranger.

And five of the seven just-named Division employees

— including Grievants — held peace officer status. The six remaining
hunters were citizens, several of whom were relatives of the above-cited
Division employees.
On October 4 Anderson did not participate actively in an elk drive as did
most of the other hunters. The latter positioned himself by sitting on a log
near the hunting party's campground.

The story which Anderson related to the

other hunters and Wildlife Resource investigators' generally, was that upon
hearing a noise behind him he turned and was startled to find a bear running
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toward him.

The bear, Anderson stated, was about forty feet distant, when he

first noticed it; he then swung around to face the bear's direction and
brought his rifle to the hip and fired from a left-handed position. Anderson
later claimed that he had fired at the bear reflexively, without thinking or
intending to kill the animal. After the shot was fired, the bear then
continued running off in another direction through the brush.
Hunsaker later stated that Anderson told him the bear had raised up when
he (Anderson) first saw it (T. I, 163); Weaver too related that Anderson had
told him that it was on its feet, standing (Mgt. Exh. 2, p. 87). \fet during
the investigative interview and in his written statement Anderson related: "I
didn't know if it was even a cub or what but it looked 12 feet tall when I saw
it. It wasn't standing. It was running on all fours. . . . "
Anderson Interview; Anderson Statement.)

(Mgt. Exh. 1,

He testified at the evidentiary

hearing that the bear was running, not standing (T. II, p. 265).
When found later, the bear had traveled about two hundred feet from where
it had been first seen by Anderson when he had fired at it. The bear was a
cinnamon-colored black bear cub about three feet in length, weighing about one
hundred pounds. The bear cub was found to have been fatally wounded with a
gunshot to the stomach area, and had bled considerably with about two feet of
entrails hanging out, before it had collapsed and died in the underbrush.
During the investigation Anderson acknowledged shooting the bear (Mgt. Exh.
1); later, at the hearing he hedged his testimony:

"I don't believe I hit the

bear" (T. II, pp. 266, 271). Circumstantial evidence points to Anderson
having shot the bear.
Robert G. Anderson (a citizen and not to be confused with the Grievant,
Robert 0. Anderson) approached the Grievant shortly after the shooting.
Together both Andersons and Ray Keith walked to the site where the bear had
first been noticed by Grievant Anderson, which was the animal's location when
the Grievant had discharged his rifle at it. From that place, both Andersons
and Keith followed the bear's blood-spotted trail till its carcass was located
about two hundred feet from where it had been first observed by Grievant.
Citizen Robert G. Anderson later reported that Grievant Anderson was "visibly
upset" at finding a dead bear cub. Other hunters also commented later on
Grievant's distraught condition.
As the elk hunters trickled back into camp, the bear-killing episode
became common knowledge and the focus of conversation among the members of the
hunting party.
1T

Three sequential events then occurred which are significant to this case.
From the bearfs place of death, the carcass was moved from a sunny location to
a shady one nearby.

Weaver stated that it had been his decision to move the

dead bear about fifteen feet in order to get the carcass out of the sun so
that it wouldn't bloat (Mgt. Exh. 2, p. 11; T. II, pp. 198-99).

Anderson

stated that the carcass had been moved about ten feet (Mgt. Exh. 1, p. 9, T.
II, p. 300). Hunsaker, who assisted in dragging the bear, reported the
carcass being moved about a hundred yards over to a lone pine tree to conceal
it (Mgt. Exh. 3 ) . Those moving the carcass were identified as both Grievants,
together with Hunsaker, Mike Anderson (Grievant's son) and Randy Gillette
(Mike's brother-in-law).

Grievants were both charged with having moved the

dead bear in order to conceal it, albeit both denied any intended concealment.
After the removal party laid the animal's carcass down, several hunters
removed the bear's ears, or part at least of one ear, and claws by cutting
them off with knives. Weaver suggested taking the animal's pelt and head, but
made no such effort. Others, including Anderson, Mike Anderson and Randy
Gillette, removed several claws.

Hunsaker acknowledged cutting off an ear.

Weaver was present and observed the so-called taking of souvenirs from the
bear's carcass.

Anderson admitted removing several of the bear's claws, and

he too observed the other hunters remove claws and ear parts.
After some discussion as to whether the bear-shooting episode should be
reported to the Wildlife Resource Division's conservation officers, that
decision was left entirely to Grievant Anderson.

Anderson did not report the

incident, nor did Weaver, nor did any of the other hunters who were also
Division employees.
In late October 1985 a citizen informant revealed the bear-killing episode
to authorities.

This led to an investigation by Wildlife Resource Division

officials, which in turn, prompted Anderson's and Weaver's dismissal from the
Division of Parks and Recreation.

Additionally, the other five Division

employees received disciplinary penalties which included reprimands and
suspensions ranging between two and five days without pay.
B.

Off-Duty Willful, Substantial Misconduct:
With respect to Step 5 Decision, Conclusion No. 1, the Division's appeal

asserts that error occurred in the lower forum when the hearing officer ruled
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that Grievants' complained-of misconduct was not grounds for dismissal because
it took place during off-duty status, essentially while they were on
vacation.

The hearing examiner stated that he had found no statute or

regulation which would have required Grievants to report the bear-killing
episode; on that basis he ruled that Anderson and Weaver were not guilty of
malfeasance in office. The correct issue for the conclusion of law is not
whether the conduct constituted malfeasance or nonfeasance, but whether the
off-duty misconduct was sufficiently job-related as to warrant a public
employer's penalties in light of the facts and circumstances present in this
case.
The Utah Code establishes statutory standards relevant to this case
regarding demotion and dismissal of career service employees, as follows:
Dismissal or demotions of career service
employees shall only be to advance the good of
the public interest, and for such just causes as
. . . malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office
(Section 67-19-18(1)).
Malfeasance has been authoritatively defined in Personnel Management Rules and
Regulations, (1985 ed.), published by the State's Division of Personnel
Management ("DFW"), as: "Intentional wrongdoing; deliberate violation of law
or standard; mismanagement of responsibilities."

(p. 1-3)

Malfeasance may

occur on duty and thus be performed "in office"; or, it may take the form of
serious wrongdoing that is entirely improper conduct, conduct that is
committed while off-duty — conduct that consists of substantial wrongdoing,
or that consists of highly improper misbehavior, such misconduct which is
found to be job-related by its nature. For example, on related off-duty
misconduct, see Borsari v. Federal Aviation Administration, 699 F. 2d 106
(1983).
Substantial error resulted when the hearing officer ruled that because
Grievants were off-duty, no malfeasance occurred (Conclusion No. 5). Instead,
a specific finding of wrongful conduct should have been made.

Thus, it was

inconsistent and harmful error to have ruled that Grievants' misconduct in the
bear incident was of a non-culpable nature, and that Grievants erred only in
not reporting the incident upon returning to work.

The evidentiary findings

and conclusions are significantly defective in not having established
job-related off-duty wrongdoing.
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With respect to Conclusions No. 1 and No. 2, the Step 5 Decision further
errs by assigning culpability to Grievants only for not having reported the
bear kill.

The hearing officer attached no blame for several additional acts

of wrongful misconduct.
Shooting the bear may have been an illegal act; it was done out of season
and without a permit.

(See Utah Code Annotated, Section 23-20-4.)

The taking

of souvenir parts from the bear may also have been an illegal act, according
to a conservation officer/investigator (T. I. p. 184; Section 23-20-4 Utah
Code Annotated).

Whether or not ultimately illegal, failure to report or take

appropriate action with respect to these matters was wrongdoing.
Aside from the actual shooting of the bear (which should have been
reported to conservation officers), additional wrongful actions were committed
which very seriously disparage Grievants1 (especially Anderson's) employment
relationship.

The evidence supporting the matters below demonstrates that

Finding of Fact No. 9 was not, in part, supported by substantial evidence:
1.

The hearing officer made a finding that it had not been Grievants1

intent to conceal the bear from anyone's view (Finding No. 9. g . ) .

Yet others

in the party testified that concealment was a motive. Setting aside the
Grievants1 somewhat self-serving explanation, the act by Anderson and Weaver
to move the bear toward shade —
State employees —

as Regional Managers, peace officers and

gave rise to the appearance of moving the bear in order to

further conceal its carcass.

Under the circumstances even the appearance

of concealment was wrongful conduct.

These senior Division administrators

set a blemished example for the other Division employees, five of whom were
also peace officers, as well as for the six citizens also present.
2.

The hearing officer found that Anderson had removed several of the

bear's claws.
and claws.

Others who assisted in moving the bear cut off portions of ears

Anderson and Weaver were present but did not object, and as

just-stated, Anderson participated in what later was designated as
souvenir-taking.

The hearing officer noted that no parts of the bear were

taken from the mountain (Finding No. 9. e, f.), but he attached no finding of
misconduct or wrongdoing to Anderson for his improper action in the matter of
the souvenir-taking, fet Anderson's taking of claws was direct job-related
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willful misbehavior, due to his public employment with an agency responsible
for the state's parks and outdoor recreation programs. Given Anderson*s and
Weaver's positions as Regional Managers, wherein they functioned as senior
administrators, such behavior was non-exemplary, reproachful, improper, and
wrongful.
The magnitude of Grievants1 unbecoming conduct was of a very serious
level.

In a comparable case, discipline imposed on a Colorado conservation

officer was affirmed because the evidence showed that the offender's "poor
judgment caused the incident which was well publicized and subjected the
Division of Game, Fish and Parks to adverse publicity detrimental to the
public interest." The state employee "had created [an] impression with
onlookers that he violated [the] very restrictions he was responsible for
enforcing" which constituted "conduct unbecoming a wildlife conservation
officer." Hatfield v. Civil Service Commission, 495 P. 2d 1148, 30 Col. App.
506.

Anderson's misconduct was not only "unbecoming" to a public manager, but

also well publicized (Anderson Exh. 1 ) .
3.

The hunting party collectively discussed whether the bear-killing incident

should be reported to Wildlife Division officials. The matter was left to
Anderson, who decided not to report the incident (Finding No. 9.h.).
The evidentiary examiner found that Grievants had "put it [the bear
incident] out of their minds until the investigation in January, 1986"
(Finding No. 9.i.); and that "Neither Grievant took any action to influence
other members of the hunting party not to report the incident. . . . "
No. 9.j.)

That finding is disputed by both Grievants' testimony:

(Finding

Anderson

related that he had trouble sleeping at nights due to thinking about the
October 4 events (T. II, p. 291); Weaver recalled discussing the situation
with his wife after returning from the hunting trip (T. II, pp. 113, 194-95,
226).

Thus testimony showed that neither Grievant blanked his mind of the

incident upon returning home (T. II, p. 278). We believe this demonstrates
that the Grievants knew the misconduct was serious but they intentionally
continued in their improper actions. The decision of Anderson not to report
the incident influenced the others not to report the incident.
4.

The hearing officer acknowledged that the Division director was justified

in imposing "more severe discipline of the Grievants than that which was given
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to the other state employees involved in the incident," because of their "high
level positions" (Conclusion No. 6 ) . He even concluded that Anderson deserved
a more severe penalty than Weaver because Anderson "had primary responsibility
for killing the bear and reporting the incident" (jLbid.). Indeed, when the
evidence is considered in the aggregate (the actual killing of the bear,
moving of the carcass which gave rise to at least the appearance of
concealment as viewed by some of the hunters, Anderson's participation in
removal of the bear's claws, dereliction by Grievants of their peace officer
responsibilities, setting an unworthy example to lower-ranking Division
employees and to the citizens present, non-disclosure of the entire incident
until a law enforcement investigation was initiated and, influencing others
not to report the incident), the misconduct is substantial, wrongful and
sufficiently related to their official employment positions as public managers
5
and peace officers to warrant dismissal, at least in the case of Anderson.
A failure to make accurate findings and conclusions supportable by substantial
evidence regarding Grievants' wrongful actions, based upon the evidence in the
record, warrants voiding the Step 5 Decision.

C.

Nonfeasance.
The lower forum's examiner concluded that Grievants had been nonfeasant

only in not properly reporting Anderson's shooting of the bear to authorities
(Conclusion No. 3) , not malfeasant.

He then concluded than nonfeasance for

non-reporting did not constitute just cause for dismissal.
are not supported by substantial evidence.

These conclusions

Even standing alone, proven

nonfeasance may be sufficient to meet the statutory just cause standard to
sustain either demotion or dismissal (Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-18(1)).
Concededly, the facts and circumstances in a given case may not always warrant
the penalty imposed by management, even if nonfeasance is proven by the
evidence (Board Rules 19.8.2.).

Although a tribunal may find adequate

substantial evidence to support a given disciplinary action, other
circumstances, however, may be relied upon to alter management's decision.
For example, counsel referred to the Merit Systems Protection Board's ("MSPB")
case of Gregory v. Department of Education, AT 531D8110809 (1981), in which an
administrative law judge held:
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The Board [MSPB] will still make a separate
determination whether the agency imposed penalty
is clearly excessive, disproportionate to the
substantiated charges, or arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable.
Anderson's offenses were much greater than Weaver's offenses. While both
Grievants' behavior was wrongful in connection with the failure to report,
Grievant Anderson's actions were more serious because of a greater duty which
he had. While Anderson killed the bear and participated in the mutilation, it
is not these facts alone which cause his culpability to be greater than
Weaver's.

It is the fact that Anderson's conduct initiated the incident and

created the responsibility to report and appropriately deal with the incident
that caused Anderson's duty to report to be greater than others in the hunting
party.

Whether or not his actions with respect to killing the bear were

excusable, his failure to report the incident was of greater consequence
because of his resulting primary duty to report the incident and his influence
with respect to such reporting upon the others.
The Division's Brief (pp. 15-17) lists seventeen factors individually
considered by Director Miller, pursuant to the latter1s testimony, as he
pondered the October 4 incident and the Grievants1 official public positions
within the agency, tet the hearing officer disdained all of this evidence and
sought to mitigate simply on the basis of long term service records.
Conversely the issue of long-term service should also be considered from the
point of view that as long term employees as well as senior managers,
Grievants should have been expected to know that their actions were improper
and unacceptable.
perspectives.

Length of service must be considered from both

Given Anderson's managerial position, peace officer status, and

culpability, the mitigation of Anderson's dismissal was an arbitrary act on
the hearing officer's part.

Alternatively, substantial evidence clearly

supports Anderson's greater degree of culpability.
not reporting, but to a much lesser degree.

Weaver was nonfeasant for

Given Anderson's position and his

degree of involvement in off-duty misbehavior, his dismissal alone was not
unreasonable nor excessive, nor does it violate the so-called fairness
doctrine because it doesn't "shock one's sense of fairness." Alfieri v.
Murphy, 366 N.Y.S. 2d 10, 47 A.D. 2d 820 (1975).
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D.

Peace Officer Status,
Both Grievants held peace officer status (Findings Nos. 5, 10, 16; T . I ,

pp. 197, 217; II, 154, 257, 258). The trier of facts concluded that as sworn
peace officers neither Grievant had committed malfeasance in office because
neither had been on duty at the time of the October 4 hunting incident.
Rather he concluded that the Division had failed to show by evidence that even
if a peace officer killed a protected game animal out of season without a
permit, said peace officer was required to report the unlawful taking (i.e.,
killing) of such animal pursuant to Utah Oode Annotated, Section 23-20-4.
The Utah Code Annotated establishes and defines peace officer status at
Section 77-la-l through 4. Therein four types or levels of peace officers are
recognized:

(1) peace officer, (2) correctional officer, (3) reserve and

auxiliary officers, and (4) special function officer.
Section 77-la-la

Under provision of

peace officer specifically includes "employees of the

Department of Natural Resources designated as peace officers by law."

Both

Grievants wore uniforms with badges much of the time (T. II. pp. 63-64).
Section 63-11-17 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, governs the
appointment of peace officers within the Division of Parks and Recreation.
The pertinent provision states:
The board shall have power to enact appropriate
regulations to protect state parks property from
misuse or damage and to preserve the peace within
state parks by deputizing peace officers of the
state's political subdivisions as agents'of the
division of parks and recreation. The officers
and administrators of the division and such other
persons the division may deputize shall have the
same power and shall follow the same procedure in
making arrests and the handling of prisoners and
in the general enforcement of this act as other
peace officers. (Emphasis added.)
The just-cited provision authorizes the Board of Parks and Recreation or
the Division director to designate peace officers to enforce laws and
regulations within State parks.

Division employees with peace officer status

may be those individuals whose primary duties consist of law enforcement
responsibilities, or those whose primary duties are not in the law enforcement
area but who are designated and trained as "reserve" or "auxiliary" peace
officers, pursuant to Section 77-la-3, thus providing a backup service to law
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enforcement personnel on an as-needed basis. Thus Grievants1 peace officer
status most closely corresponds with that of the "reserve" or "auxiliary"
category.

As such, Grievants were authorized peace officers, according to

Utah law.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 67-15-10.5 sets forth grounds on which peace
officer status may be revoked.

Grounds for suspension or revocation include:

(e) Any conduct or pattern of conduct that would
tend to disrupt, diminish or otherwise jeopardize
public trust and fidelity with regard to law
enforcement. (Emphasis added.)
To hold that Grievants were off-duty at the time that the wrongful conduct
was committed and that they were trained only in park law, not wildlife law,
and therefore they are not responsible or culpable for their actions as peace
officers is erroneous. Section 67-15-10.5(e) does not distinguish between
on-duty and off-duty. A peace officer is held accountable to a higher
standard of personal conduct both on and off the job. Application of
incredibly poor judgment as well as violation of wildlife statutory
prohibitions fall within the ambit of peace officer off-duty conduct.
Director Miller held Grievants responsible for committing "a serious breach of
trust, public trust" (T. II pp. 130). They breached their public trust not
only before five other fellow peace officers, but also in front of six private
citizens.
Utah's Supreme Court has previously held peace officers responsible for
off-duty misconduct that adversely affects the employer's rightful interests.
In Clearfield City v. Oept. of Employment Security, 663 P. 2d 440 (Utah 1983),
the court declared that misconduct occurring outside the hours of employment
need only be connected (i.e., related) to the employer's rightful interest in
order to be subject to sanction:
It is only necessary that misconduct have such
'connection' to the employee's duties and to the
employer's business that it is a subject of
legitimate and significant concern to the
employer.
Reversible error resulted in not holding Grievants sufficiently responsible
for their off-duty misconduct as peace officers in concert with their roles as
senior public managers.
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It was unreasonable to have found Grievants not malfeasant as off-duty
peace officers who had no duty to report the unlawful taking of the bear while
concomitantly finding them nonfeasant for having failed to report the incident
as supervisors.

(Cf. Conclusions Nos. 1,3)

Malfeasance and nonfeasance are

merely labels for wrongdoing, improper conduct and misbehavior.

Importantly,

though, it was error to find that as "peace officers" Grievants had no duty to
report the incident but as "supervisors" they were obligated to report.
Grievants1 peace officer status has been disregarded while their
managerial/administrative status has been downgraded to that of supervisors.
Finding No* 16 states that Anderson considered only two percent of his and
Weaver's duties to consist of law enforcement responsibilities.

(Per

Anderson's remark, T. II p. 257.) The issue is not whether the Grievants
served two percent, twenty percent or ninety percent in peace officer status.
The salient fact is that they are and were required to be certified peace
officers in order to be Regional Managers. Both Grievants acknowledged such.
The question is whether the complained-of off-duty misconduct is sufficiently
serious or material and whether it is related to their peace officer status.
A nexus exists between Grievants' off-duty misconduct as peace officers and
public managers and the Utah standard of "advancing the good of the public
interest"

(Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-18-(D).

Even the hearing officer

found their non-reporting to be nonfeasance as supervisors. This tribunal,
however, believes that the magnitude of nonfeasance is significantly greater
than that determined at Step 5 because of their peace officer status, the
seriousness of the wrongdoing, and the connection of the wrongdoing with the
employees' duties and the employer's business. While we do not find that any
disciplinary action will be upheld merely because an employee is designated as
a "peace officer", we hold that Anderson, and to a lesser extent Weaver and
the other peace officers, had a duty to report a violation of the wildlife law
for the reasons stated above.
Anderson and Weaver acted improperly not only as peace officers, but also
as hunters.

If Anderson killed the bear because he believed his life was in

danger, that would surely mitigate any charge of pre-meditated, deliberate, or
wanton slaying.

But even the status of his State position aside, Anderson had

a responsibility to report his taking of a black bear out of season to
conservation officers.

It was his responsibility to come forward to explain

that he had not intended to kill the bear pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
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Section 23-20-3 and to report the incident, as would be expected of any hunter.
III.
SUMMARY OF FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Anderson's conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to provide just cause
for termination.

After shooting the bear, he deliberately failed to report

the incident, even though several of the hunters suggested that he should
report the incident to authorities (T. I p. 164, 170, 171; II, pp. 192, 193,
194; Mgt. Exh. 3, Statement, pp. 2-3). His participation in moving the bear
gave rise to the appearance of attempting to conceal the carcass; he removed
several bear claws, which gave rise to the allegations of souvenir-taking and
mutilation; he set a tarnished example for his fellow hunters who were also
peace officers, and to the citizens in the hunting party for improper conduct
by a State employee; he failed to disclose the matter upon returning to duty
which violated the spirit and intent of the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics.
Even more deplorable was the fact that although neither Anderson nor Weaver
disclosed the bear-killing incident, the hunting party ultimately left that
decision solely to Anderson while the hunters

reached an agreement to remain

silent. Finding No. 9.j., states that "Neither Grievant took any action to
influence other members of the hunting party not to report the incident; there
was no conspiring to 'cover-up1 the killng of the bear. Management Exhibits
1 , 2 , and 3.

Testimony of Anderson, Weaver, Blaine Luke, and Rodney

Hunsaker." Substantial evidence in the record, however, adequately shows that
such a factual finding is not correct. There was a clearly stated and
mutually accepted understanding among the members of the hunting party to keep
g
silent anent the bear incident.
Indeed Anderson did keep silent until the
investigation in January 1986 brought the episode to light.

Anderson's

wrongful actions coupled with his nonfeasance in not reporting as a peace
officer and manager are contrary to the statutory criterion of advancing the
good of the public interest.

(See Utah Code Annotated, Section 67-19-18(1).)

The evidence in the record supports the following Conclusions and Factual
Findings:
1.

It is illegal to take parts of protected wildlife, such as bear parts
(Section 23-30-4).

Anderson acknowledged removing some of the bear's
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claws.

Weaver did not remove bear parts.

Both were present as other

hunters removed claws and ear parts.
The Regional Managers were "on-duty" in a substantial sense as peace
officers when they were on the hunt, since they retained formal peace
officer responsibilities even when "off-duty."

The legal significance of

those responsibilities is only in part measurable by the proportion of
time they occupied in their Regional Managers1 total workload.
Neither Anderson nor Weaver disclosed or reported the bear-killing
incident on his own initiative. Rather the hunting party left it up to
Anderson to report the matter.

He chose not to disclose the incident to

authorities.
Grievants1 failure to report was job-related, in a dual way: A) It
contradicted the duty of the Regional Managers to fulfill certain
responsibilities which applied even when those managers were formally
"off-duty"; and B ) , it contradicted the duty of the Regional Managers to
fulfill certain responsibilities they had when they returned to formal
"on-duty" status.
A conscious decision was made, both on the mountain and subsequently in
practice, not to report the bear shooting.

The decision initially was

Anderson's, but Weaver sustained him in that choice.
The supposition that the Regional Managers1 failure to report after they
had returned to formal "on-duty" status was merely inadvertent, is not a
credible premise.

The hunting party viewed the matter seriously.

The

potential implications of the incident had great significance, confirmed
by later outcomes. The number of people who were in the hunting party,
and who therefore knew about the shooting, was sizeable. The people most
centrally involved were well aware of the affirmative legal duty to
report.

In such a context, "forgetting" would be extremely difficult to

do, and is certainly inexcusable as a defense.
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The members of the hunting party clearly were influenced by the Regional
Managers to avoid disclosing the shooting, even if no direct pressure was
applied and even if no formal agreement was concluded within the hunting
group. The hunters knew Anderson's wishes. Influence was inherent in the
circumstances, from a triple perspective.

First, the informal code

practiced among hunting companions is one of relations based upon
friendship. Second, given the employment connection for those members of
the hunting group who worked for the Division of Parks and Recreation,
they could understandably have been concerned about their future careers.
And third, people at a high level, such as the subject regional
administrators, can reasonably be expected to maintain a sufficient
measure of awareness of legal requirements applicable to themselves, and
be extra sensitive to the trusteeship aspects of their public service, and
to the public relations needs of their employing governmental agency.
The Regional Managers' failure to report was damaging to the agency, in
several respects:

(A) That failure undermined the responsibility of

these administrators to set a good example to all other employees of the
agency.

The symbolic significance of administrative misbehavior is very

great, because it affects the tone of expectations about levels of
behavior by others in the agency, and affects the degree of commitment and
dedication that employees offer to the Division.

(B) That failure sent

important signals to the general public about the degree to which public
administrators themselves abide by the law and are held accountable under
the law.

Behaviors of the sort involved here can subtly but

far-reachingly undermine levels of public trust and confidence in the
agency, and the degree of willingness of the citizenry to cooperate with
public agency programs and to abide by the law themselves.
The opportunity of the Division to discipline its employees in this case
was not foreclosed by the time required for another agency (i.e., Wildlife
Resource Division) to proceed carefully to investigate.

The time lags

(understandable and defensible in the context) should not be interpreted
to mean that the matter was not considered important to the Division,
contrary to Conclusion No. 5.

(Cf. T. II, 109-110.)
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10. When Mr. Miller testified about his own loss of trust and confidence in
his two Regional Managers, that testimony was not hearsay as stated in
Finding No. 14.
11. In Conclusion of Law No. 5 the hearing officer stated the following seven
premises.
Management's failure to take prompt action upon
receipt of information concerning the bear
incident leads to the conclusion that the trust
and confidence of supervision was not eroded to
the point that eventual termination was
justified. Indeed, the Grievants were allowed to
continue their normal duties for six weeks
following detailed disclosure of the incident to
Mr. Miller. Mr. Miller had preliminary
information available to him for four and
one-half months before he took action to
terminate the Grievants. He did nothing to
expedite the investigation and did not suspend
the Grievants during any portion of the
investigation. The lack of expeditious handling
of the investigation by the Wildlife Division
also serves to indicate that the matter was not
considered to be a very important matter to that
Division, either. Finally, Mr. Miller's
statements to the Grievants upon their discussing
the matter with him further indicates that the
issues involved were not regarded to be serious
enough to merit the ultimate penalty of
discharge. During the period of the
investigation, including the time following the
point when all details were made known, there is
no direct evidence in the record to indicate that
the Grievants were not able to perform their jobs
adequately or that the morale of the other
employees in the Division was adversely affected.
The Board finds that the just-quoted conclusion contains several errors of
fact together with some inaccurate inferences, specifically:
A.

The Division director did take prompt action upon receipt of the DWR

investigative report issued on February 14. Following detailed disclosure
of the incident through the DWR report, only three weeks elapsed between
issuance of the report and the imposition of penalties, not six weeks.
Thus, within three weeks punitive action was imposed by Miller.
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And

during that three week period, Miller was further actively engaged in
review and consultation.
B.

It would have been inappropriate to have punished Grievants solely on

the basis of "preliminary information available."
misconduct had to be

The Grievants1 off-duty

verified by an extensive investigation. That

investigation was entirely in the hands of the DWR law enforcement
investigators until Miller received a report in mid-February.
C.

As Miller had no control over the investigation being performed by

another independent agency, he can not be faulted for what the hearing
officer considers to be a somewhat slow-paced investigation. Suspension
is a disciplinary action.

It would have been presumptuous for Miller to

have suspended any of the seven employees until the facts were at hand.
Miller's Division should not be faulted for not expediting a
geographically-widespread investigation (scattered over several counties)
involving thirteen hunters which was not his responsibility.
D.

No evidence was elicited to show that DWR did not consider the

investigation to be a "very important matter."
E. Miller's alleged statements to the Grievants, if they were made, came
in January well before all of the factual information was placed in his
hands through the DWR report.

At that time Miller had as yet taken no

action, nor bound himself to any future specific course of action. In
fact, Miller stated that he didn't really want to speak with the Grievants
about the incident until the factual investigation was completed.
Considered in the aggregate, Conclusion No. 5, contains several erroneous
conclusions and draws some incorrect inferences.
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IV.
ANALYSIS OF PENALTIES
The following set of facts greatly influenced the Board's prescribing
appropriate penalties to Anderson and Weaver, based upon a careful
consideration of the just cause standard:
It was Anderson who shot at the bear and killed it (Findings of Fact,
9.d.).

Thus it was his action, appropriate or not, which initiated the

incident.

The shooting triggered the unfortunate series of events which

concluded with a failure to report.

Again, the threshold action which led to

such consequences was Anderson's, not Weaver's; thus the former had a greater
duty to report.
The hearing officer found that the hunting party discussed the problem of
what to do given the fact that the bear had been killed.
"the issue was left to Anderson . . . ."

He determined that

Thus Anderson carries extra

responsibility for the failure of hunting party members to report the
incident.

Since it was Anderson who could have been in some legal difficulty

when the incident was reported, and whose career could suffer, his decision
not to report naturally put his hunting colleagues in a difficult position
regarding their relationship to him in the circumstances.
decision created for them an ethical dilemma.

In effect, his

In order for them to fulfill

their own respective duties to report the bear shooting, they would have to go
against Anderson's wishes, while also carrying the burden of placing Anderson
at substantial risk as a result of their reporting.
Anderson's failure to report was evidently not the result of
misinterpretation of legal requirements, nor a well-intentioned attempt to
fulfill some worthy agency objective in the face of a possible legal
obstacle.

This is not to imply that having such motives would be regarded as

excusing the neglect of a positive legal reporting duty.

But they at least

are not based on individual self-interest to the same degree as Anderson's
motives apparently were here.
The hearing officer found that "Anderson removed claws from the bear but
did not take them from the mountain."

No comparable finding was made about

Weaver.
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In conclusion, and certainly not to excuse Weaver's misconduct, the
magnitude of Anderson's culpability is vastly greater than the degree accorded
to Weaver.

It is reasonable as well as justifiable that their respective

penalties individually manifest that difference based upon their degree of
culpability.

Anderson's dismissal satisfies the just cause standards set

forth by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.
2d 1129 (Utah 1985), which requires that culpability, knowledge and control
must be present.

Anderson's dismissal by the agency is reinstated pursuant to

his notice of dismissal under date of March 20, 1986 by the Department's
executive director, Dee C. Hansen (Mgt. Exh. 7 ) .
The Board orders that Weaver be assessed a penalty of six calendar weeks
without pay effective March 21, 1986, following which he shall be reinstated
to a Regional Manager II position (whether the Central Region, or another)
with all backpay and benefits which he would have earned had he been employed
subsequent to the suspension, including the one-time State employees' bonus of
one percent, albeit minus any earned income from other employment or from
unemployment payments by the Employment Security Department.

27

V.
DECISION AND ORDER
The Step 5 decision is hereby vacated. Robert 0. Anderson's dismissal is
reinstated pursuant to the above-stated date. The agency is ordered to
reinstate D. Dennis Weaver subject to the foregoing conditions.

DATED

this \ ^

day of Feburary, 1987.

WE CONCUR:
Bruce T. Jones
Mary Graham-Payne
Dalmas H. Nelson
Jose L . T r u j i l l o
A n i t a B. B r a d f o r d , d i s s e n t s .

BRUCE T . jai^ES^Chairman
Utah PersonnelKeview Board

\ZAJi--yf.
ROBERT N. WHITE, SPHR
Admini. * r a t o r
Utah Personnel Review Board

APPEAL
Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made within 20 calendar days
from issuance of this decision with the District Court for Salt Lake County.
On appeal to District Court, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. Utah Code Ann. Section
67-19-25(6), 1953 as amended.

OQ.

BRADFORD, Board Member:

(Dissenting)

I dissent from the majority opinion which vacates the hearing officer's
penalty of suspension and reinstates the Division's termination of Anderson.
There is no doubt that Anderson exhibited "bad judgment" by not reporting his
shooting of the bear, even though the bear killing per se appears to have been
unintentional. Therefore, failure to properly report the shooting incident
constitutes nonfeasance but only of a degree short of —

but not warranting

—

dismissal.
I agree with the hearing officer in that even if nonfeasance is proven,
that fact or condition does not unalterably lead to a conclusion which
necessarily demands termination in the instant case.

Consideration has to be

given to the various degrees or shadings of nonfeasance in each case. The
statutory provision at Utah Code Annotated Section 67-19-18(1) supports this
position.

The Code provides for recognition of at least two penalties,

demotion or dismissal, even if nonfeasance is established.

Proven nonfeasance

does not automatically warrant dismissal. Such job-related factors as length
of service, performance record, absence of prior disciplinary incidents,
severity of the infraction, disparity of treatment between similarly situated
employees, etc. may justify either greater or lesser penalties.
Furthermore, I am unconvinced by the Division's argument that Director
Jerry Miller's decision does not "shock one's sense of fairness."
17).

(Brief, p.

To the contrary, indeed, my conscience is "shocked" by the excessive

penalty of dismissal given the facts, circumstances and conclusions in this
case as set forth by the hearing officer.

The hearing officer's decision

regarding Anderson's and Weaver's suspensions and reinstatements was
appropriate, although I would favor longer suspensions for both Grievants
(even up to six months' duration); or, in the alternative, demotion also would
have been appropriate.
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F O O T N O T E S

The Step 5 (evidentiary level) hearing was not transcribed until
after the Division's appeal of the Hearing Officer's determination
was taken to Step 6. Thus, the trier of facts did not have it
available for his decision-making purposes.

The Hearing Officer re-worded this issue/question as follows: "Was
dismissal an appropriate disciplinary action in their cases? If not,
what remedy or remedies are appropriate?11

The hearing officer accepted Grievants' testimony as to motivation
unreservedly in the matter of moving the bear without an intent at
concealment. (Example: Anderson stated that moving the bear did not
take it out of view. T. II, p. 292) The evidence, however, does not
so clearly support Grievants1 claim but allows for a contrary
inference to be drawn. Kean Luke testified that the bear was "moved
about fifteen yards into the cover." (Mgt. Exh. 3, Interview, p. 4 ) ;
Robert G. Anderson (citizen) stated that Grievant Anderson and three
others "walked over to the bear and dragged it into the trees."
(Mgt. Exh. 3, Interview, p. 4 ) ; Ray Keith knew that the bear had been
"moved 10 feet to the trees." (Mgt. Exh. 3, Interview p. 6) Others
alluded more directly to a concealment: Wayne Johnson, a citizen,
understood moving of the bear to be a cover-up. (Mgt. Exh. 3,
Interview p. 6 ) ; Hunsaker, who assisted in moving the carcass,
stated at the hearing: "TVe probably drug it 60 yards, over to a
pinetree." (T.I, p. 165.) Why? "To drag it away from the road."
(T. I, p. 165) Previously during the investigative interview
Hunsaker reported that the bear was "pulled about 100 yards over to a
lone pine tree to conceal the animal." (Mgt. Exh. 3, Statement p.
3 ) . Lucchesi stated: "Some one said they ought to move the bear out
of sight. And several went down by the bear and moved it into or
behind small brush or trees." (Mgt. Exh. 3, Statement p. 2)
Anderson, Weaver, and Ray Keith described the carcass being moved
only 10-15 feet; whereas Kean Luke, Hunsaker, and Lucchesi reported a
much greater distance. Several witnesses specifically referred to
concealing or covering-up the carcass. Admittedly, the bear's
remains were not buried, nor thrown in a ditch or culvert and then
covered, nor even covered over with a cairn. Yet some of the hunters
distinctly expressed the view that the carcass was being more
carefully concealed. The evidence suggests that the Grievants' did
intend concealment. When all of the evidence is considered, not
merely Grievants' statements, then it is clear that Finding of Fact
No. 9.g. is incorrect to some degree.
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FOOTNOTES CONTINUED:

4.

Anderson and Weaver were each responsible for administering a
sizeable work force. Weaver's managerial span of control included 44
permanent staff and 49 part-time positions. (T. I, p. 210) He
directly supervised ten staff. (Jt. Exh. 1) Anderson had managerial
responsibility for 51 permanent staff and 52 part-time positions.
(T.I, p. 210) He, too, supervised directly about 10-12 people. In
addition to serving as members of the Division's "management team,"
Grievants assisted in both policy development and the overall
direction of the agency. (T. I, p. 211)

5.

Anderson's current position and status, and to a lesser extent
Weaver's, were obviously a factor considered by several of the other
hunters who were also Division employees. Lucchesi stated that he
didn't disclose the incident because he believed that he had better
not say anything against a high up official with the Division. (Mgt.
Exh. 3, Interview p. 13) Hunsaker stated that both Anderson and
Weaver had "quite a high position with the division and you know, I
mean sure, it counts." (T. I, pp. 69-70). He realized that Anderson
could become his supervisor again. (Ibid.)
According to Blaine Luke, " I had thoughts of what and who Bob
was within the division . . . ." (Mgt. Exh. 3, Statement, p. 2) Said
Luke: "If I told on Bob, I would be on his 'bad list"1 (T. I. p.
139) Luke stated that he respected Anderson and Weaver because of
their positions. (T. I, pp. 136, 146, 153). Luke considered that
Anderson would probably be in the running for the new directorship of
operations and park development (ibid., 139), and thus might yet
become his future superior.
All of the foregoing statements demonstrate rather conclusively
how Grievants' positions as public managers influenced the
lower-ranking Division employees on the hunt not to "make waves"
against their superiors regarding the bear incident.

6.

See Attorney General Opinion Request No. 85-17 —
Resources Peace Officers.

7.

Even Hunsaker, who was not a peace officer, reflected on Anderson's
and Weaver's sworn officer status: "There were five law officers
willing to look the other way and I went along with the group."
(Mgt. Exh. 3, Interview p. 5) Blaine Luke, on the other hand, didn't
consider his law enforcement role: "My peace officer status didn't
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enter into my thoughts." (T.I, p. 170) For such neglect, he was
later disciplined. Grievants, however, by the nature of their
managerial positions can reasonably be held to greater accountability
for their peace officer status and responsibilities than the other
five Division employees.

8.

The term "nexus" is not listed in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. The
New College Edition of The American Heritage Dictionary (1980)
defines nexus as " . . . a means of connection between things." Peter
B. Broida, author of A Guide to Merit Systems Protection Board Law &
Practice 1979 - 1985 (Washington, D.C.: Dewey Publications, Inc.,
1985), devotes one-half of chapter 7 ("Nexus and Mitigation") to the
legal concept of nexus as applied to employment cases at bar.
Some practioners hold that nexus as a principle is applicable
only in off-duty misconduct cases; others hold that it must be
considered as an essential element in all disciplinary
determinations. To quote Broida: "Although there are cases that
made it appear that nexus determinations are only essential in
off-duty misconduct cases, the nexus formulation in fact applies to
all misconduct: there must be a connection between any misconduct,
and disciplinary action, and service efficiency." p. 282.
Anderson's counsel stated in his Memorandum of Law, p. 3, that
the federal civil service standard commonly known as the "efficiency
of the service" criterion is equivalent to Utah's standard "to
advance the good of the public interest". (Utah Code Ann. Section
67-19-18(1) and DPM Rule ll.a.). In general, we agree.
In the federal or MSPB process, a governmental agency must make
two separate determinations before removing an employee on grounds of
off-duty misconduct. First, it must be shown that the alleged
offender actually committed the conduct complained of; and second,
that removal based upon the stated misconduct will promote the
efficiency of the the service. Sherman v. Alexander, 684 F. 2d 464.
The requirement that removal or termination based upon the specified
off-duty misconduct will promote the efficiency of the service is
known as the "nexus requirement." Wild v. United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 692 F. 2d 1129. Also see Abrams v.
United States Dept. of the Navy, 714 F. 2d. 1219 (1983) in which the
question is raised as to whether a public employee may sufficiently
rebut a presumption of a nexus between egregious off-duty misconduct
and the efficiency of the service by showing that his off-duty
misconduct will not impede the agency's achievement of its goals
directly or indirectly through its other employees while preserving
the agency's exercise of discretion in making personnel management
decisions. (Ibid., p. 1220.) Federal courts have further limited
the nexus concept by requiring that the nature of the complained of
off-duty misconduct must be limited to actions which at least
rationally could be considered likely to discredit the employee(s) or
the governmental agency. Major v. Hampton, 413 F. Supp. 66.
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9.

Contrary to the hearing officer's finding that there was "no
conspiracy to 'cover-up1 the killing of the bear," the record is
replete with such statements: Robert G. Anderson: A discussion
resulted in everyone saying to keep quiet on the incident (Mgt. Exh.
3, Report pp. 4, 14). Ray Keith stated that there was "an agreement
by the group to keep the killing of the bear quiet." (Mgt. Exh. 3,
Report, p. 6). Blaine Luke: There was considerable discussion among
the hunters as to what should be done with the bear, and a decision
was made to do nothing (Mgt. Exh. 3, Report p. 12). Rod Hunsaker:
At first it was decided [in "a discussion involving everyone"] to
contact a conservation officer. Then it was decided to just keep
quiet about the incident (ibid, p. 15). Blaine Luke: A decision was
made to do nothing (ibid, p. 12). [Admittedly this witness lost his
recall at the hearing, T . I . pp. 134-35, 148].
More importantly, Hunsaker testified as follows:
A: . . . . [W]e had all taken the stand of that [sic] if Bob
[Anderson] doesn't want to turn it in, then you know, because he was
scared if he didn't want to turn it in, then fine. We won't turn it
in. We can't make him turn it in . . . I mean that was not a
conspiracy, it was just a passing deal, you know, hey guys, let's
lock our lips, a little bit. I can't remember who said it, because I
can't remember enough to incriminate somebody you know.
Q: So there were agreements made not to tell anyone anything?
A: Yeah, but just between the entire group, I guess.
167-68)
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(T. I, pp.

M A I L I N G

C E R T I F I C A T E

I certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing PERSONNEL REVIEW
BOARD'S STEP 6 DECISION has been sent to the following: D. Dennis Weaver,
Grievant, at P. 0. Box 97, Midway, Utah

84049; to his attorney, John T.

Caine, of Richards, Caine & Allen, 2568 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401;
and Robert 0. Anderson, Grievant, 807 East William Way, Murray, Utah 84107;
to his legal counsel L. Zane Gill at Gill & Wade, Valley Tower Building, Suite
900, 50 West 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101; and UPEA Employee

Relations Representative Casey Romijn; and from the Department of Natural
Resources: Dee C. Hansen, Executive Director; Jerry Miller, Director,
Division of Parks and Recreation; Margo Silvester, Personnel Manager; J.
Stephen Mikita, Assistant Attorney General; Stephen G. Schwendiman, Chief, Tax
& Business Regulation Division, Office of the Attorney General; and to Laura
Robinson, Court Reporter for Alpha Court Reporters.

D A T E D

this

j t j ^ a y of February, 1987.

Penny G. Wright
Secretary
Personnel Review Board

Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made within 20 calendar days
from issuance of this decision with the District Court for Salt Lake County.
On appeal to District Court, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. Utah Code Ann. Section
67-19-25(6), 1953 as amended.

ADDENDUM L
Career Service Review Board decision Paul Urry v. Central Services
Division, 2 PRB 17, issued February 7, 1986.

BEFORE THE PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Appeal of:
PAUL URRY,
Appellant,

D E C I S I O N

v.

AND

ORDER

CENTRAL SERVICES DIVISION,
Respondent.

The above-entitled matter came before the Personnel Review Board as an
appeal hearing, pursuant to notice, on January 9, 1986, at 9:25 A.M. in Room
5100 of the State Office Building, Capitol Hill, Salt Lake City, Utah. Board
members present were:

Peter Fillmore, Chairman; Anita C. Bradford; Dalmas H.

Nelson; and Mary Graham-Payne.

Absent and excused was Jose L. Trujillo.

Paul Urry ("the Appellant") was present and represented by Gregory J.
Sanders, Attorney at Law.

Assistant Attorney General Stephen G. Schwendiman,

Chief, Tax and Business Regulation Division, and Special Agent, Sharon K.
Esplin, both of the Utah Attorney General's Office, represented the Central
Services Division.

Also present:

Eugene H. Findlay, Executive Director of

the Department of Administrative Services and Robert Draper, Deputy Director
of the Central Services Division; ana Mrs. Paul Urry, Appellant's spouse.
A court reporter made a verbatim record of the proceeding before the
Board, which, to date, has not been transcribed.

However, the court

reporter's record from the evidentiary level hearing at Step 5 had been
previously transcribed into two volumes. That transcript was made available
to the parties' counsel and used as a basis for their briefs.
The Board, having previously received copies of both parties' briefs
together with Hearing Officer H. Wright Volker's Step 5 Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decision ("Decision"), and having reviewed and
considered these documents, then heard oral arguments on the matter.

Following oral argument the Board took the matter under advisement and after
deliberating in an executive session decided to individually review the
transcript and exhibits in greater detail. The executive session continued on
January 22, 1986.

Being duly apprised in the facts and premises of the case,

the Board now makes and issues the following conclusions and decision.

BACKGROUND:
The present appeal has its origin in Appellants dismissal from the Motor
Pool, a component of the Division of Central Services, which is an
organizational unit of the Department of Administrative Services
("Department"), State of Utah.

Mr. Urry was formally notified by an "Intent

to Terminate" letter dated June 19, 1985, from Eugene H. Findlay, Executive
Director of the above-mentioned Department, that dismissal was to be effective
June 27, 1985 unless appealed.

An appeal to Mr. Findlay was timely submitted

with a subsequent administrative review occurring on June 27.

Grievant's

opportunity to respond to allegations resulted in an affirmance of the earlier
termination decision albeit the effective dismissal date was changed to June
27, 1985.
Thereafter an appeal was perfected to the Personnel Review Board for a
Step 5 hearing pursuant both the State Employees1 Grievance and Appeals
Procedure (i.e., the Board's promulgated rules) and to Sections 67-19-20
through 25 of the Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
hearing took place on September 10 and 11, 1985.

The evidentiary Step 5
Hearing Officer Volker's

Decision was issued on October 9, 1985 followed by a Notice of Amendment dated
October 15, 1985. The Hearing Officer sustained management's dismissal of
Appellant from the Department's Motor Pool.

From that Step 5 Decision

Appellant advanced the matter to this Board which has proper appellate
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the above-cited provisions of the State
Personnel Management Act.

ISSUES:
The two issues presented to the Hearing Officer for his adjudication were:
1.

Was the Grievant, Paul Urry, dismissed for just cause?

2.

If not, what is the appropriate remedy?
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The Step 5 determination by Hearing Officer Volker concluded that:

'The

State has proved by substantial evidence that Grievant was terminated from his
employment with the State of Utah for just cause and the action of the State
is sustained."

(Decision p. 18.)

Appellant's brief presents two issues for the Boara's consideration.
First, he claims that error occurred where the Hearing Officer concluded that
the sending of Motor Pool repair work to Walter Jones May (or "Jonesy")
constituted the obtaining of a special privilege which violated Section
67-16-4(3) of the State code.

Second, Appellant further asserts that the

Hearing Officer erred in concluding that dismissal be sustained given the
circumstances of the case; hence Mr. Urry avers that the penalty of
termination was too severe and therefore not appropriate under the facts of
this case.
Appellant bears the burdens of proof and persuasion that reversible error
occurred in the evidentiary determination.

The standard of review applicable

to the Board's jurisdiction consists of determining whether the Step 5 Hearing
Officer's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Step 5
decision is warranted by the facts. State Employees' Grievance and Appeals
Procedure, 1983 ed., ("Board Rules", See Section 19.8).

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Appellant's dismissal from his nine years with the State's Motor Pool was
initiated with a Letter of Intent to Terminate, dated June 19, issued by
Executive Director Eugene H. Findlay.

That document stated the charges and

reasons for Mr. Urry's dismissal in the following paragraph:
That which is the basis for the action taken
against you consists of incidents that have
occurred over the past eighteen months but which
have only come to light recently. They include
the preparation and/or use of phony bids for
repair of state vehicles which resulted in the
giving of most, if not all repair business, to
one firm at a time and where you received meals
and other gratuities from them. Your involvement
was direct with knowledge that such was going
on. In my opinion, this is a violation of the
State's Procurement Code and of the
anti-competitive provisions of the Anti-Trust
Act. You further received a paint job for a
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vehicle owned by you from this same business for
less than full value and engaged in trading a VCR
recorder with this business or its employee for a
value greater than its actual worth. You also
were treated to frequent meals by an employee of
this business during the time the gratuities and
phony bids were being prepared and state money
was being used to pay for repairs to state
vehicles under the control of the Motor Pool.
(Jt. Exh. #1)
After making his Findings of Fact, the Hearing Officer concluded that some
of the above-stated charges had been proven while others had not been
adequately substantiated.

Specifically, the Step 5 Decision determined that

Appellant had, indeed, violated a long-standing Motor Pool policy by knowingly
obtaining false bids from Jonesy together with legitimate bids submitted by
the latter on repair offers made at Freed Chrysler-Plymouth and Streator
Chevrolet; that in obtaining these second or false bids Appellant committed
malfeasance and/or misfeasance; that Appellant violated Section 67-16-4(3) of
the Public Officers1 and Employees' Ethics Act ("Ethics Act") when he failed
to obtain valid competitive second bids on each repair job.

(Decision,

Conclusions 9, 11, 13, 18.) The accusations that Appellant had violated
provisions of the Utah Procurement Code, the State's Antitrust Act, and
Section 67-16-5(2) of the just-cited Ethics Act were dismissed by the Hearing
Officer as being either erroneous or unsubstantiated.
Both before and during the period of time that Appellant obtained bogus
bids from Jonesy the Motor Pool had a policy that required at least two
competitive bids on auto body repair work.

The basis of that two bid

requirement was set forth in a written directive to the then Motor Pool
manager, Keith Floyd, from the Purchasing Division director under date of
March 9, 1983.

(Mgt. Exh. #8). That document states in pertinent part:

As we discussed in my office the other day, this
letter will authorize you to make purchases for
repair parts only from $500.00 to $2,000.00 by
obtaining telephone quotations. No less than two
(2) businesses shall be solicited for these
quotations.
(Emphasis in original.)
When a change in Purchasing Division directors occurred during 1983, the
successor reiterated the just-cited two bid procedure in a memo dated December
1, 1983, which states in part:
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Our records indicate that Doug Christiansen (see
attached letter aated March 9, 1983) delegated
purchase approval to the Motor Pool. Assuming
the circumstances which led to that delegation
still exist, I affirm that relationship.
Specifically the Motor Pool is authorized to:
*

*

#

(3) Procure repair parts only between $500 and
$2,000 by obtaining at least two bids (may be
telephone bids) and attaching documentation to
the warrant request.
*

*

*

The just-described two bid policy was in effect until the State changed
the bidding procedure on auto body repair work by contracting with Bloom and
Associates, Inc., an insurance adjusting firm^ in March, 1985. The Hearing
Officer made a finding that the Motor Pool "had an unwritten or verbal rule,
or policy, requiring two competitive bids for repair of damaged automobiles."
(Decision, Conclusion No. 15.) That finding is accurate with regard to Mr.
Floyd not disseminating any written rule on bidding procedures to either Urry,
Allen Orwin (Appellant's subordinate) or others.

Yet it would be a

misstatement to conclude that no written policy or directive existed between
the Purchasing Division and the Motor Pool manager, inasmuch as two directives
were issued to Mr. Floyd in 1983, both specifically pertaining to repair work
requiring two bids.
Thus during the period of time when the Motor Pool was required to obtain
two or more competitive auto repair bids, a written policy was applicable.*
Was Mr. Urry aware of that two bid policy while performing his duties under
Mr. Floyd, the Motor Pool manager?

Although he did not post the competitive

two bid policy, Mr. Floyd testified that he required a second bid (T.I, 34,
72), that he preferred written bids to verbal ones ( T . I , 73), that he told
Appellant to get two bids and that Urry always obtained two bids (T.I, 38).
Allen Orwin

testified that both Floyd and Urry told him to always obtain two

bids ("Yes, we always got two bids." T. I, 91). Orwin understood that even
though the two bid policy was unwritten, that it was both required and to be
complied with.

(Ibid.)

^Problems relating to implementing the two bid policy will be reviewed
under the "Discussion" heading hereinafter.
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Importantly, Mr. Urry testified on cross-examination that he knew that he
was to obtain two bids on auto repair work and that he had been told by his
supervisor (Floyd) at different times to obtain two bids:
Q

Isn't it true that Keith Floyd told you on
occasions that you needed to get two bids?

A

Yes.

Q

Was there any question in your mind for accident
repair work that you needed to get two bids?

A

No, what I was told [was] that we needed two bids.

Q

And that had always been what you had been told?

A

Right.

Q

That had never been changea?

A

No.
(T. II, 70)

Indeed, Appellant's presentation at Step 5 was an acknowledgment that he
knew about the two bid policy and he admitted to the phony bid ploy.

(T.I,

10; II, 102, 103).
The testimony of Orwin, Floyd and Urry showed that Motor Pool employees
who were responsible for gathering auto body repair bids had a sufficient
knowledge of the policy either in its original written format (Floyd) or as a
worksite practice or a verbalized rule (Urry and Orwin).
Importantly, the record clearly demonstrates that Appellant intentionally
violated and/or disregarded complying with the competitive aspect of the two
bid policy by manipulating the bidding system when he sent the State auto
repair jobs to his friend Jonesy.

In concert, Jonesy and Appellant

collaborated in the submission of forged bids together with valid bids on at
least 42 Motor Pool repair orders over more than a year.
James Jed Anderson, formerly a service writer and now a service manager at
Freeds, testified that he saw Jonesy fill out bids on Freeds' estimate forms.
Jonesy then asked Anderson to write down the same repair work although on
another shop's form in front of Mr. Urry.

Anderson said that he wrote

spurious bids between three and fifteen times.

(T.I, 120, 119)

Stan Roberts, an estimator and manager at Rick Warner Body Shop, stated
that he had never met Mr. Urry and had not provided body shop repair estimates
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to the Motor Pool during the 1984-1985 period of time-

Roberts stated that

the Rick Warner estimates attached to State warrant requests (Mgt. Exh. #13)
were written on obsolete forms and that the handwriting was neither his nor
his colleague's (i.e., Clark Muir).

(T. I., 146). He did not authorize

anyone else to bid on his forms (T. I., 150). Thus the bids in Mgr. Exh. #13
were forged, according to Roberts.
Gene McNaughton was a manager at Woodco Enterprises during the 1984-85
period under question.

McNaughton identified several Woodco bids that he and

his colleague "Woody" had filled out.

(T. I., 132-34).

However, McNaughton

also identified Woodco bid forms that neither he nor Woody had completed.
These latter bids had been processed by the Motor Pool as bona fide bids (Mgt.
Exh. # 11, 12); although they were not, according to McNaughton.
Keith Roberts, an assistant body shop manager at Streator Chevrolet from
fall of 1984 into January, 1985, acknowledged providing Appellant with "quite
a few" bids that were not on Streator forms. That is, these were so-called
"courtesy" bids written by Roberts on business forms other than Streator1s.
Roberts identified some of these courtesy bids in Mgt. Exh. #12 that he had
completed for Urry (T. I., 183-85).
Urry's co-worker, Allen Orwin, testified that he had witnessed Jonesy
writing bids on someone else's letterheads on several occasions.
observed Woodco forms being used by Jonesy.
given to Urry or Orwin.

(T. I., 81-82).

Orwin

These same forms would then be

Finally, Appellant himself candidly

acknowledged obtaining fake or "courtesy" bids from Jonesy.

(T. II, 57, 68,

76)
Appellant has steadfastly maintained that he was aware of the two bid rule
and acknowledged that he always obtained two bids.

Was it his understanding

that phony or courtesy bids were acceptable within the context of the two bid
policy?

Keith Floyd stated in his March 13, 1985 memo (Mgt. Exh. 7) to the

Finance Division Director that:

"In the past, our division [i.e., Motor Pool]

has obtained two competitive bids per accident and had the vehicle repaired at
the vendor whose bid was lowest."

(Emphasis added.)

Floyd, thus, specified

that it had been a standing Motor Pool practice that each of the two bids be
competitive or bona fide per repair.

Assistant division director Robert

Draper corroborated Floyd's testimony.

( T . I . 29-30).

The evidence in the record is more than sufficient to show that Appellant
committed malfeasance ("Intentional wrong; deliberate violation of law or
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standard; mismanagement of responsibilities."

DPM Rules) and misfeasance

("Performance of a lawful action in an . . . improper manner."

DPM Rules).

Turning to the Ethics Act, Appellant contends that he did not violate
Section 67-16-4(3) of the State Code. The Hearing Officer concluded
otherwise.

(Decision, Conclusion No. 13, p. 9 ) . Section 67-16-4(3) prohibits

a public employee or officer from using one's official position to secure
"special privileges" either for self or others.

Hearing Officer Volker found

that Mr. Urry had breached the just-cited provision when he used his official
position to take State automobiles to his friend Jonesy, first at Freeds then
later at Streators, while knowingly accepting second —

and false —

bids that

were higher than bids officially offered by Jonesy at either business.
(Decision, pp. 9, 13)
Although the term "special privileges" is defined neither within the
Ethics Act nor in Utah case law, the term appears sufficiently plain and
understandable. The purpose of the Ethics Act is to "set forth standards of
conduct" for public officers and employees to serve as a guide for situations
where actual or even potential conflicts of interest may arise between one's
public duties (i.e., Mr. Urry the Motor Pool employee) and one's private
interests (i.e., Mr. Urry the private citizen).
Specifically, did Mr. Urry attempt to use his official position to secure
special privileges for his friend Jonesy?

Appellant told why he took the

Motor Pool's auto repair business to Jonesy at Freeds, then later to Jonesy at
Streators:
Q

Why did you take the business there?

A

Because I liked him.

Q-

Just your friend?

A

Right.

Q

Did you have any intent to benefit Freeds?

A

No.

Q

Is it a fair statement to say that you were
sending the business where your friend was?

A

Yes.

Q

Now Jonesy quit Freeds and moved to Streator's,
is that correct?

[Jonesy]
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A

That's correct*

Q

What happened to the business?

A

It followed.

Q

It followed your friend, didnft it?

A

Right.

Appellant avers that the term "or others" refers only to other public
employees and thus excludes Jonesy.

In our view, "or others11 includes the

entire citizenry of the State, including Walter May, a.k.a. Jonesy.

It is

clear that the Legislature intended to insulate public officers and employees
against granting special privilege to those within government service as well
as to those without.
Appellant suggests that the only harm to the State was that of a rule
violation which itself was not clearly established in the work place.
p. 13)

(Brief,

Yet the "special privileges" standard was breached in the following:

when Jonesy received his Freeds' two per cent and his Streators'
two-and-one-half per cent commissions

on body shop work performed by his

respective employers (the Division asserts that more than $30,000 was paid out
to Jonesy1s employers during the complained of period and hence Jonesy
received his commissions thereon); when two —

and

only two —

body shops

received the bulk, perhaps even all of the State's repair business, of the
Motor Pool's body shop jobs to the detriment of those firms not invited to
submit bids; when State funds were being narrowly channeled to Jonesy's
employers in contravention of the Purchasing Division's intent to ensure
competitive solicitation in matters involving body shop service fees between
$500 - $2,000; and when the State's prescribed competitive bidding procedure
was being circumvented by the Jonesy-Urry friendship.

Appellant's wrongful

actions constituted a serious willful violation of Motor Pool policy.
Appellant's malfeasance, misfeasance and violation of Section 67-16-4(3) of
the Ethics Act warrant his dismissal.

(See Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended

Section 67-16-12.)

CONCLUSIONS:
The Board sustains the Hearing Officer's findings and conclusions
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showing that Appellant was dismissed for just cause.

Management's decision is

not viewed as arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or based upon any
mistake(s) of fact.

Hence, in this appeal it is not the Board's intent or

province to substitute its judgment for that of management's.

Concededly,

management might have imposed a different, even a less severe, penalty.
among Board members, imposition of penalties might vary.

Even

Only if there is

found to be a situation where the facts do not warrant such a penalty or that
a serious abuse of discretion has occurred, should management's penalty be set
aside.

DISCUSSION:
Board Rule 19.8.2 sets forth a standard of review which authorizes the
Board to determine whether a Step 5 decision is warranted by the facts and
circumstances of a case. The facts and circumstances of the Urry appeal
warrant the following discussion:
1. Timing.

It appears entirely coincidental that this entire business of

the Motor Pool's accepting and processing of spurious bids came to light at
all.

For at the approximate time (perhaps during the same month) that Orwin

sparked a "whistleblower" investigation, the Motor Pool implemented the Bloom
and Associates, Inc. firm's procedure of utilizing a single adjuster for
damage claims and discontinued the two bid policy.

Yet rather incredibly the

State (whether at the Department or Division level) failed to discern any
"glitches" in the phony bid process which had lasted over a year.

It is

reasonable to conclude that closer monitoring or periodic auditing would have
detected the pre-selection pattern given the very few firms' bid sheets that
were being processed with the warrant requests.
2.

The Two Bid Policy.

Throughout the Step 5 hearing there was frequent

reference to "the two bid policy" of the Motor Pool.

Yet in retrospect the

requirement that these be competitive bids was not sufficiently stressed by
the Motor Pool manager to Urry or Orwin, nor was that aspect emphasized or
even mentioned in the March 9 and December 1, 1983 memos.

(Mgt. Exh. 8, 6 ) .

Presumably Mr. Floyd, himself, was inadequately trained in the Procurement
Regulations to understand and to demand competitive bids from his staff. The
bidding system used by the Motor Pool was lax, intolerably so. The Motor
Pool's bidding system lacked specificity:
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it contained numerous exceptions,

it permitted telephone solicitation bids without setting any basic
requirements, it failed to stress the need for authentic competitive bids and
it failed to provide adequate instructions and/or training to staff, thus
supporting Appellant's counsel's claim that insufficient training was provided
(not that much training is necessary in order to secure two legitimate bids).
3.

Industry Practice.

One of Appellant's arguments in his own defense

was that "courtesy" bids are a commonplace feature of the insurance/auto
repair industry.
T . I , 184, 191-2).

Indeed, one Division witness so testified.

(Keith Roberts,

Despite an industry-wide practice, however, the State,

through its officers and employees, may reasonably expect that bids are to be
valid and competitive where private entrepreneurs are invited, pursuant to
rules and official policies, to submit bids.

Often large sums of State funds

are involved in governmental purchases and the public rightfully expects its
tax dollars to be carefully and properly spent and spent pursuant to the
State's rules and policies.
4.
Urry:

Application Failures. The circle of culpability extended beyond Mr.
Orwin testified that Floyd as well as Urry told him to "Go down and get

some bids from Jones."

(T.I, 92, 78, 107); the bids from Urry and Orwin

always went to Floyd ( T . I , 92); since Floyd received all bids he should have
realized that Urry was not properly soliciting competitive bids, but he seems
to not have questioned Urry's numerous bids received from Jonesy; rather Floyd
condoned the Motor Pool's defective bidding system, by directing his staff to
solicit bids from Jonesy even though Freeds and Streators had each received a
long run on the State's repair business directly concomitant to Jonesy's
employment. To some extent Urry was following Floyd's instructions by taking
the Motor Pool business to Jonesy; although Mr. Urry must be held accountable
for improper conduct in actually obtaining spurious bids.
In sum, the Motor Pool bidding system was slack to the point of being
critically defective; and it functioned with inadequate supervision over the
solicitation process resulting in a system which deteriorated into a mere
formality rather than serving as an earnest process.

Hence, while Mr. Urry's

dismissal is based upon the principle of just cause and no severe abuse of
discretion occurred, we further conclude that Urry's actions were part of an
overall defective bidding system, a faulty system encompassing more than just
Appellant himself.
Mr. Urry had been a satisfactory State employee for many years prior to
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the events giving rise to this case.

No doubt he has learned from this

experience and presumably would not engage in such conduct in the future.
Therefore, in full consideration of all the facts and circumstances anent the
faulty bidding system, the Board directs Mr. Urry's placement upon the State's
reappointment register to a position for which he qualifies but one in other
than the Motor Pool.

(Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, Section 67-19-25(6).)

All provisions of the Personnel Management Rules and Regulations (1985 ed.)
shall apply to Mr. Urry's placement upon the State's reappointment register as
in the case of any other employee placed upon said register. The period of
time between dismissal and any placement into a future State position shall be
treated as an administrative leave without pay, with no seniority, back pay or
benefits accruing during the interim.

Upon registering at the office of

Personnel Management, Mr. Urry may have his name placed on the State's
reappointment register, if he so desires.

io

DECISION:
The Hearing Officer's decision sustaining Appellant's dismissal at Step 5
is affirmed, except that Appellant shall be placed upon the State's
reappointment register as noted above, provided that Mr. Urry applies to the
Division of Personnel Management within ten working days following receipt of
this decision.

DECISION UNANIMOUS.
DATED

this

/—

day February, 1986.

Peter Fillmore, Chairman
Personnel Review Board

~\Z_Mi~~>i.
Robert N. White, SPHR
Administrator &. Executive Secretary
Personnel Review Board

Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made within 20 calendar days from
issuance of this decision with the District Court for Salt Lake County. On
appeal to District Court, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amenaed,
Section 67-19-25(6).
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M A I L I N G

C E R T I F I C A T E

I certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing DECISION has been
mailed to the following:
Utah

Paul Urry, Appellant, at 9955 South 730 East, Sandy,

84070; to his attorney, Gregory J. Sanders of Kipp & Christian, 600

Commercial Club Building, 32 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111-2765;

to Stephen G. Schwendiman, Assistant Attorney General, legal counsel for the
Department of Administrative Services; and to the following from the
Department of Administrative Services: Gene Findlay, Executive Director;
Scott Lawrence, Director of Central Services; Robert Draper, Deputy Director,
Central Services; Alan Ostler, Manager of Motor Pool; Brian Harris, Director,
Division of Personnel Management and to the Utah Personnel Review Board:
Peter Fillmore, Chairman; Anita C. Bradford; Dalmas H. Nelson, Mary
Graham-Payne, and Jose L. Trujillo.

D A T E D

this

/ ij~L day of February 1986,

Penny G. Wright
Secretary
Personnel Review Board

Any appeal from the Board's decision must be made within 20 calendar days
from issuance of this decision with the District Court for Salt Lake CountyOn appeal to District Court, the Board's findings of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive- Utah Code Ann- Section
67-19-25(6), 1953 as amended.

ADDENDUM M
Utah Admin. Code Rl37-1-21(D)(3) (1994), as cited by Petitioner Moon
has the same language as Utah Admin. Code R137-l-22(4) (1997),
Addendum G to this Brief which was in effect at the time of the hearing.
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M.

Reconsideration.
1.

Section 63-46b-13, Utah Administrative Procedures Act, governs reconsideration requests
to the same hearing officer at step 5.

2.

The written request must contain specific reasons why a reconsideration is warranted with
respect to the factual findings and legal conclusions of the evidentiary/step 5 decision.
The same hearing officer shall decide the propriety of a reconsideration. A request for
reconsideration is filed with the administrator. An appeal to the board for a
reconsideration must be filed with the administrator. Any appeal to the board from a
hearing officer's reconsideration must be filed within ten working days upon receipt of the
reconsideration or within ten working days after expiration of the time for receipt of the
reconsideration.

R137-1-21. The Board and the Appellate Procedure.
A.

B.

C.

Transcript Production. The party appealing the hearing officer's decision to the board at the
appellate/step 6 level shall order production of the evidentiary/step 5 proceeding's transcript
from the court reporter. The appellant shall share an equal payment with the CSRB Office to
the court reporting firm.
1.

Transcript production cost-sharing applies only to the appellant and to the CSRB Office.
The former receives the transcript original; the latter receives a transcript copy.

2.

The respondent may inquire of the CSRB Office about obtaining a transcript copy, or may
directly purchase a copy from the court reporting firm.

Briefs. An appeal hearing before the board is based upon the evidentiary record previously
established by the hearing officer. No additional or new evidence is permitted unless compelled
by the board.
1.

The appellant in a step 6 proceeding must obtain the transcript of the step 5 hearing.
After receipt of the transcript, the appellant has 30 calendar days to file an original and
six copies of a brief with the administrator. Additionally, the respondent must be provided
with a copy of the appellant's brief.

2.

Upon receipt of a copy of the appellant's brief, the respondent then has 30 calendar days
to file an original and six copies of a reply brief with the administrator.

3.

Briefs are distributed to board members upon receipt from both parties.

4.

All briefs shall be hand delivered, sent by the U.S. Postal Service postage prepaid, or sent
through the state's Central Mailing.

5.

Briefs shall be date-stamped upon receipt in the CSRB Office.

6.

The time frame for receiving briefs shall be modified or waived only for good cause as
determined by the administrator.

Rules of Procedure. The following rules are applicable to appeal hearings before the board:
1.

Dismissal of Appeal. Upon a motion by either party or upon its own motion, the board
may dismiss any appeal prior to holding a formal appeal hearing if the appeal is clearly
moot, without merit, not properly filed, or not within the scope of the board's authority.
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D.

2.

Notice. Written notice of the date, time, place, and issues for hearing by the board shall
be given to the aggrieved employee, to the employee's counsel or representative, to the
agency, and to the agency's counsel or representative, at least five days before the date set
for the hearing.

3.

Compelling Evidence. The board may compel evidence in the conduct of its appeals.

4.

Oral Argument/Time Limitation. As a general rule, the board restricts the oral argument
to 30 minutes, or less, per party. The board may grant additional time as it deems
appropriate.

5.

Oral Argument Set Aside. If the board determines that oral argument is unnecessary, the
parties shall be so notified, but they may be expected to appear before the board at the
date, time, and place set to answer any questions raised by the board members.

6.

Argument or Memoranda. Oral argument or written memoranda may be required of the
parties at the board's discretion.

The Board's Standards of Review. The board's standards of review shall be based upon the
following criteria:
1.

The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual findings of the CSRB
hearing officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial evidence standard.
If the board determines that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not
reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board
may, in its discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional factual
findings.

2.

Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing
officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the factual findings based upon the
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then determine whether the CSRB
hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes according to
the correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the evidentiary/step 5
decision of the CSRB hearing officer.

3.

Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing officer,
including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable and rational
based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of relevant policies, rules,
and statutes determined according to the above provisions.

E.

Appeal Hearing Record. The proceeding before the board shall be reported by a certified court
reporter, or in exceptional circumstances by a recording machine.

F.

Appellate Review. Upon a party's application for review of the hearing officer's evidentiary
decision, the board's decision shall be based upon a review of the record, including briefs and
oral arguments presented at step 6, and no further evidentiary hearing will be held unless
otherwise ordered by the board.

G.

Remand. Until the board's decision is final, the board may remand the case to the original
hearing officer to take additional evidence, as appropriate.

H.

Appellate Decisions. The board's decisions shall be issued pursuant to the following rules:
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